Dear Qubes Community, We have just published Qubes Security Bulletin (QSB) 070: Xen issues related to grant tables v2 and IOMMU. The text of this QSB is reproduced below. This QSB and its accompanyingsignatures will always be available in the Qubes Security Pack (qubes-secpack).
View QSB-070 in the qubes-secpack: <https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/master/QSBs/qsb-070-2021.txt> In addition, you may wish to: - Get the qubes-secpack: <https://www.qubes-os.org/security/pack/> - View all past QSBs: <https://www.qubes-os.org/security/qsb/> - View the XSA Tracker: <https://www.qubes-os.org/security/xsa/> ``` ---===[ Qubes Security Bulletin 070 ]===--- 2021-08-25 Xen issues related to grant tables v2 and IOMMU (XSA-378, XSA-379, XSA-382) User action required ===================== Users must install the following specific packages in order to address the issues discussed in this bulletin: For Qubes 4.0, in dom0: - Xen packages, version 4.8.5-35 For Qubes 4.1, in dom0: - Xen packages, version 4.14.2-2 These packages will migrate from the security-testing repository to the current (stable) repository over the next two weeks after being tested by the community.  Once available, the packages are to be installed via the Qubes Update Tool or its command-line equivalents.  Dom0 must be restarted afterward in order for the updates to take effect. If you use Anti Evil Maid, you will need to reseal your secret passphrase to new PCR values, as PCR18+19 will change due to the new Xen binaries. Summary ======== The following security advisories were published on 2021-08-25: XSA-378  "IOMMU page mapping issues on x86": | Both AMD and Intel allow ACPI tables to specify regions of memory | which should be left untranslated, which typically means these | addresses should pass the translation phase unaltered. While these | are typically device specific ACPI properties, they can also be | specified to apply to a range of devices, or even all devices. | | On all systems with such regions Xen failed to prevent guests from | undoing/replacing such mappings (CVE-2021-28694). | | On AMD systems, where a discontinuous range is specified by firmware, | the supposedly-excluded middle range will also be identity-mapped | (CVE-2021-28695). | | Further, on AMD systems, upon de-assigment of a physical device from a | guest, the identity mappings would be left in place, allowing a guest | continued access to ranges of memory which it shouldn't have access to | anymore (CVE-2021-28696). | XSA-379  "grant table v2 status pages may remain accessible after de-allocation": | Guest get permitted access to certain Xen-owned pages of memory. The | majority of such pages remain allocated / associated with a guest for | its entire lifetime. Grant table v2 status pages, however, get | de-allocated when a guest switched (back) from v2 to v1. The freeing | of such pages requires that the hypervisor know where in the guest | these pages were mapped. The hypervisor tracks only one use within | guest space, but racing requests from the guest to insert mappings of | these pages may result in any of them to become mapped in multiple | locations. Upon switching back from v2 to v1, the guest would then | retain access to a page that was freed and perhaps re-used for other | purposes. | | A malicious guest may be able to elevate its privileges to that of the | host, cause host or guest Denial of Service (DoS), or cause information | leaks. XSA-382  "inadequate grant-v2 status frames array bounds check" | The v2 grant table interface separates grant attributes from grant | status. That is, when operating in this mode, a guest has two tables. | As a result, guests also need to be able to retrieve the addresses that | the new status tracking table can be accessed through. | | For 32-bit guests on x86, translation of requests has to occur because | the interface structure layouts commonly differ between 32- and 64-bit. | | The translation of the request to obtain the frame numbers of the | grant status table involves translating the resulting array of frame | numbers. Since the space used to carry out the translation is limited, | the translation layer tells the core function the capacity of the array | within translation space. Unfortunately the core function then only | enforces array bounds to be below 8 times the specified value, and would | write past the available space if enough frame numbers needed storing. | | Malicious or buggy guest kernels may be able to mount a Denial of | Service (DoS) attack affecting the entire system. Privilege escalation | and information leaks cannot be ruled out. Impact ======= XSA-378: As the Xen Security Team explains, "The precise impact is system specific, but can - on affected systems - be any or all of privilege escalation, denial of service, or information leaks." Only a guest with a PCI device can leverage this vulnerability, such as sys-net or sys-usb in a default Qubes OS configuration. XSA-379: As the Xen Security Team explains, "A malicious guest may be able to elevate its privileges to that of the host, cause host or guest Denial of Service (DoS), or cause information leaks." XSA-382: Similar to the XSA-379. XSA-382 affects only Xen version 4.10 or newer, thus only Qubes OS R4.1 is affected. Discussion =========== This is yet another set of problems related to grant tables v2. Since none of the software included in Qubes OS uses this feature (both Linux and Windows use grant tables v1), we have decided to disable grant tables v2 in Xen globally in addition to apply the specific patches described above. Credits ======== See the original Security Advisories. References ===========  https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/testing/  https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/updating-qubes-os/  https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-378.html  https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-379.html  https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-382.html -- The Qubes Security Team https://www.qubes-os.org/security/ ``` This announcement is also available on the Qubes website: https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2021/08/25/qsb-070/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "qubes-users" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to qubes-users+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/qubes-users/851f8a5c-8b89-c389-f315-bd6f0956b299%40qubes-os.org.
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