I'm not sure. Misuse defines what it's not, while allowing for a whole host of things which it is. If it's defined as the antonym, and we defined that particular function or use, then that would forbid any uses not covered - probably not what is intended.
On Fri, Jun 8, 2018 at 5:36 AM, Moudrick M. Dadashov via Public < [email protected]> wrote: > Would it help if we define its antonym e.g. "designed for or capable of a > particular function or use"? > > Thanks, > M.D. > > > > On 2018-06-07 17:32, Ryan Sleevi via Public wrote: > >> On Thu, Jun 7, 2018 at 10:24 AM, Geoff Keating <[email protected]> >> wrote: >> >> On Jun 7, 2018, at 1:40 PM, Ryan Sleevi via Public >>>> >>> <[email protected]> wrote: >>> >>>> >>>> In the pursuit of a definition, we tried to work backwards - what >>>> >>> are situations we think are misuse. >>> >>> The dictionary definition of ‘misuse’ is: >>> >>> use (something) in the wrong way or for the wrong purpose >>> >> >> I'm not sure how this helps us move forward - were you suggesting that >> 4.9.1.1 would read: >> >> 4. The CA obtains evidence that the Certificate was used for the wrong >> way or for the wrong purpose; >> >> With such a definition, this supposes there's a right way or right >> purpose. >> >> 1) Do you believe the right purpose is wholly reflecting in the >> Subscriber Agreement or Terms of Use? >> 2) Do you believe the right way is wholly reflected in the definition >> I provided (from 1.1), that the right way is "used for authenticating >> servers accessible through the Internet" >> >> >> Another suggestion was that it involved scenarios where the >>>> >>> Subscriber private key was in an HSM, and itself was not >>> compromised, but had signed things it was not expected to. This >>> wasn't elaborated on further - so I'm uncertain if this meant things >>> other than the TLS handshake transcript - but this is already met by >>> our definition of Key Compromise in 1.6.1, that is: >>> >>>> ""A Private Key is said to be compromised if its value has been >>>> >>> disclosed to an >>> >>>> unauthorized person, an unauthorized person has had access >>>> >>> to it, or there exists a >>> >>>> practical technique by which an unauthorized person may >>>> >>> discover its value. “"" >>> >>> If a key is in a HSM and not exportable, then its value is not >>> disclosed, nor does an unauthorized person have access *to the >>> key*. Dictionary definition of ‘access’ is 'obtain, examine, >>> or retrieve’ none of which apply here. So it is not covered by >>> Key Compromise. >>> >> >> I'm not sure - what are you providing an example of? I would think >> that, say, generating a signed message that was not authorized, then >> "an unauthorized person has access to it". Perhaps you could help me >> understand this misuse - is it that the signature was authorized and >> was directed to sign something that they didn't want to do? >> _______________________________________________ >> Public mailing list >> [email protected] >> https://cabforum.org/mailman/listinfo/public >> > _______________________________________________ > Public mailing list > [email protected] > https://cabforum.org/mailman/listinfo/public >
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