I see a requirement here being presented as an implementation. The requirement is the ability of an authorized party within the network to observe network traffic for debugging purposes. That is a very normal requirement in process control. Process control networks are typically run in a fashion that most IETF-ers would find unusual. The networks are typically very quiet with absolutely no extraneous traffic. The traffic is typically unencrypted so that systems can be monitored continuously.
The overriding objective is to protect integrity and availability. Confidentiality is not (typically) considered a concern. The problem being that a lot of systems depend on confidentiality of certain data to provide for integrity. Particularly to protect against replay attacks. So I don't think turning off encryption entirely is the right move. A better approach for this particular requirement is to have a mechanism which uses encryption but explicitly provides the necessary observer decryption capabilities. But that approach has been repeatedly rejected in IETF. On Thu, Sep 29, 2022 at 8:31 AM Randy Armstrong (OPC) < [email protected]> wrote: > The OPC Foundation is looking at deploying QUIC within factories as means > for different OT devices to communicate with each other. In this > environment, factory owners often wish to monitor traffic to check for > anomalies. Encryption prevents this. > > > > For this reason, an authentication only option is essential to making QUIC > a viable choice for communication within factories. > > > > Regards, > > > > Randy Armstrong > > OPC UA Security WG Chair > >
