On 6/21/19 6:37 PM, ljul8...@gmail.com wrote:

I was told that if dom0 gets infected, everything in the laptop can be found and read.

While this is a true statement, you then have to think about exactly what it would take for someone to do this given the Qubes logical architecture and the physical hardware enforced memory separation that Qubes is built upon. For an adversary to circumvent your dom0 you will likely have needed to have helped them do so, by first doing something to deliberately break your security model.

Note to self: Don't do stupid things in dom0.

Since dom0 has no networking, just to get into dom0, the adversary would have to first breach the sys-net VM and then somehow circumvent or leverage a flaw in the Xen hypervisor to establish a communications channel into Dom0 to take control. That is exactly why Dom0 has no networking nor any user applications, so its actually *hard* to do stupid things. The attack surface of dom0 purposefully is kept to the absolute bare minimum. For this reason I use a separate stripped down OS template for sys-net, just to make this VM as a stepping stone, a little more challenging for the adversary. Faux hacker tools, process instrumentation, and lots of land mines.

Or, you yourself would have to introduce some APT agent (e.g. inserting an infected USB device) into Dom0, so that this APT agent can later reach back out to the adversary, as to establish a back-channel, and permit their gain of control over the machine. You would have to unwittingly be their accomplice in the crime that you yourself are wanting to prevent.

Neither of the above circumventions are easy, and thus the only sure way for an adversary to get into your system is for them to have personal physical access to your hardware, an alternate bootable OS on a CD/USB, along with the LVM encryption passwords. That is where Qubes AEM comes in. I have had to breach my own systems on occasion, while I already know the passwords, and I have found that it can still be a challenge to take control over a Qubes system without leaving some kind of obvious evidence behind.

Note to self: Don't over-harden your desktop system if you want to actually get your work done.

The ip is not a problem but I’m not sure about the MAC address? If they found 
out the latter by infecting dom0, what are the possibilities to trace that MAC 
address to the laptop owner?


What you are asking for is called "MAC randomization". You can google this phrase in this news group or the Qubes site and find out how to do it. Basically, each time you boot you can script up the modification of the MAC address to another value, so that, statistically at least, you are never using the same MAC address.

Since the majority of networks assign the actual IP address to you, you likely won't have much control over that address, and logically the IP address belongs to the network, not you. Chances are that with a different MAC address you will not likely be getting the same IP address each time either, depending of course on how they actually allocate their addresses.




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