On 5/4/2018 11:05 πμ, LEROY Franck via Public wrote:
Hello
“Certificate-based authentication can be used as part of Multifactor
Authentication only if the private key is stored in a Secure Key
Storage Device."
Using a ‘SKSD’ doesn’t mean a 2 factors authentication.
It only guaranties that the private key cannot be duplicated and/or
stolen.
When the SKSD is for example a smartcard under the sole control of a
human being that keeps private the activation secret, then we have 2FA.
When the SKSD is an HSM, most of the time the HSM is accessed
programmatically with a passphrase that is stored in the ‘memories’ of
the server (i.e. RAM, Database, INI file…) or with a software
certificate ;-).
If we take Diginotar as an example, the hacker found the activation
secret of the HSM (thales one) in the RAM of the server and then gain
access to the authenticated PKCS11 API in order to issue certificates.
So we have to make a clear distinction when this is a human being that
uses a GUI to validate a certificate issuance, and when systems
communicate inside a secure zone using authenticated channels.
Best regards
Franck Leroy
Hello Franck,
The NSRs require (2.f) that each individual in a Trusted Role use a
unique credential. The main intent of this ballot is to enforce 2FA for
accessing a Secure Zone from an insecure Zone and for accessing services
(for example "approving the issuance of a Certificate") designated for
Trusted Roles from an insecure Zone.
So, yes, we are referring to individuals in Trusted Role capacity that
would need to have their private key in a FIPS (140-2 L2 overall L3
physical) or EAL4+ certified device, in order for Certificate-based
authentication to be used as 2FA.
Dimitris.
*De :*Public [mailto:[email protected]] *De la part de* Tim
Hollebeek via Public
*Envoyé :* mercredi 28 mars 2018 21:39
*À :* Ryan Sleevi <[email protected]>; CA/Browser Forum Public
Discussion List <[email protected]>
*Objet :* Re: [cabfpub] Ballot 221: Two-Factor Authentication and
Password Improvements
Thank you.
*From:*Ryan Sleevi [mailto:[email protected]]
*Sent:* Wednesday, March 28, 2018 3:29 PM
*To:* Tim Hollebeek <[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>>; CA/Browser Forum Public
Discussion List <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>>
*Subject:* Re: [cabfpub] Ballot 221: Two-Factor Authentication and
Password Improvements
Note, the redline doc doesn't quite align with this ballot text - look
for "Multi-Ffactor" in the doc :)
On Wed, Mar 28, 2018 at 3:25 PM, Tim Hollebeek via Public
<[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
Ballot 221: Two-Factor Authentication and Password Improvements
Purpose of Ballot: The Network Security Working Group met a number
of times to
improve the Network Security Guidelines requirements around
authentication,
specifically by requiring two-factor authentication, and improving
the password
requirements in line with more recent NIST guidelines.
While CAs are encouraged to improve their password requirements as
soon as
possible, a two year grace period is being given to allow
organizations to
develop and implement policies to implement the improved
requirements, especially
since some organizations may have to simultaneously comply with other
compliance frameworks that have not been updated yet and are based
on older NIST
guidance about passwords.
The following motion has been proposed by Tim Hollebeek of
DigiCert and endorsed
by Dimitris Zacharopoulos of Harica and Neil Dunbar of TrustCor.
— MOTION BEGINS –
This ballot modifies the “Network and Certificate System Security
Requirements”
as follows, based upon Version 1.1:
In the definitions, add a definition for Multifactor Authentication:
"Multi-Factor Authentication: An authentication mechanism
consisting of two or
more of the following independent categories of credentials (i.e.
factors) to
verify the user’s identity for a login or other transaction:
something you know
(knowledge factor), something you have (possession factor), and
something you
are (inherence factor). Each factor must be independent.
Certificate-based
authentication can be used as part of Multifactor Authentication
only if the
private key is stored in a Secure Key Storage Device."
Add a definition for Secure Key Storage Device:
"Secure Key Storage Device: A device certified as meeting at least
FIPS 140-2
level 2 overall, level 3 physical, or Common Criteria (EAL 4+)."
In section 1.j., capitalize Multi-Factor Authentication, and
strike the
parenthetical reference to subsection 2.n.(ii).
In section 2.f., add "(for accountability purposes, group accounts
or shared
role credentials SHALL NOT be used)" after "authenticate to
Certificate Systems".
Change section 2.g. to read:
"g. If an authentication control used by a Trusted Role is a
username and password,
then, where technically feasible, implement the following
controls:
i. For accounts that are accessible only within Secure
Zones or High Security
Zones, require that passwords have at least twelve
(12) characters;
ii. For accounts that are accessible from outside a
Secure Zone or High Security
Zone, require Multi-Factor Authentication, with
passwords that have at least
eight (8) characters and are not be one of the
user's previous four (4)
passwords; and implement account lockout for failed
access attempts in
accordance with subsection k;
iii. When developing password policies, CAs SHOULD take
into account the password
guidance in NIST 800-63B Appendix A.
iv. If passwords are required to be changed
periodically, that period SHOULD be
at least two years. Effective April 1, 2020, if
passwords are required to
be changed periodically, that period SHALL be at
least two years."
In section 2.h., change "Require" to "Have a policy that requires"
In section 2.i., change "Configure" to "Have a procedure to configure"
Change section 2.k. to read:
"k. Lockout account access to Certificate Systems after no more
than five (5) failed access attempts, provided that this security
measure:
i. is supported by the Certificate System,
ii. Cannot be leveraged for a denial of service attack, and
iii. does not weaken the security of this authentication
control;"
Change section 2.n. to read:
"Enforce Multi-Factor Authentication for all Trusted Role accounts
on Certificate
Systems (including those approving the issuance of a Certificate,
which equally
applies to Delegated Third Parties) that are accessible from
outside a Secure Zone
or High Security Zone; and”
— MOTION ENDS –
The procedure for approval of this ballot is as follows:
Discussion (7+ days)
Start Time: 2018-03-28 15:30:00 EDT
End Time: after 2018-04-04 15:30:00 EDT
Vote for approval (7 days)
Start Time: TBD
End Time: TBD
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