>> If there is no user acces control like a real root real user then its no
>> sense to use it.
> I think you've missed something pretty fundamental.
> Throw out everything you know about the Linux kernel and how it enforces
> security (including MAC). Qubes takes the position that the Linux
> kernel code base is simply too large and complex to meaningfully trust,
> and that any security policies must be enforced by a smaller, more
> trustable hypervisor.
> The security problem is then less about user accounts, process
> separation, etc. and more about ensuring guest VMs only modify their own
> state, and interact with other VMs only through simple, easier-to-audit
> and easier-to-securely-implement channels.
> IMO all the Qubes magic is about these over-the-top channels. You can
> use bare Xen (or ESXi, or HyperV or whatever) to get similar VM
> isolation, but it will be cumbersome to orchestrate typical user actions
> (inter-VM file copying, PDF conversion, networking/firewalling,
> trustable DWM, ...). Qubes makes it easy.
> PS: Let me give an example. Suppose your typical Linux desktop has a
> 'user1' account and a 'tor' account. Suppose the latter is used for
> running a Tor relay. Normally you would expect the Linux kernel to
> enforce access control, to ensure any code running with the 'tor' uid
> will not be able to access 'user1''s files. In Qubes, you just install
> Tor into a separate VM from the VM you use for the 'user1' persona.
> Thus the barrier for Tor to access 'user1''s data is the hypervisor, not
> the Linux kernel.
Sorry for adding to the spam, but I feel obliged to add two important
1) It's not just the kernel. Practical user security depends on a lot
of userland system components, too. That's why it really is appropriate
for Qubes to abstract security domains as independent VMs.
2) While I wrote 'similar VM isolation', I still believe Qubes is the
most secure practical virtualization platform. For example, the VENOM
(CVE-2015-3456) vulnerability affected nearly every other Xen
vendor--but not Qubes. To quote Marek:
"[The solution] is already there - there is no other option in Qubes.
We've never considered running such a bloatware as qemu directly in dom0
This kind of security-first posture is what has made Qubes famous.
Trust it or not, but I hope the architecture now makes sense!
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