This says it all.
BTW, Foreign Affairs is simply the
very best scholarly journal there is
about world events. I am a subscriber and recommend it
highly.
Best experts in all fields --nations, regions, cultures--
and everything well written and thoroughly researched.
I am especially appreciative that, among other things, the
articles in the journal
rarely refer to MSM stereotypes in their reporting or
analysis. Like the word
"fundamentalism" which is tossed around by so many
journalists as if they
knew what they are talking about. Hence, say the word
"fundamentalism"
and most people assume --while not understanding the
world, either--
what it means or may mean in different contexts.
Here we have an article that is all about so-called
"fundamentalists" in Islam
which makes it clear just what is going on by not
misusing that word as a
catch-all for anything that the press dislikes and is
judged to be narrow minded.
Anyway, an outstanding article guaranteed to make it clear
that US media stories
about the "Arab Spring" have just about all been
superficial , based largely on
wishful thinking, and half-baked.
The outcomes in each country have been manipulated behind
the scenes by
the Saudis on behalf of Wahhabi interests. All the while as
the MSM
has said nothing about this reality.
Nothing.
And, O yes, the United States has been paying to undermine
democracy
in Arab countries --every time someone fills up the family
car with gasoline.
Which, of course, neither party has much interest in
actually doing
anything about.
Billy
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Foreign Affairs
Saudi Arabia's Invisible Hand
in the Arab Spring
How the Kingdom is Wielding
Influence Across the Middle East
On October 4, a brief, ominous release came from the
state-controlled Saudi Press Agency in Riyadh acknowledging
that there had been violent clashes in the eastern city of
Qatif between restive Shiites and Saudi security forces. It
reported that "a group of instigators of sedition, discord
and unrest" had assembled in the heart of the kingdom's
oil-rich region, armed with Molotov cocktails. As
authorities cleared the protesters, 11 officers were
wounded. The government made clear it would respond to any
further dissent by "any mercenary or misled person" with "an
iron fist." Meanwhile, it pointed the finger of blame for
the riots at a "foreign country," a thinly veiled reference
to archrival Iran.
Saudi Arabia has played a singular role throughout the Arab
Spring. With a guiding hand -- and often an iron fist --
Riyadh has worked tirelessly to stage manage affairs across
the entire region. In fact, if there was a moment of the
Arab revolt that sounded the death knell for a broad and
rapid transition to representative government across the
Middle East, it came on the last day of February, when Saudi
tanks rolled across the border to help put down the mass
uprising that threatened the powers that be in neighboring
Bahrain. The invasion served an immediate strategic goal:
The show of force gave Riyadh's fellow Sunni monarchy in
Manama the muscle it needed to keep control of its
Shia-majority population and, in turn, its hold on power.
But that was hardly the only advantage King Abdullah bin
Abdulaziz Al-Saud gained. The aggression quelled momentum in
Saudi Arabia's oil-rich eastern province among the newly
restive Shia minority who had been taking cues from Bahrain.
The column of tanks also served as a symbolic shot across
the bow of Iran: The brazen move was a clear signal from
Riyadh to every state in the Middle East that it would stop
at nothing, ranging from soft diplomacy to full-on military
engagement, in its determination to lead a region-wide
counterrevolution.
From the Arab Spring's beginning, Riyadh reached directly
into local conflicts. As far back as January, the kingdom
offered refuge to Tunisia's deposed leader, Zine el-Abidine
Ben Ali. Eager that popular justice not become the norm for
Arab dictators, Riyadh has steadfastly refused to extradite
Ben Ali to stand trial. (He remains in Riyadh to this day.)
Moreover, Ben Ali's statements, issued through his lawyer,
have consistently called on Tunisians to continue the path
of "modernization." For fear of upsetting his Saudi hosts,
he has not been able to express what must be his horror as a
secularist at the dramatic emergence of Ennahda
("Awakening"), the main Islamist party, on the Tunisian
political scene. Ennahda's meteoric rise is widely believed
to be, at least in part, bankrolled by Saudi Arabia and
other Persian Gulf countries.
Islamists across the region are working
in Riyadh's favor.
Islamists across the region are working in Riyadh's favor.
As with the fall of former Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak,
the Saudis gained newfound influence with the Muslim
Brotherhood and its even more hard-line Salfi allies, who
reportedly take funds from the Saudis. The Muslim
Brotherhood has vaulted to prominence in the post-Mubarak
era. It draws hundreds of thousands to rallies. It looks set
to sweep forthcoming elections. After all, it is telling
that Muslim Brotherhood members took refuge in Saudi Arabia
during the decades of persecution under former Egyptian
President Gamal Abdel Nasser. Today, the party makes a good
partner for Riyadh, as it never utters even a whisper of
criticism of what more radical Islamist outfits denounce as
the Saudi royal family's treacherous ties with the West. If
Saudi Arabia desperately backed Mubarak to his last days, in
post-revolutionary Egypt the kingdom is now closely
connected to the country's new political power brokers.
All of this makes the situation in Yemen look quite
familiar. When President Ali Abdullah Saleh was injured in
the June bombing of his presidential palace, he fled to
(where else?) Saudi Arabia. When Saleh returned to his
country last month, he found himself more indebted to Riyadh
than ever. Essentially, Saudi medics had saved his life, and
in a tribal region such personal debts are not quickly
forgotten. But Saleh may not matter much: In the capital of
Sana'a, the exhausted protesters have largely departed the
main square they had occupied. It has been taken over by
activists from Islah (or, the Islamist Congregation for
Reform), the country's main Islamist party. Islah was
founded by leading members of the powerful, Saudi-backed
Hashid tribal confederation, whose decision to turn against
Saleh was a key moment in the uprising. Whichever side
emerges triumphant from the power struggle now under way,
the Saudis have both eventualities -- either Saleh or the
Hashids -- covered.
Looking at the future of the Middle East, perhaps the most
decisive change could come in Syria. It was with a heavy
dose of irony that King Abdullah condemned Syria for the
murderous crackdown Damascus was waging against its own
popular rebellion in early August. Of course, Riyadh has a
less than exemplary human rights record, to say the least.
Likewise, King Abdullah's announcement that he was
withdrawing Saudi Arabia's ambassador to Damascus was less a
protest against the savage brutality of the Syrian regime
(if it was at all) as it was another chapter in Riyadh's
ongoing effort to loosen Iran's grasp on the region's
counterrevolution. The simultaneous decision by fellow Gulf
Cooperation Council members -- Kuwait and Bahrain -- to
likewise withdraw their ambassadors, followed by a
communiqué from the Arab League expressing predictably muted
misgivings about Damascus' ongoing massacres, indicated the
kingdom's ability to line up allies and make them dance to
the tune of the regional powerhouse.
If the Syrian regime collapses (which is hardly imminent
but appearing more and more possible as peaceful
demonstrations give way to armed insurrection), it would
mean the end not only of a brutal dictatorship but also of
the only other ostensibly secular Arab country apart from
Tunisia -- another boon for Riyadh. However, in light of
Saudi Arabia's hardened stance, the real question is what it
envisions would happen in Syria if the regime were
overthrown. Riyadh's hope, clearly, is that a post-Assad
Syria would align itself with a new Sunni-led, more
anti-Iran government in Damascus. That may be hoping against
hope, at least in the short term, because Syria is more
likely to descend into a bloody, sectarian-driven civil war
than witness a smooth transition to a new government.
Riyadh, though, is banking on the Muslim Brotherhood and its
allies ultimately coming out on top. It is certainly true
that, since most Syrians are Sunnis and the Muslim
Brotherhood is the best organized of the opposition groups,
they are the most likely to fill the vacuum in the long
term.
If the Arab Spring had any hope of ushering in greater
freedom and democracy, it would have had to challenge from
the beginning the influence of Saudi Arabia, the region's
Washington-allied superpower and its most antidemocratic,
repressive regime. That is a tall order indeed. The tragic
irony of the uprisings is that the exact opposite happened.
-- 