On 5/4/2018 11:05 πμ, LEROY Franck via Public wrote:


Hello

“Certificate-based authentication can be used as part of Multifactor Authentication only if the private key is stored in a Secure Key Storage Device."

Using a ‘SKSD’ doesn’t mean a 2 factors authentication.

It only guaranties that the private key cannot be duplicated and/or stolen.

When the SKSD is for example a smartcard under the sole control of a human being that keeps private the activation secret, then we have 2FA.

When the SKSD is an HSM, most of the time the HSM is accessed programmatically with a passphrase that is stored in the ‘memories’ of the server (i.e. RAM, Database, INI file…) or with a software certificate ;-).

If we take Diginotar as an example, the hacker found the activation secret of the HSM (thales one) in the RAM of the server and then gain access to the authenticated PKCS11 API in order to issue certificates.

So we have to make a clear distinction when this is a human being that uses a GUI to validate a certificate issuance, and when systems communicate inside a secure zone using authenticated channels.

Best regards

Franck Leroy


Hello Franck,

The NSRs require (2.f) that each individual in a Trusted Role use a unique credential. The main intent of this ballot is to enforce 2FA for accessing a Secure Zone from an insecure Zone and for accessing services (for example "approving the issuance of a Certificate") designated for Trusted Roles from an insecure Zone.

So, yes, we are referring to individuals in Trusted Role capacity that would need to have their private key in a FIPS (140-2 L2 overall L3 physical) or EAL4+ certified device, in order for Certificate-based authentication to be used as 2FA.


Dimitris.

*De :*Public [mailto:public-boun...@cabforum.org] *De la part de* Tim Hollebeek via Public
*Envoyé :* mercredi 28 mars 2018 21:39
*À :* Ryan Sleevi <sle...@google.com>; CA/Browser Forum Public Discussion List <public@cabforum.org> *Objet :* Re: [cabfpub] Ballot 221: Two-Factor Authentication and Password Improvements

Thank you.

*From:*Ryan Sleevi [mailto:sle...@google.com]
*Sent:* Wednesday, March 28, 2018 3:29 PM
*To:* Tim Hollebeek <tim.holleb...@digicert.com <mailto:tim.holleb...@digicert.com>>; CA/Browser Forum Public Discussion List <public@cabforum.org <mailto:public@cabforum.org>> *Subject:* Re: [cabfpub] Ballot 221: Two-Factor Authentication and Password Improvements

Note, the redline doc doesn't quite align with this ballot text - look for "Multi-Ffactor" in the doc :)

On Wed, Mar 28, 2018 at 3:25 PM, Tim Hollebeek via Public <public@cabforum.org <mailto:public@cabforum.org>> wrote:

    Ballot 221: Two-Factor Authentication and Password Improvements

    Purpose of Ballot: The Network Security Working Group met a number
    of times to

    improve the Network Security Guidelines requirements around
    authentication,

    specifically by requiring two-factor authentication, and improving
    the password

    requirements in line with more recent NIST guidelines.

    While CAs are encouraged to improve their password requirements as
    soon as

    possible, a two year grace period is being given to allow
    organizations to

    develop and implement policies to implement the improved
    requirements, especially

    since some organizations may have to simultaneously comply with other

    compliance frameworks that have not been updated yet and are based
    on older NIST

    guidance about passwords.

    The following motion has been proposed by Tim Hollebeek of
    DigiCert and endorsed

    by Dimitris Zacharopoulos of Harica and Neil Dunbar of TrustCor.

    — MOTION BEGINS –

    This ballot modifies the “Network and Certificate System Security
    Requirements”

    as follows, based upon Version 1.1:

    In the definitions, add a definition for Multifactor Authentication:

    "Multi-Factor Authentication: An authentication mechanism
    consisting of two or

    more of the following independent categories of credentials (i.e.
    factors) to

    verify the user’s identity for a login or other transaction:
    something you know

    (knowledge factor), something you have (possession factor), and
    something you

    are (inherence factor).  Each factor must be independent. 
    Certificate-based

    authentication can be used as part of Multifactor Authentication
    only if the

    private key is stored in a Secure Key Storage Device."

    Add a definition for Secure Key Storage Device:

    "Secure Key Storage Device: A device certified as meeting at least
    FIPS 140-2

    level 2 overall, level 3 physical, or Common Criteria (EAL 4+)."

    In section 1.j., capitalize Multi-Factor Authentication, and
    strike the

    parenthetical reference to subsection 2.n.(ii).

    In section 2.f., add "(for accountability purposes, group accounts
    or shared

    role credentials SHALL NOT be used)" after "authenticate to
    Certificate Systems".

    Change section 2.g. to read:

    "g. If an authentication control used by a Trusted Role is a
    username and password,

        then, where technically feasible, implement the following
    controls:

      i.           For accounts that are accessible only within Secure
    Zones or High Security

                   Zones, require that passwords have at least twelve
    (12) characters;

      ii.          For accounts that are accessible from outside a
    Secure Zone or High Security

                   Zone, require Multi-Factor Authentication, with
    passwords that have at least

                   eight (8) characters and are not be one of the
    user's previous four (4)

                   passwords; and implement account lockout for failed
    access attempts in

                   accordance with subsection k;

      iii.        When developing password policies, CAs SHOULD take
    into account the password

                   guidance in NIST 800-63B Appendix A.

      iv.         If passwords are required to be changed
    periodically, that period SHOULD be

                   at least two years. Effective April 1, 2020, if
    passwords are required to

                   be changed periodically, that period SHALL be at
    least two years."

    In section 2.h., change "Require" to "Have a policy that requires"

    In section 2.i., change "Configure" to "Have a procedure to configure"

    Change section 2.k. to read:

    "k. Lockout account access to Certificate Systems after no more
    than five (5) failed access attempts, provided that this security
    measure:

      i.           is supported by the Certificate System,

      ii.          Cannot be leveraged for a denial of service attack, and

      iii.        does not weaken the security of this authentication
    control;"

    Change section 2.n. to read:

    "Enforce Multi-Factor Authentication for all Trusted Role accounts
    on Certificate

    Systems (including those approving the issuance of a Certificate,
    which equally

    applies to Delegated Third Parties) that are accessible from
    outside a Secure Zone

    or High Security Zone; and”

    — MOTION ENDS –

    The procedure for approval of this ballot is as follows:

    Discussion (7+ days)

    Start Time: 2018-03-28  15:30:00 EDT

    End Time: after 2018-04-04 15:30:00 EDT

    Vote for approval (7 days)

    Start Time: TBD

    End Time: TBD


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