I agree mixing ClientAuth and S/MIME is a bad idea.

 

NetSec is needed by all WGs.  It’s not getting removed.  Hopefully all WGs will 
try to to keep their versions and effective dates in sync, to prevent audit 
pains.  As we’ve discussed several times, the NetSec legacy WG is probably 
going to convert itself into a top level WG.  It will the approve documents 
that can be incorporated by other WGs by reference.  Or just used in 
conjunction with other WG products.

 

Identity and validation is another important cross-cutting concern.  It isn’t a 
“pet marketing product”.

 

-Tim

 

From: Public [mailto:[email protected]] On Behalf Of Ryan Sleevi via 
Public
Sent: Friday, May 18, 2018 9:18 AM
To: Dimitris Zacharopoulos <[email protected]>; CA/Browser Forum Public 
Discussion List <[email protected]>
Subject: Re: [cabfpub] For Discussion: S/MIME Working Group Charter

 

 

 

On Fri, May 18, 2018 at 12:57 AM, Dimitris Zacharopoulos via Public 
<[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]> > wrote:

 

On 18/5/2018 2:51 πμ, Ryan Sleevi via Public wrote:

I don't think it's a cross-EKU situation, though, but I'm glad we're in 
agreement. 

 

An email server certificate is an id-kp-serverAuth EKU. That's already covered 
by another WG


I sincerely hope that id-kp-clientAuth EKU will also be covered by this WG 
since there will be common validation requirements for Subject information, as 
with S/MIME. It seems too much overhead to spawn an entirely different WG to 
deal just with clientAuth.

If people agree, how about using the name "Client and S/MIME Certificate WG" 
which seems aligned with the "Server Certificate WG"?

 

As I've mentioned several times, it would be good to actually focus on a 
constrained, defined problem, before you proverbially try to boil the ocean.

 

It is not obvious that there will be common validation requirements, because 
the id-kp-clientAuth situation has a vast dimension of possible uses and 
spectrum. It's not actually reflective of the deployed reality that the 
validation requirements are the same. It also is based on an entirely separate 
notion of identity.

 

So no, I don't agree, because they really are substantially different in 
deployed reality - and an S/MIME WG is, in itself, a sizable undertaking just 
to get S/MIME BRs, due to the broad spectrum of client capabilities and CA 
past-practices - and the lifetime of extant certificates that presents unique 
challenges to defining a sensible and realistic profile.

 

A good charter - one that leads to productive engagement from a broad set of 
participants while actually delivering meaningful improvements - is one that 
keeps itself narrowly focused on the task at hand, produces results, and then 
looks to recharter based on the things you knew were out there, but agreed not 
to discuss until you actually completed the work. That allows you to keep 
momentum, focus, and participation. Just look at the challenges each of our 
(legacy) WG has faced with a broad remit, in that the set of topics has made it 
difficult both to engage participation of the broader Forum and to actually 
make forward progress, because it's constantly having to deal with 'all these 
things' or trying to do 'all these things'.

 

When we see narrowly focused ballots and efforts that try to solve a specific 
set of problems, then we make progress. The validation WG's effort at 3.2.2.4 
is a prime example of that - a prolonged effort that directly benefited from 
being focused on that problem, and ruling some things (like 3.2.2.5) out of 
scope of the discussion in order to make progress on the narrow set.

 

The same too is in the charter. Let's not try to encompass pet marketing 
projects (EV for S/MIME), "things we might need but we don't know why" (network 
security), or "things that are kinda related, but only in some domains" 
(id-kp-clientAuth). Let's focus on the problem at hand - S/MIME authentication 
- keeping the WG scoped narrowly and on task, and deliver something that can 
help users have faith in the Web PKI to deliver tangible benefits in that 
space, rather than the reality we have today.

Attachment: smime.p7s
Description: S/MIME cryptographic signature

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