I think Billy will like this.   True, neo-classical economics in theory 
recognizes this as part of the danger of agency failure, but in practice 
virtually nobody seems to have made any effort to understand (much less 
mitigate) this threat.

Especially since the line between "fraud" and "creativity" is awfully thin, 
when it comes to accounting...

-- Ernie P.

http://www.schneier.com/

Schneier on Security

A blog covering security and security technology.

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November 1, 2010

Control Fraud

I had never heard the term "control fraud" before:

Control fraud theory was developed in the savings and loan debacle. It 
explained that the person controlling the S&L (typically the CEO) posed a 
unique risk because he could use it as a weapon.
The theory synthesized criminology (Wheeler and Rothman 1982), economics 
(Akerlof 1970), accounting, law, finance, and political science. It explained 
how a CEO optimized "his" S&L as a weapon to loot creditors and shareholders. 
The weapon of choice was accounting fraud. The company is the perpetrator and a 
victim. Control frauds are optimal looters because the CEO has four unique 
advantages. He uses his ability to hire and fire to suborn internal and 
external controls and make them allies. Control frauds consistently get "clean" 
opinions for financial statements that show record profitability when the 
company is insolvent and unprofitable. CEOs choose top-tier auditors. Their 
reputation helps deceive creditors and shareholders.

Only the CEO can optimize the company for fraud.

This is an interesting paper about control fraud. It's by William K. Black, the 
Executive Director of the Institute for Fraud Prevention. "Individual 'control 
frauds' cause greater losses than all other forms of property crime combined. 
They are financial super-predators." Black is talking about control fraud by 
both heads of corporations and heads of state, so that's almost certainly a 
true statement. His main point, though, is that our legal systems don't do 
enough to discourage control fraud.

White-collar criminology has a set of empirical findings and theories that are 
useful to understanding when markets will act perversely. This paper addresses 
three, interrelated theories economists should know about. "Control fraud" 
theory explains why the most damaging forms of fraud are situations in which 
those that control the company or the nation use it as a fraud vehicle. The 
CEO, or the head of state, poses the greatest fraud risk. A single large 
control fraud can cause greater financial losses than all other forms of 
property crime combined they are the "super-predators" of the financial world. 
Control frauds can also occur in waves that can cause systemic economic injury 
and discredit other institutions essential to good government and society. 
Control frauds are commonly able to defeat for several years market mechanisms 
that neo-classical economists predict will prevent such frauds.
"Systems capacity" theory examines why under deterrence is so common. It shows 
that, particularly with respect to elite crimes, anti-fraud resources and 
willpower are commonly so limited that "crime pays." When systems capacity 
limitations are severe a "criminogenic environment" arises and crime increases. 
When a criminogenic environment for control fraud occurs it can produce a wave 
of control fraud.

"Neutralization" theory explores how criminals neutralize moral and social 
barriers that reduce crime by constraining our decision-making to honest 
enterprises. The easier individuals are able to neutralize such social 
restraints, the greater the incidence of crime.

[...]

White-collar criminology findings falsify several neo-classical economic 
theories. This paper discusses the predictive failures of the efficient markets 
hypothesis, the efficient contracts hypothesis and the law & economics theory 
of corporate law. The paper argues that neo-classical economists' reliance on 
these flawed models leads them to recommend policies that optimize a 
criminogenic environment for control fraud. Fortunately, these policies are not 
routinely adopted in full. When they are, they produce recurrent crises because 
they eviscerate the institutions and mores vital to make markets and 
governments more efficient in preventing waves of control fraud. Criminological 
theories have demonstrated superior predictive and explanatory behavior with 
regard to perverse economic behavior. This paper discusses two realms of 
perverse behavior the role of waves of control fraud in producing economic 
crises and the role that endemic control fraud plays in producing economic 
stagnation.

Posted on November 1, 2010 at 6:02 AM • 16 Comments

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