On 10/30/20 5:51 AM, evado...@gmail.com wrote:
interesting but threat model unclear. If the attacker can force you to enter one password after suspend, why would he not force you to enter LUKS and user password 5 minutes later?There are a lot of more attack vectors when system is booted and only protected by xscreensaver. The attacker can use some hardware backdoors, xscreensaver bugs/backdoors/kill it to receive access: dump your memory on hardware level, receive access to memory from vulnerable hardware, guess screensaver password etc. If the system will automatically shutdown then there is only one attack vector: LUKS password
There's no disagreement that shut down is more secure than suspended, but the devil is in the details. How exactly is it supposed to work?
1. Attacker forces you to wake up computer (e.g., open laptop lid). 2. Attacker forces you to enter password. 3. You enter incorrect password? 4. Attacker tells you to enter correct password this time? 5. Qubes shuts down because it's been too long?Why not just have an alternate passphrase that, when entered, shuts down the PC (or, as you suggest, wipes the LUKS header)? Why a timer?
Perhaps the alternate passphrase, when entered, also sends out an SOS message?
пятница, 30 октября 2020 г. в 07:54:14 UTC, haa...@web.de:On 10/29/20 11:06 PM, evado...@gmail.com wrote:Proof of Concept. github.com/evadogstar/qubes-sleepkeeper Qubes-Sleepkeeper protects you from physical attack when the attacker force you to enter the password of your Qubes after it wakeup from sleep or from password guessing after wakeup. The attacker have very limited time to do so or Qubes will shutdown automaticaly.Interesting but threat model unclear. If the attacker can force you to enter one password after suspend, why would he not force you to enter LUKS and user password 5 minutes later? Please explain. Rather an evil maid "attempt detection" (not protection) by "laptop is down instead of sleeping"? I think it really could help as additional data protection in case of normal, criminal theft...
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