Hi Rob, Thank you for the comprehensive survey and for clearly communicating your findings.
In response to your questions, and from the perspective of the Chrome Root Program: 1. Is a CA's incident report expected to disclose the affected certificates > that have already expired prior to the CA's response to the incident? > We see disclosing the full set of affected certificates, regardless of whether they have expired or have been revoked, as presenting the community with the most complete perspective of an incident’s impact. This is our preferred approach. 2. Is a CA's incident report expected to disclose the affected certificates > that have already been revoked prior to the CA's response to the incident? Yes, similar to the previous question, our preference is to collect the most complete perspective possible. 3. Is a CA's incident report expected to disclose both an affected > precertificate and its corresponding certificate? Or just one of the pair? You raise an opportunity for improvement. Historically, a list of precertificates was considered acceptable. However, having both precertificates and final certificates provides a more comprehensive perspective, which we consider favorable. We appreciate other thoughts and perspectives. Additionally, we’ll plan to sync on these opinions with the other members of the CCADB Steering Committee, which could ultimately lead to an update of https://www.ccadb.org/cas/incident-report. Thanks again! -Chris On Mon, Apr 8, 2024 at 12:45 PM 'Rob Stradling' via CCADB Public < [email protected]> wrote: > In recent weeks, a number of CAs have filed incident reports relating to > mistakes made when setting critical flags in Subscriber certificate > extensions since the TLSBRv2 profiles came into force. We thought it would > be worth performing a comprehensive survey ourselves in order to discover > if any similar incidents at other CAs had not yet been detected. > > I've run [1] against the primary crt.sh DB, which caused it to trawl > through the crt.sh ID space starting around the time TLSBRv2 went into > force to identify any Subscriber certificate containing any common > extension with its critical flag set incorrectly per §7.1.2.7.6. I've > posted a report of the results at [2], which was generated using [3]. > > Seven further incidents were identified. I sent Certificate Problem > Reports to the two CAs whose affected PKI hierarchies are trusted by root > programs whose representatives are active in monitoring Bugzilla. Both of > those CAs responded promptly and filed incident reports: [4] and [5]. > > Having gathered this data, today I've used it to cross-check the lists of > affected certificates that CAs have provided with their incident reports. > I was surprised to find two bugs ([6] and [7]) without any attached list of > affected certificates. I also observed some patterns of "omissions" in the > disclosed lists of affected certificates, for which I would like to call > upon the root program owners to clarify their expectations; noting that the > CCADB incident reporting requirements [8] say that each incident report's > *"Appendix > must include a listing of the complete certificate details of all affected > certificates"*: > > 1. Is a CA's incident report expected to disclose the affected > certificates that have already expired prior to the CA's response to the > incident? > 2. Is a CA's incident report expected to disclose the affected > certificates that have already been revoked prior to the CA's response to > the incident? > 3. Is a CA's incident report expected to disclose both an affected > precertificate and its corresponding certificate? Or just one of the pair? > > > > [1] > https://gist.github.com/robstradling/6a5ecca872cf28232d90638fc2c44ed5#file-check_extension_criticality-go > [2] > https://gist.github.com/robstradling/6a5ecca872cf28232d90638fc2c44ed5#file-report-csv > [3] > https://gist.github.com/robstradling/6a5ecca872cf28232d90638fc2c44ed5#file-generate_report-sh > [4] https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1888060 > [5] https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1888104 > [6] https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1887096 > [7] https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1883416 > [8] https://www.ccadb.org/cas/incident-report > > -- > Rob Stradling > Senior Research & Development Scientist > Sectigo Limited > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "CCADB Public" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/a/ccadb.org/d/msgid/public/MW4PR17MB47290848C0FE089BD12FA77AAA002%40MW4PR17MB4729.namprd17.prod.outlook.com > <https://groups.google.com/a/ccadb.org/d/msgid/public/MW4PR17MB47290848C0FE089BD12FA77AAA002%40MW4PR17MB4729.namprd17.prod.outlook.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer> > . > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "CCADB Public" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/a/ccadb.org/d/msgid/public/CAAbw9mCwjzphmV3r-W%3DoSyGiGXdoBqhvcvnCyMkSogiq0%2BTthQ%40mail.gmail.com.
