Prior to 9/11 the thought of an attack from the air originating from within the USA wasn't considered a threat. Like I keep saying 9/11 changed us forever. We have been at war with Terrorists for 25 years. On 9/11 we woke up and realized it couldn't be handled like a criminal case. Stuntman
> > Amen! > > > With Love, > > CtrlAltDel aka Dave > C4/5 Complete - 28 Years Post > Texas, USA > > QuadPirate <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > FLAVOR00-NONE-0000-0000-000000000000;I sure wish nobody was running David I'd vote for him. > > Mark > > -------Original Message------- > > From: David K. Kelmer > Date: Saturday, October 30, 2004 14:54:03 > To: QuadPirate; Stuntman; [EMAIL PROTECTED]; [EMAIL PROTECTED] > Subject: Re: [QUAD-L] Who's the Enemy- StockPile > > > Hi QP, > > I was watching the History Channel yesterday and they had the story of the Professional golfer Payne Stewart and the five other victims of the fatal Lear jet that crashed near Mina, South Dakota in 1999 after officials lost contact with the plane which apparently traveled on auto- pilot for more than 1,700 miles before running out of fuel. > > The Air Force deployed an F-16 fighter jet from Tyndall, Florida to locate the aircraft. Two F-15 fighter jets from Eglin, Air Force Base in northern Florida then took over the watch. The escort duty was then relayed to two F-16s based in Tulsa, Oklahoma. > > I remember watching this story with a friend as it was happening, and she asked me what would happen if the Lear jet was headed for a large city. I told her that our military would NEVER let a jet flying off- course get close to a large city. I said that there was someone at that moment with the authority to give orders to shoot down the jet to stop it from flying into a city before it could cause any damage. Sadly, I was wrong! > > > > The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States. > > NORAD Mission and Structure. > > Prior to 9/11, it was understood that an order to shoot down a commercial aircraft would have to be issued by the National Command Authority (a phrase used to describe the president and secretary of defense). Exercise planners also assumed that the aircraft would originate from outside the United States, allowing time to identify the target and scramble interceptors. The threat of terrorists hijacking commercial airliners within the United States-and using them as guided missiles-was not recognized by NORAD before 9/11.98 > > Clarifying the Record > > The defense of U.S. airspace on 9/11 was not conducted in accord with preexisting training and protocols. It was improvised by civilians who had never handled a hijacked aircraft that attempted to disappear, and by a military unprepared for the transformation of commercial aircraft into weapons of mass destruction. As it turned out, the NEADS air defenders had nine minutes' notice on the first hijacked plane, no advance notice on the second, no advance notice on the third, and no advance notice on the fourth. > > http://www.9-11commission.gov/report/911Report_Ch1.htm > > Institutionalizing Imagination: > The Case of Aircraft as Weapons > > Imagination is not a gift usually associated with bureaucracies. For example, before Pearl Harbor the U.S. government had excellent intelligence that a Japanese attack was coming, especially after peace talks stalemated at the end of November 1941. These were days, one historian notes, of "excruciating uncertainty." The most likely targets were judged to be in Southeast Asia. An attack was coming, "but officials were at a loss to know where the blow would fall or what more might be done to prevent it."11 In retrospect, available intercepts pointed to Japanese examination of Hawaii as a possible target. But, another historian observes, "in the face of a clear warning, alert measures bowed to routine."12 > > It is therefore crucial to find a way of routinizing, even bureaucratizing, the exercise of imagination. Doing so requires more than finding an expert who can imagine that aircraft could be used as weapons. Indeed, since al Qaeda and other groups had already used suicide vehicles, namely truck bombs, the leap to the use of other vehicles such as boats (the Cole attack) or planes is not far-fetched. > Yet these scenarios were slow to work their way into the thinking of aviation security experts. > > http://www.9-11commission.gov/report/911Report_Ch11.htm -- It's not the fall that hurts. Home page http://tnthompson0.tripod.com/homeincyberspace/ Graphics portfolio http://tnthompson1.tripod.com/index.htm Domain space http://nw-in.com/index.html
