This says it all. 
 
BTW, Foreign Affairs is simply the very best  scholarly journal there is
about world events. I am a subscriber and recommend it highly.
Best experts in all fields  --nations, regions, cultures--
and everything well written and thoroughly researched.
 
I am especially appreciative that, among other things, the articles in the  
journal
rarely refer to MSM stereotypes in their reporting or analysis. Like the  
word
"fundamentalism" which is tossed around by so many journalists as if  they
knew what they are talking about. Hence, say the word  "fundamentalism"
and most people assume   --while not understanding the world,  either--
what it means or may mean in different contexts. 
 
Here we have an article that is all about so-called "fundamentalists" in  
Islam
which makes it clear just what is going on by not misusing that word  as a 
catch-all for anything that the press dislikes and is judged to be narrow  
minded.
 
Anyway, an outstanding article guaranteed to make it clear that US media  
stories
about the "Arab Spring" have just about all been superficial , based  
largely on
wishful thinking, and half-baked.
 
The outcomes in each country have been manipulated behind the scenes  by
the Saudis on behalf of Wahhabi interests. All the while as the MSM
has said nothing about this reality. 
 
Nothing.
 
And, O yes, the United States has been paying to undermine democracy
in Arab countries  --every time someone fills up the family car with  
gasoline.
Which, of course, neither party has much interest in actually doing
anything about.
 
Billy
 
-------------------------------------------------------------
 
 
Foreign Affairs
 
Saudi Arabia's Invisible Hand 
in the Arab Spring
 
How the Kingdom is Wielding Influence Across the  Middle East 
 
 
 
 
 
_John R. Bradley_ (http://www.foreignaffairs.com/author/john-r-bradley)  


 
 
October 13,  2011 




 
On October 4, a brief, ominous release came from the state-controlled Saudi 
 Press Agency in Riyadh acknowledging that there had been violent clashes 
in the  eastern city of Qatif between restive Shiites and Saudi security 
forces. It  reported that "a group of instigators of sedition, discord and 
unrest" had  assembled in the heart of the kingdom's oil-rich region, armed 
with 
Molotov  cocktails. As authorities cleared the protesters, 11 officers were 
wounded. The  government made clear it would respond to any further dissent 
by "any mercenary  or misled person" with "an iron fist." Meanwhile, it 
pointed the finger of blame  for the riots at a "foreign country," a thinly 
veiled reference to archrival  Iran. 
Saudi Arabia has played a singular role throughout the Arab Spring. With a  
guiding hand -- and often an iron fist -- Riyadh has worked tirelessly to 
stage  manage affairs across the entire region. In fact, if there was a 
moment of the  Arab revolt that sounded the death knell for a broad and rapid 
transition to  representative government across the Middle East, it came on the 
last day of  February, when Saudi tanks rolled across the border to help 
put down the mass  uprising that threatened the powers that be in neighboring 
Bahrain. The invasion  served an immediate strategic goal: The show of force 
gave Riyadh's fellow Sunni  monarchy in Manama the muscle it needed to keep 
control of its Shia-majority  population and, in turn, its hold on power. 
But that was hardly the only advantage King Abdullah bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud  
gained. The aggression quelled momentum in Saudi Arabia's oil-rich eastern  
province among the newly restive Shia minority who had been taking cues 
from  Bahrain. The column of tanks also served as a symbolic shot across the 
bow of  Iran: The brazen move was a clear signal from Riyadh to every state in 
the  Middle East that it would stop at nothing, ranging from soft diplomacy 
to  full-on military engagement, in its determination to lead a region-wide 
 counterrevolution. 
>From the Arab Spring's beginning, Riyadh reached directly into local  
conflicts. As far back as January, the kingdom offered refuge to Tunisia's  
deposed leader, Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali. Eager that popular justice not become  
the norm for Arab dictators, Riyadh has steadfastly refused to extradite Ben 
Ali  to stand trial. (He remains in Riyadh to this day.) Moreover, Ben Ali's 
 statements, issued through his lawyer, have consistently called on 
Tunisians to  continue the path of "modernization." For fear of upsetting his 
Saudi 
hosts, he  has not been able to express what must be his horror as a 
secularist at the  dramatic emergence of Ennahda ("Awakening"), the main 
Islamist 
party, on the  Tunisian political scene. Ennahda's meteoric rise is widely 
believed to be, at  least in part, bankrolled by Saudi Arabia and other 
Persian Gulf countries. 
Islamists across the region are working in Riyadh's favor. 
Islamists across the region are working in Riyadh's favor. As with the fall 
 of former Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, the Saudis gained newfound 
influence  with the Muslim Brotherhood and its even more hard-line Salfi 
allies, who  reportedly take funds from the Saudis. The Muslim Brotherhood has 
vaulted to  prominence in the post-Mubarak era. It draws hundreds of thousands 
to rallies.  It looks set to sweep forthcoming elections. After all, it is 
telling that  Muslim Brotherhood members took refuge in Saudi Arabia during 
the decades of  persecution under former Egyptian President Gamal Abdel 
Nasser. Today, the party  makes a good partner for Riyadh, as it never utters 
even a whisper of criticism  of what more radical Islamist outfits denounce as 
the Saudi royal family's  treacherous ties with the West. If Saudi Arabia 
desperately backed Mubarak to  his last days, in post-revolutionary Egypt the 
kingdom is now closely connected  to the country's new political power 
brokers.  
All of this makes the situation in Yemen look quite familiar. When 
President  Ali Abdullah Saleh was injured in the June bombing of his 
presidential 
palace,  he fled to (where else?) Saudi Arabia. When Saleh returned to his 
country last  month, he found himself more indebted to Riyadh than ever. 
Essentially, Saudi  medics had saved his life, and in a tribal region such 
personal debts are not  quickly forgotten. But Saleh may not matter much: In 
the 
capital of Sana'a, the  exhausted protesters have largely departed the main 
square they had occupied. It  has been taken over by activists from Islah (or, 
the Islamist Congregation for  Reform), the country's main Islamist party. 
Islah was founded by leading members  of the powerful, Saudi-backed Hashid 
tribal confederation, whose decision to  turn against Saleh was a key moment 
in the uprising. Whichever side emerges  triumphant from the power struggle 
now under way, the Saudis have both  eventualities -- either Saleh or the 
Hashids -- covered. 
Looking at the future of the Middle East, perhaps the most decisive change  
could come in Syria. It was with a heavy dose of irony that King Abdullah  
condemned Syria for the murderous crackdown Damascus was waging against its 
own  popular rebellion in early August. Of course, Riyadh has a less than 
exemplary  human rights record, to say the least. Likewise, King Abdullah's 
announcement  that he was withdrawing Saudi Arabia's ambassador to Damascus 
was less a protest  against the savage brutality of the Syrian regime (if it 
was at all) as it was  another chapter in Riyadh's ongoing effort to loosen 
Iran's grasp on the  region's counterrevolution. The simultaneous decision by 
fellow Gulf Cooperation  Council members -- Kuwait and Bahrain -- to 
likewise withdraw their ambassadors,  followed by a communiqué from the Arab 
League expressing predictably muted  misgivings about Damascus' ongoing 
massacres, indicated the kingdom's ability to  line up allies and make them 
dance to 
the tune of the regional powerhouse. 
If the Syrian regime collapses (which is hardly imminent but appearing more 
 and more possible as peaceful demonstrations give way to armed 
insurrection), it  would mean the end not only of a brutal dictatorship but 
also of the 
only other  ostensibly secular Arab country apart from Tunisia -- another 
boon for Riyadh.  However, in light of Saudi Arabia's hardened stance, the 
real question is what  it envisions would happen in Syria if the regime were 
overthrown. Riyadh's hope,  clearly, is that a post-Assad Syria would align 
itself with a new Sunni-led,  more anti-Iran government in Damascus. That may 
be hoping against hope, at least  in the short term, because Syria is more 
likely to descend into a bloody,  sectarian-driven civil war than witness a 
smooth transition to a new government.  Riyadh, though, is banking on the 
Muslim Brotherhood and its allies ultimately  coming out on top. It is 
certainly true that, since most Syrians are Sunnis and  the Muslim Brotherhood 
is 
the best organized of the opposition groups, they are  the most likely to 
fill the vacuum in the long term. 
If the Arab Spring had any hope of ushering in greater freedom and 
democracy,  it would have had to challenge from the beginning the influence of 
Saudi 
Arabia,  the region's Washington-allied superpower and its most 
antidemocratic,  repressive regime. That is a tall order indeed. The tragic 
irony of 
the  uprisings is that the exact opposite happened.

-- 
Centroids: The Center of the Radical Centrist Community 
<[email protected]>
Google Group: http://groups.google.com/group/RadicalCentrism
Radical Centrism website and blog: http://RadicalCentrism.org

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