On Tue, Aug 21, 2018 at 2:15 PM Bruce Morton via Public <[email protected]> wrote:
> BR 6.1.1.3 states “The CA SHALL reject a certificate request if the > requested Public Key does not meet the requirements set forth in Sections > 6.1.5 and 6.1.6 or if it has a known weak Private Key (such as a Debian > weak key, see http://wiki.debian.org/SSLkeys).” > > > > My assumption is a certificate which has been revoked due to compromise > has a “weak Private Key.” As such, based on the current BRs, a CA should > reject certificate requests using a key from a certificate that they > revoked due to compromise. > > > If we're talking about the same CA re-signing a key previously used in a certificate that the CA revoked due to key compromise, then [if nothing else] the CA must revoke the new certificate within 24 hours per 4.9.1.1(3). Thus, I would expect that CAs are checking for reuse of compromised private keys prior to issuance. If we're talking about other CAs rejecting the compromised key, then I have to question whether there is enough benefit to offset the substantial effort involved in designing and running a system that isn't susceptible to the concerns Ryan raised. It'd be interesting to see a proposal. Bruce. > > > > *From:* Public [mailto:[email protected]] *On Behalf Of *Tim > Hollebeek via Public > *Sent:* August 21, 2018 4:55 PM > *To:* Jeremy Rowley <[email protected]>; Ryan Sleevi < > [email protected]>; CA/Browser Forum Public Discussion List < > [email protected]> > *Subject:* [EXTERNAL]Re: [cabfpub] Issuance of certificates for keys > reported as compromised > > > > Yes, certainly, at a minimum, CAs should not be issuing new certificates > for keys they themselves have previously determined to be compromised. > > > > As you correctly note, this is currently a fairly common occurrence. > > > > -Tim > > >
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