I'm not sure if this has been discussed before (sorry if I missed did), but I would like to bring up the fact that there might be Subscribers who suffer a Key Compromise (like the ones distributed with their own software or embedded within customer devices), who would be willing to leave the compromised Certificate/Key out there until they find a way to replace it (that might take more than 24 hours or 5 days). This is a case where the Subscriber weighs the impact of Availability in the security properties of the offered service more than Confidentiality.
If a Subscriber doesn't want their Certificate revoked because that might have a significant impact/damage in their service Availability, isn't that something the ecosystem should respect and allow? Shouldn't this be treated on a case-by-case basis? I would be in favor of entering clauses in the BRs to allow more than 5 days before revocation for certain such cases, provided that the CA and the affected Subscriber would have to disclose the case to the CA/B Forum, as Ryan suggested in previous discussions. Just disclosing the fact should be enough. It would just be an additional option for the CAs and the Subscribers that would improve today's practices. As Jeremy demonstrated, there are several real cases today, where CAs try to extend the 24hours revocation window in order to balance that Availability risk for the Subscribers and -I might add- the Relying Parties that want to have access to the Subscriber's services. I believe there are RPs out there that value availability more than confidentiality. I'm not one of them, but... :) Thoughts? Dimitris. _______________________________________________ Public mailing list [email protected] https://cabforum.org/mailman/listinfo/public
