On 5/4/2018 11:05 πμ, LEROY Franck via Public wrote:
“Certificate-based authentication can be used as part of Multifactor
Authentication only if the private key is stored in a Secure Key
Using a ‘SKSD’ doesn’t mean a 2 factors authentication.
It only guaranties that the private key cannot be duplicated and/or
When the SKSD is for example a smartcard under the sole control of a
human being that keeps private the activation secret, then we have 2FA.
When the SKSD is an HSM, most of the time the HSM is accessed
programmatically with a passphrase that is stored in the ‘memories’ of
the server (i.e. RAM, Database, INI file…) or with a software
If we take Diginotar as an example, the hacker found the activation
secret of the HSM (thales one) in the RAM of the server and then gain
access to the authenticated PKCS11 API in order to issue certificates.
So we have to make a clear distinction when this is a human being that
uses a GUI to validate a certificate issuance, and when systems
communicate inside a secure zone using authenticated channels.
The NSRs require (2.f) that each individual in a Trusted Role use a
unique credential. The main intent of this ballot is to enforce 2FA for
accessing a Secure Zone from an insecure Zone and for accessing services
(for example "approving the issuance of a Certificate") designated for
Trusted Roles from an insecure Zone.
So, yes, we are referring to individuals in Trusted Role capacity that
would need to have their private key in a FIPS (140-2 L2 overall L3
physical) or EAL4+ certified device, in order for Certificate-based
authentication to be used as 2FA.
*De :*Public [mailto:public-boun...@cabforum.org] *De la part de* Tim
Hollebeek via Public
*Envoyé :* mercredi 28 mars 2018 21:39
*À :* Ryan Sleevi <sle...@google.com>; CA/Browser Forum Public
Discussion List <firstname.lastname@example.org>
*Objet :* Re: [cabfpub] Ballot 221: Two-Factor Authentication and
*From:*Ryan Sleevi [mailto:sle...@google.com]
*Sent:* Wednesday, March 28, 2018 3:29 PM
*To:* Tim Hollebeek <tim.holleb...@digicert.com
<mailto:tim.holleb...@digicert.com>>; CA/Browser Forum Public
Discussion List <email@example.com <mailto:firstname.lastname@example.org>>
*Subject:* Re: [cabfpub] Ballot 221: Two-Factor Authentication and
Note, the redline doc doesn't quite align with this ballot text - look
for "Multi-Ffactor" in the doc :)
On Wed, Mar 28, 2018 at 3:25 PM, Tim Hollebeek via Public
<email@example.com <mailto:firstname.lastname@example.org>> wrote:
Ballot 221: Two-Factor Authentication and Password Improvements
Purpose of Ballot: The Network Security Working Group met a number
of times to
improve the Network Security Guidelines requirements around
specifically by requiring two-factor authentication, and improving
requirements in line with more recent NIST guidelines.
While CAs are encouraged to improve their password requirements as
possible, a two year grace period is being given to allow
develop and implement policies to implement the improved
since some organizations may have to simultaneously comply with other
compliance frameworks that have not been updated yet and are based
on older NIST
guidance about passwords.
The following motion has been proposed by Tim Hollebeek of
DigiCert and endorsed
by Dimitris Zacharopoulos of Harica and Neil Dunbar of TrustCor.
— MOTION BEGINS –
This ballot modifies the “Network and Certificate System Security
as follows, based upon Version 1.1:
In the definitions, add a definition for Multifactor Authentication:
"Multi-Factor Authentication: An authentication mechanism
consisting of two or
more of the following independent categories of credentials (i.e.
verify the user’s identity for a login or other transaction:
something you know
(knowledge factor), something you have (possession factor), and
are (inherence factor). Each factor must be independent.
authentication can be used as part of Multifactor Authentication
only if the
private key is stored in a Secure Key Storage Device."
Add a definition for Secure Key Storage Device:
"Secure Key Storage Device: A device certified as meeting at least
level 2 overall, level 3 physical, or Common Criteria (EAL 4+)."
In section 1.j., capitalize Multi-Factor Authentication, and
parenthetical reference to subsection 2.n.(ii).
In section 2.f., add "(for accountability purposes, group accounts
role credentials SHALL NOT be used)" after "authenticate to
Change section 2.g. to read:
"g. If an authentication control used by a Trusted Role is a
username and password,
then, where technically feasible, implement the following
i. For accounts that are accessible only within Secure
Zones or High Security
Zones, require that passwords have at least twelve
ii. For accounts that are accessible from outside a
Secure Zone or High Security
Zone, require Multi-Factor Authentication, with
passwords that have at least
eight (8) characters and are not be one of the
user's previous four (4)
passwords; and implement account lockout for failed
access attempts in
accordance with subsection k;
iii. When developing password policies, CAs SHOULD take
into account the password
guidance in NIST 800-63B Appendix A.
iv. If passwords are required to be changed
periodically, that period SHOULD be
at least two years. Effective April 1, 2020, if
passwords are required to
be changed periodically, that period SHALL be at
least two years."
In section 2.h., change "Require" to "Have a policy that requires"
In section 2.i., change "Configure" to "Have a procedure to configure"
Change section 2.k. to read:
"k. Lockout account access to Certificate Systems after no more
than five (5) failed access attempts, provided that this security
i. is supported by the Certificate System,
ii. Cannot be leveraged for a denial of service attack, and
iii. does not weaken the security of this authentication
Change section 2.n. to read:
"Enforce Multi-Factor Authentication for all Trusted Role accounts
Systems (including those approving the issuance of a Certificate,
applies to Delegated Third Parties) that are accessible from
outside a Secure Zone
or High Security Zone; and”
— MOTION ENDS –
The procedure for approval of this ballot is as follows:
Discussion (7+ days)
Start Time: 2018-03-28 15:30:00 EDT
End Time: after 2018-04-04 15:30:00 EDT
Vote for approval (7 days)
Start Time: TBD
End Time: TBD
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