Lack of evidence sometimes, to provide notice others. Sometimes its getting ahold of the person requesting revocation for some reason. Here are the reasons and some of the things we’ve seen. Sometimes we can tell just by looking but a lot of allegations we get involve a more thorough investigation:
1. The Subscriber requests in writing that the CA revoke the Certificate; - Need to contact the subscriber to confirm this was indeed requested. Sometimes these just come through a general alias so figuring out if it was the subscriber takes a bit of work. 2. The Subscriber notifies the CA that the original certificate request was not authorized and does not retroactively grant authorization; - Again, need to contact the subscriber to confirm. Especially if this was alleged somewhere on a website rather than the through the designated channels. 3. The CA obtains evidence that the Subscriber’s Private Key corresponding to the Public Key in the Certificate suffered a Key Compromise or no longer complies with the requirements of Sections 6.1.5 and 6.1.6; - TBH, this one is the easiest to confirm as it requires evidence of the key compromise. Investigations on this one are doable in a shorter time period. 4. The CA obtains evidence that the Certificate was misused; - Misuse depends on the circumstances. Usually requires investigation about the use with the subscriber. 5. The CA is made aware that a Subscriber has violated one or more of its material obligations under the Subscriber Agreement or Terms of Use; - Again, requires investigation on what is actually being done. What section did they breach? Usually this involves legal on both sides and is a pain in the butt. It never concludes within 24 hours (or even 5 days). 6. The CA is made aware of any circumstance indicating that use of a Fully-Qualified Domain Name or IP address in the Certificate is no longer legally permitted (e.g. a court or arbitrator has revoked a Domain Name Registrant’s right to use the Domain Name, a relevant licensing or services agreement between the Domain Name Registrant and the Applicant has terminated, or the Domain Name Registrant has failed to renew the Domain Name); - Requires confirmation with the court/licensing service. If this is a registrar, expect a super long response time. 7 days would be a boon. 7. The CA is made aware that a Wildcard Certificate has been used to authenticate a fraudulently misleading subordinate Fully-Qualified Domain Name; - Requires involvement of the subscriber to see what happened. 8. The CA is made aware of a material change in the information contained in the Certificate; - We’re made aware of this a lot (change in name, address, etc). Usually it requires investigation with a government entity or with the company itself. 9. The CA is made aware that the Certificate was not issued in accordance with these Requirements or the CA’s Certificate Policy or Certification Practice Statement; - Often straight-forward but sometimes it can involve a good deal of investigation into logs. This one usually doesn’t take us more than a couple of hours though. 10. The CA determines that any of the information appearing in the Certificate is inaccurate or misleading; - This is hard one to determine sometimes but it doesn’t often involve the customer. 11. The CA ceases operations for any reason and has not made arrangements for another CA to provide revocation support for the Certificate; - Never see this happen 12. The CA’s right to issue Certificates under these Requirements expires or is revoked or terminated, unless the CA has made arrangements to continue maintaining the CRL/OCSP Repository; - Sort of happened with Symantec. However they made arrangements to continue maintaining the repository. 13. The CA is made aware of a possible compromise of the Private Key of the Subordinate CA used for issuing the Certificate; - This hasn’t happened in my experience 14. Revocation is required by the CA’s Certificate Policy and/or Certification Practice Statement; or - I don’t know of any CPS that goes beyond these requirements for TLS certs. 15. The technical content or format of the Certificate presents an unacceptable risk to Application Software Suppliers or Relying Parties (e.g. the CA/Browser Forum might determine that a deprecated cryptographic/signature algorithm or key size presents an unacceptable risk and that such Certificates should be revoked and replaced by CAs within a given period of time). - This one isn’t an issue either. By the time something passes with the BRs, every CA is well aware of the need to migrate. From: Ryan Sleevi <sle...@google.com> Sent: Tuesday, August 21, 2018 1:44 PM To: Jeremy Rowley <jeremy.row...@digicert.com> Cc: CABFPub <public@cabforum.org>; Bruce Morton <bruce.mor...@entrustdatacard.com>; servercert...@cabforum.org Subject: Re: [cabfpub] [Servercert-wg] [EXTERNAL]Re: Ballot SC6 - Revocation Timeline Extension This is where the reporting bit came in. Responses inline. On Tue, Aug 21, 2018 at 2:19 PM Jeremy Rowley <jeremy.row...@digicert.com <mailto:jeremy.row...@digicert.com> > wrote: I’m surprised no one has given any examples yet. There are a lot of them if you go through the revocation requests: 1. Certs reported on a long weekend where we can’t reach anyone at the organization. You’re looking at 4 days there in the US sometimes. Outside of the US there can be up to a week or so where response are difficult (especially in Europe and China) I think it's worth understanding why it's important/necessary to obtain contact with the organization. Is it because you lack evidence, or to provide notice? I think there's a significant difference between these two. 1. 2. See the Blizzard cert that we had to revoke. (Although this mixes investigation with revocation timelines) Right, I'm aware of what you're referencing, but I'm not sure I see how it relates. Could you elaborate on what you see here? I thought the investigation was fairly cut and dry. 1. 2. Sometimes we get requests for revocation through third parties alleging key compromise without proof. Takes a while for them to generate a CSR and send it over. Sure, but don't you think it's fair to say the CA hasn't obtained evidence of revocation? And if the reporter disagrees with the CA's assessment (about whether the evidence constitutes proof of compromise), they at least have a response from the CA's investigation and determination that they can then discuss, and understand publicly whether the CA's made a mistake in that assessment, and how to improve the controls around that. 1. 2. Emails about cert misuse on sites that contain wares or similar items can take 7 days to figure out whether it is indeed phishing or something similar. A solution there is don't revoke certs for content ;) 1. I’d have to dig out the exact emails on each off these to send over, but 7 days for investigation is pretty short unless we get a copy of the private key in the first go-around from the reporting entity. From: Public <public-boun...@cabforum.org <mailto:public-boun...@cabforum.org> > On Behalf Of Ryan Sleevi via Public Sent: Tuesday, August 21, 2018 11:08 AM To: Bruce Morton <bruce.mor...@entrustdatacard.com <mailto:bruce.mor...@entrustdatacard.com> >; servercert...@cabforum.org <mailto:servercert...@cabforum.org> Cc: CABFPub <public@cabforum.org <mailto:public@cabforum.org> > Subject: Re: [cabfpub] [Servercert-wg] [EXTERNAL]Re: Ballot SC6 - Revocation Timeline Extension On Tue, Aug 21, 2018 at 1:01 PM Bruce Morton via Servercert-wg <servercert...@cabforum.org <mailto:servercert...@cabforum.org> > wrote: Per Mike’s items: 1. 7 days would be preferable as this would provide a “business week” for the CA to investigate the issue. It will also provide 2 extra days to have reach and discuss the issue with the Reporter and the Subscriber. As Mike summarized correctly, Google felt and feels that 7 days is too long. We repeatedly asked for specific examples and details of where the additional time would be valuable, and to date, no CA has provided them. We had previously proposed that anything longer should require a mandatory public, unredacted incident report from the CA, and the concession to avoid such a requirement was to find a balance, while also ensuring that CAs were gathering and collecting concrete reports to provide that. 2. Given the examples for unacceptable risk, I would assume that this item would have a deadline set in the BRs. We have done this before with non-registered domain name certificates. So if the certificate has not been revoked by the deadline, then it must be revoked immediately. As such, perhaps this requirement should be better defined and also moved to the 24 hour section. 3. I do agree that the CA should work with both the Reporter and the Subscriber; however, please note that the investigation may mean that the certificate will not be revoked. Also, having a preliminary report within 24 hours may not be feasible to have a report with substantial substance as there may not be time to discuss with the Subscriber. I do suggest that within 24 hours the CA should advise the Reporter and the Subscriber that an investigation has started which may result in the certificate being revoked. I don't think this is something we'd agree on. As noted above, our goal is to improve the transparency. There are some who've said that the best solution to these issues is to know what it's like by going to work for a CA. Absent changing employers, the next best thing is going to be to improve the transparency of the ecosystem, which will improve the trust overall. CAs are already required to conduct their activities within 24 hours - this doesn't relax that particular item, but allows them to make it available as a report, while offering greater flexibility. That seems a meaningful compromise to balance the need for transparency while providing CAs and Subscribers some degree of flexibility. Thanks, Bruce. From: Servercert-wg [mailto:servercert-wg-boun...@cabforum.org <mailto:servercert-wg-boun...@cabforum.org> ] On Behalf Of Mike Reilly (GRC) via Servercert-wg Sent: August 21, 2018 12:17 PM To: Doug Beattie <doug.beat...@globalsign.com <mailto:doug.beat...@globalsign.com> >; CA/B Forum Server Certificate WG Public Discussion List <servercert...@cabforum.org <mailto:servercert...@cabforum.org> >; Tim Hollebeek <tim.holleb...@digicert.com <mailto:tim.holleb...@digicert.com> >; Wayne Thayer <wtha...@mozilla.com <mailto:wtha...@mozilla.com> > Cc: CA/Browser Forum Public Discussion List <public@cabforum.org <mailto:public@cabforum.org> > Subject: [EXTERNAL]Re: [Servercert-wg] [cabfpub] Ballot SC6 - Revocation Timeline Extension Hi all. Some areas of clarification requested from the Microsoft team: * I don’t remember why 5 days was chosen vs. 7 or 3 days. I believe it was we felt 7 days was too long but 5 days was reasonable. I believe we also considered the scenario where an incident occurs on a Friday evening of a three day weekend and the difficulty of the CA dealing with a subscriber who may be unavailable over a weekend for a non-urgent revocation requirement. 5 days covered that scenario without being too far past 24 hours. 3 days was felt to be too short and 7 days seemed too long. Correct? * Regarding point 11. Will this "given period of time" means up to 5 days as well? Point 11 reads: “The technical content or format of the Certificate presents an unacceptable risk to Application Software Suppliers or Relying Parties (e.g. the CA/Browser Forum might determine that a deprecated cryptographic/signature algorithm or key size presents an unacceptable risk and that such Certificates should be revoked and replaced by CAs within a given period of time)” * There is also a bit of confusion about the following statement as it is still governed by the 5 day requirement so we’re not sure why it’s called out this way. “Within 24 hours of receiving a problem report, the CA is now required to report back to both the entity reporting the problem and the Subscriber on the CA's findings, and to work with the reporter to establish a date by which the CA will revoke the certificate.” Should this be clarified to include both the reporter and the Subscriber included in both steps to reduce potential impact to relying parties. Perhaps add more clarification in this statement: * Report back the findings to reporter and the Subscriber within 24 hours * Work with the reporter and the Subscriber to revoke within 5 days Thanks, Mike From: Servercert-wg <servercert-wg-boun...@cabforum.org <mailto:servercert-wg-boun...@cabforum.org> > On Behalf Of Doug Beattie via Servercert-wg Sent: Monday, August 20, 2018 1:43 PM To: Tim Hollebeek <tim.holleb...@digicert.com <mailto:tim.holleb...@digicert.com> >; CA/B Forum Server Certificate WG Public Discussion List <servercert...@cabforum.org <mailto:servercert...@cabforum.org> >; Wayne Thayer <wtha...@mozilla.com <mailto:wtha...@mozilla.com> > Cc: CA/Browser Forum Public Discussion List <public@cabforum.org <mailto:public@cabforum.org> > Subject: Re: [Servercert-wg] [cabfpub] Ballot SC6 - Revocation Timeline Extension Tim, I agree that Vulnerability is different from key compromise and the actions we take should reflect that and I think we should try to keep 12 and 13 type events in the 5-day list. Is our strategy to have vulnerabilities fall into the 5 day list and exploited vulnerabilities fall into the 24 hour list? Key Compromise: A Private Key is said to be compromised if: 1) its value has been disclosed to an unauthorized person 2) an unauthorized person has had access to the private keys 3) a vulnerability has been exploited to disclose private keys And the remainder of the definition can be removed because those are examples of vulnerabilities being exploited ( Debian weak and poor key generation). If we want a list of possible vulnerabilities or bad practices, then we can put in an appendix. I think #13 is a special case of #12 (both vulnerabilities), so I still recommend removing it. Is the distribution of a private key in in a software package any different than the distribution of a private key in any other (insecure) method? Here’s what I’d recommend: a) Use the new definition I listed above b) change: 12. The CA is made aware of a vulnerability that exposes the Subscriber's Private Key to compromise; or to 12. The CA is made aware of a vulnerability that has been exploited to disclose the Subscriber's Private Key; or c) Delete #13 Doug From: Servercert-wg <servercert-wg-boun...@cabforum.org <mailto:servercert-wg-boun...@cabforum.org> > On Behalf Of Tim Hollebeek via Servercert-wg Sent: Monday, August 20, 2018 3:57 PM To: Wayne Thayer <wtha...@mozilla.com <mailto:wtha...@mozilla.com> >; CA/B Forum Server Certificate WG Public Discussion List <servercert...@cabforum.org <mailto:servercert...@cabforum.org> > Cc: CA/Browser Forum Public Discussion List <public@cabforum.org <mailto:public@cabforum.org> > Subject: Re: [Servercert-wg] [cabfpub] Ballot SC6 - Revocation Timeline Extension Vulnerability is different from key compromise. Replacing all the heartbleed certificates within 24 hours would have been a huge fire drill. It’s important to get them replaced as quickly as possible, but mandatory revocations within 24 hours is going to make things worse, not better. There are potential mitigating factors for a vulnerability. For example, the technical details may not be publicly known yet, or there may be no public exploit available yet. The vulnerability might not affect all OS versions, might be easily blocked by firewalls, and so on. The amount of effort necessary to turn a vulnerability into a key compromise can vary from insignificant to “lots and lots”. A compromised key, on the other hand, is clearly compromised. -Tim From: Servercert-wg <servercert-wg-boun...@cabforum.org <mailto:servercert-wg-boun...@cabforum.org> > On Behalf Of Wayne Thayer via Servercert-wg Sent: Monday, August 20, 2018 12:52 PM To: CA/B Forum Server Certificate WG Public Discussion List <servercert...@cabforum.org <mailto:servercert...@cabforum.org> > Cc: CA/Browser Forum Public Discussion List <public@cabforum.org <mailto:public@cabforum.org> > Subject: Re: [Servercert-wg] [cabfpub] Ballot SC6 - Revocation Timeline Extension This has the potential to cause confusion, so I'd like to attempt to fix it. Given that a reasonable interpretation of the existing definition of key compromise encompasses reasons 12 and 13, but I want to leave those two reasons in the document for the sake of clarity as Ryan suggests, maybe I should just move those two up to the 24-hour section? I could also be persuaded that a vulnerability is different than proof of key compromise, in which case 12 could stay in the 5-day section and we could move "or there exists a practical technique by which an unauthorized person may discover its value" from the definition of key compromise to 12. What do others think? - Wayne On Mon, Aug 20, 2018 at 7:04 AM Ryan Sleevi <sle...@google.com <mailto:sle...@google.com> > wrote: On Mon, Aug 20, 2018 at 9:17 AM Doug Beattie via Servercert-wg <servercert...@cabforum.org <mailto:servercert...@cabforum.org> > wrote: We’re having a hard time determining the differences between the following: The CA SHALL revoke a Certificate within 24 hours if: 3. The CA obtains evidence that the Subscriber's Private Key corresponding to the Public Key in the Certificate suffered a Key Compromise; or and The CA SHOULD revoke a certificate within 24 hours and MUST revoke a Certificate within 5 days if one or more of the following occurs: 12. The CA is made aware of a vulnerability that exposes the Subscriber's Private Key to compromise; or 13. The CA is made aware that the Subscriber's Private Key is being publicly distributed in a software package. If “Subscriber's Private Key is being publicly distributed in a software package”, isn’t that the same as #3: “obtains evidence that the Subscriber's Private Key corresponding to the Public Key in the Certificate suffered a Key Compromise”? How do you see #12 in reality? What types of vulnerabilities do you envision that could expose a subscribers Private Key that are not also consistent with #3? While this is the same argument that I've made in the past, I think the goal here is to reduce ambiguity for those that might take a tortured reading of the text. For example, at least one vendor 'obfuscated' the private key within their binary, requiring running the embedded private key through a transformation (I hesitate to say decryption, since the passphrase was itself fixed within the binary). Such a vendor might argue that the key has not been compromised until someone reverses the binary. This resolves that ambiguity by saying that the distribution within the binary itself constitutes a compromise, regardless of whether a passphrase is used. Also, the definition of Private Key Compromise is very broad, and the scenarios in #12 and #13 would appear to fall into “Key Compromise” which further causes confusion about them. What constitutes a “practical technique”? If we applied this definition to #12 and #13, wouldn’t these all fall into the 24 hour rule? Key Compromise: A Private Key is said to be compromised if its value has been disclosed to an unauthorized person, an unauthorized person has had access to it, or there exists a practical technique by which an unauthorized person may discover its value. A Private Key is also considered compromised if methods have been developed that can easily calculate it based on the Public Key (such as a Debian weak key, see http://wiki.debian.org/SSLkeys <https://na01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=http%3A%2F%2Fwiki.debian.org%2FSSLkeys&data=02%7C01%7CMike.reilly%40microsoft.com%7Ccc86f18ac7f1436d776808d606dd9e4f%7C72f988bf86f141af91ab2d7cd011db47%7C1%7C0%7C636703946261915965&sdata=VTjxlqVQj%2F5CEUKsG10UF2UoC75AtmFi3d51%2Fj9wdZ4%3D&reserved=0> ) or if there is clear evidence that the specific method used to generate the Private Key was flawed. Doug From: Public <public-boun...@cabforum.org <mailto:public-boun...@cabforum.org> > On Behalf Of Wayne Thayer via Public Sent: Monday, August 13, 2018 4:58 PM To: CA/B Forum Server Certificate WG Public Discussion List <servercert...@cabforum.org <mailto:servercert...@cabforum.org> > Cc: CA/Browser Forum Public Discussion List <public@cabforum.org <mailto:public@cabforum.org> > Subject: [cabfpub] Ballot SC6 - Revocation Timeline Extension This begins the formal discussion period for ballot SC6. ========================================== Ballot SC6: Revocation Timeline Extension Purpose of Ballot: Section 4.9.1.1 of the Baseline Requirements currently requires CAs to revoke a Subscriber certificate within 24 hours of identifying any of 15 issues affecting the certificate. In cases where there is not an immediate threat of misuse of the certificate, this requirement can cause undue harm to a Subscriber that isn't capable of replacing the certificate prior to revocation. This ballot makes a number of improvements to the revocation rules imposed by the Baseline Requirements: * Primarily, it creates a tiered timeline for revocations. The most critical "reasons" still require revocation within 24 hours, but for many others 24 hours becomes a SHOULD and the CA has 5 days before they MUST revoke. * A new "reason for revocation" was added to address the fact that there is currently no requirement for CAs to revoke a certificate when requested by the domain name registrant. After considering some more specific language that required CAs to follow 3.2.2.4 to validate domain control, I settled on the following more general "reason": "The CA obtains evidence that the validation of domain authorization or control for any Fully-Qualified Domain Name or IP address in the Certificate should not be relied upon." * Reason #10 states "The CA determines that any of the information appearing in the Certificate is inaccurate or misleading;" This ballot removes "or misleading" because that is a subjective judgement that could effectively be used to justify censorship, as discussed at length in relation to the "Stripe, Inc of Kentucky" EV certificates. * Current reasons #11 and #13 were removed from the section on subscriber certificates because they address cases where the intermediate and/or root must be revoked, so there isn't much sense (and some possible harm) in requiring revocation of all the leaf certs. * It requires CAs to disclose their problem reporting mechanisms in a standard location: CPS section 1.5.2. * Within 24 hours of receiving a problem report, the CA is now required to report back to both the entity reporting the problem and the Subscriber on the CA's findings, and to work with the reporter to establish a date by which the CA will revoke the certificate. The following motion has been proposed by Wayne Thayer of Mozilla and endorsed by Tim Hollebeek of DigiCert and Dimitris Zacharopoulos of Harica. --- MOTION BEGINS --- This ballot modifies the “Baseline Requirements for the Issuance and Management of Publicly-Trusted Certificates” as follows, based on Version 1.6.0: ** Modify Section 4.9.1.1 to read as follows: ** The CA SHALL revoke a Certificate within 24 hours if: 1. The Subscriber requests in writing that the CA revoke the Certificate; 2. The Subscriber notifies the CA that the original certificate request was not authorized and does not retroactively grant authorization; 3. The CA obtains evidence that the Subscriber's Private Key corresponding to the Public Key in the Certificate suffered a Key Compromise; or 4. The CA obtains evidence that the validation of domain authorization or control for any Fully-Qualified Domain Name or IP address in the Certificate should not be relied upon. The CA SHOULD revoke a certificate within 24 hours and MUST revoke a Certificate within 5 days if one or more of the following occurs: 1. The Certificate no longer complies with the requirements of Sections 6.1.5 and 6.1.6; 2. The CA obtains evidence that the Certificate was misused; 3. The CA is made aware that a Subscriber has violated one or more of its material obligations under the Subscriber Agreement or Terms of Use; 4. The CA is made aware of any circumstance indicating that use of a Fully-Qualified Domain Name or IP address in the Certificate is no longer legally permitted (e.g. a court or arbitrator has revoked a Domain Name Registrant's right to use the Domain Name, a relevant licensing or services agreement between the Domain Name Registrant and the Applicant has terminated, or the Domain Name Registrant has failed to renew the Domain Name); 5. The CA is made aware that a Wildcard Certificate has been used to authenticate a fraudulently misleading subordinate Fully-Qualified Domain Name; 6. The CA is made aware of a material change in the information contained in the Certificate; 7. The CA is made aware that the Certificate was not issued in accordance with these Requirements or the CA's Certificate Policy or Certification Practice Statement; 8. The CA determines that any of the information appearing in the Certificate is inaccurate; 9. The CA's right to issue Certificates under these Requirements expires or is revoked or terminated, unless the CA has made arrangements to continue maintaining the CRL/OCSP Repository; 10. Revocation is required by the CA's Certificate Policy and/or Certification Practice Statement; 11. The technical content or format of the Certificate presents an unacceptable risk to Application Software Suppliers or Relying Parties (e.g. the CA/Browser Forum might determine that a deprecated cryptographic/signature algorithm or key size presents an unacceptable risk and that such Certificates should be revoked and replaced by CAs within a given period of time); 12. The CA is made aware of a vulnerability that exposes the Subscriber's Private Key to compromise; or 13. The CA is made aware that the Subscriber's Private Key is being publicly distributed in a software package. ** Modify section 4.9.3 as follows: ** The CA SHALL provide a process for Subscribers to request revocation of their own Certificates. The process MUST be described in the CA's Certificate Policy or Certification Practice Statement. The CA SHALL maintain a continuous 24x7 ability to accept and respond to revocation requests and Certificate Problem Reports. The CA SHALL provide Subscribers, Relying Parties, Application Software Suppliers, and other third parties with clear instructions for reporting suspected Private Key Compromise, Certificate misuse, or other types of fraud, compromise, misuse, inappropriate conduct, or any other matter related to Certificates. The CA SHALL publicly disclose the instructions through a readily accessible online means and in section 1.5.2 of their CPS. ** Modify section 4.9.5 to read as follows: ** Within 24 hours after receiving a Certificate Problem Report, the CA SHALL investigate the facts and circumstances related to a Certificate Problem Report and provide a preliminary report on its findings to both the Subscriber and the entity who filed the Certificate Problem Report. After reviewing the facts and circumstances, the CA SHALL work with any entity reporting the Certificate Problem Report or other revocation-related notice to establish a date when the CA will revoke the Certificate which MUST not exceed the time frame set forth in Section 4.9.1.1. The date selected by the CA SHOULD consider the following criteria: 1. The nature of the alleged problem (scope, context, severity, magnitude, risk of harm); 2. The consequences of revocation (direct and collateral impacts to Subscribers and Relying Parties); 3. The number of Certificate Problem Reports received about a particular Certificate or Subscriber; 4. The entity making the complaint (for example, a complaint from a law enforcement official that a Web site is engaged in illegal activities should carry more weight than a complaint from a consumer alleging that she didn't receive the goods she ordered); and 5. Relevant legislation. --- MOTION ENDS --- A comparison of the changes can be found at: https://github.com/cabforum/documents/compare/master...wthayer:patch-1?short_path=7f6d14a#diff-7f6d14a20e7f3beb696b45e1bf8196f2 <https://na01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fgithub.com%2Fcabforum%2Fdocuments%2Fcompare%2Fmaster...wthayer%3Apatch-1%3Fshort_path%3D7f6d14a%23diff-7f6d14a20e7f3beb696b45e1bf8196f2&data=02%7C01%7CMike.reilly%40microsoft.com%7Ccc86f18ac7f1436d776808d606dd9e4f%7C72f988bf86f141af91ab2d7cd011db47%7C1%7C0%7C636703946261925974&sdata=ZF1OJR2W60OJ9%2BA1c4BlDwDEQVzFc3ze2gI87AXrXow%3D&reserved=0> The procedure for approval of this ballot is as follows: Discussion (7+ days) Start Time: 2018-08-13 19:00 UTC End Time: Not before 2018-08-20 19:00 UTC Vote for approval (7 days) Start Time: TBD End Time: TBD _______________________________________________ Servercert-wg mailing list servercert...@cabforum.org <mailto:servercert...@cabforum.org> http://cabforum.org/mailman/listinfo/servercert-wg <https://na01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=http%3A%2F%2Fcabforum.org%2Fmailman%2Flistinfo%2Fservercert-wg&data=02%7C01%7CMike.reilly%40microsoft.com%7Ccc86f18ac7f1436d776808d606dd9e4f%7C72f988bf86f141af91ab2d7cd011db47%7C1%7C0%7C636703946261935982&sdata=o5VhYd5QGEiWefWo1P4jkRtFfioP%2FkeEx2nJYGXLo%2FY%3D&reserved=0> _______________________________________________ Servercert-wg mailing list servercert...@cabforum.org http://cabforum.org/mailman/listinfo/servercert-wg
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