Il 08/06/2018 11:52, Ryan Sleevi via Public ha scritto:
I'm not sure. Misuse defines what it's not, while allowing for a whole host of things which it is. If it's defined as the antonym, and we defined that particular function or use, then that would forbid any uses not covered - probably not what is intended.On Fri, Jun 8, 2018 at 5:36 AM, Moudrick M. Dadashov via Public <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:Would it help if we define its antonym e.g. "designed for or capable of a particular function or use"? Thanks, M.D. On 2018-06-07 17:32, Ryan Sleevi via Public wrote: On Thu, Jun 7, 2018 at 10:24 AM, Geoff Keating <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: On Jun 7, 2018, at 1:40 PM, Ryan Sleevi via Public <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: In the pursuit of a definition, we tried to work backwards - what are situations we think are misuse. The dictionary definition of ‘misuse’ is: use (something) in the wrong way or for the wrong purpose I'm not sure how this helps us move forward - were you suggesting that 4.9.1.1 would read: 4. The CA obtains evidence that the Certificate was used for the wrong way or for the wrong purpose; With such a definition, this supposes there's a right way or right purpose. 1) Do you believe the right purpose is wholly reflecting in the Subscriber Agreement or Terms of Use? 2) Do you believe the right way is wholly reflected in the definition I provided (from 1.1), that the right way is "used for authenticating servers accessible through the Internet" Another suggestion was that it involved scenarios where the Subscriber private key was in an HSM, and itself was not compromised, but had signed things it was not expected to. This wasn't elaborated on further - so I'm uncertain if this meant things other than the TLS handshake transcript - but this is already met by our definition of Key Compromise in 1.6.1, that is: ""A Private Key is said to be compromised if its value has been disclosed to an unauthorized person, an unauthorized person has had access to it, or there exists a practical technique by which an unauthorized person may discover its value. “"" If a key is in a HSM and not exportable, then its value is not disclosed, nor does an unauthorized person have access *to the key*. Dictionary definition of ‘access’ is 'obtain, examine, or retrieve’ none of which apply here. So it is not covered by Key Compromise. I'm not sure - what are you providing an example of? I would think that, say, generating a signed message that was not authorized, then "an unauthorized person has access to it". Perhaps you could help me understand this misuse - is it that the signature was authorized and was directed to sign something that they didn't want to do? _______________________________________________ Public mailing list [email protected] <mailto:[email protected]> https://cabforum.org/mailman/listinfo/public <https://cabforum.org/mailman/listinfo/public> _______________________________________________ Public mailing list [email protected] <mailto:[email protected]> https://cabforum.org/mailman/listinfo/public <https://cabforum.org/mailman/listinfo/public> _______________________________________________ Public mailing list [email protected] https://cabforum.org/mailman/listinfo/public
smime.p7s
Description: Firma crittografica S/MIME
_______________________________________________ Public mailing list [email protected] https://cabforum.org/mailman/listinfo/public
