The argument that size does matter comes from the idea that our representative 
system that depends on upward influence cannot be efficient if it is being 
asked to do too much stuff.  That's why I believe it would be immediately 
helpful to shrink  the beast.  It cannot work if it is too large.

Kevin


  Actually, the "issue" of Big Government is mostly a non-issue for me.
  I want the government to do its job, to be efficient, not to be corrupt,
  not to be owned by special interests, to spend in a ruthlessly responsible 
way,
  to levy taxes that are necessary and not one dime more, and to be based
  on actual justice and objective evaluations of our problems. The size
  of gvt is FAR less important to me than if it does these things
  or does not do these things.

  Billy

  -------------------------------------------------------------



  11/23/2011 5:18:39 P.M. Pacific Standard Time, [email protected] 
writes:
    I thought that you liked big government and lots of regulators and 
regulations. 

    And it should probably be titled "How Bigger Government props up Big 
Finance," because the Government would have to be big enough to support not 
only its weight, but also the weight of "Big Finance" in order to be able to 
prop the latter up.  

    David 


    "Remember, to a liberal, anyone who makes money in an endeavor frowned upon 
by liberals is 'greedy' and any person who expresses an idea contrary to basic 
liberal dogma is preaching 'hate.'  How shallow these people are."—Neal Boortz 

     


    On 11/23/2011 5:04 PM, [email protected] wrote: 



      Real Clear Politics / Real Clear Markets



      November 22, 2011 
      How Government Props Up Big Finance
      By Marc Joffe & Anthony Randazzo

      Since medieval times, writers and ethicists have counted envy among the 
seven deadly sins. In utilitarian terms, envy is at best a zero-sum game 
because it can only be satisfied when someone loses.

      Given this moral and practical failing, it is a shame that envy plays 
such a large role in the Occupy Wall Street protests spread around the country. 
And, yet, the Occupy movement does have a point that transcends this negative 
emotion: the financial industry has grown large on the backs of government 
handouts, manipulated regulation, and taxpayer bailouts.

      While there is no objective size the financial industry should be, it is 
fair to say it would never have become this large without the crony capitalist 
system that has masqueraded as a free market. In the process, the financial 
industry has absorbed resources that could better be used elsewhere while 
imposing large, systemic risks on the economy. Watching others grow rich from 
special privilege understandably leads to envy, but from this perspective, the 
high compensation received by financial industry leaders is merely a symptom of 
a much larger problem.

      Big finance has achieved its present girth on the back of numerous policy 
decisions - some going back centuries. Many of these policies had the intention 
of protecting the general public, but often had the unintended consequence of 
enriching bankers beyond the product of their labor.

      For example, central banks often seek to encourage growth by lowering 
interest rates for small businesses and individuals. But in the process it is 
mainly large banks that benefit from higher margins, as the Fed provides 
lendable funds at a steep discount - not all of which is shared with borrowers. 
Federal policies designed to assist homebuyers also benefit mortgage investors 
and grant them taxpayer supported guarantees they will get paid (bailing out 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac has already cost $182 billion as a result).

      Subsidized mortgages also result in higher home prices - undermining 
affordability goals. Over the long term, consumers become more leveraged, while 
financial firms collect more interest and fees.

      But special privileges to the financial industry predate discretionary 
monetary policy and subsidized lending. Indeed, these privileges are so 
embedded in our system, they never occur to us. Perhaps the most distortionary 
of these is banking licenses that offer limited liability. Without such 
licenses, bank owners would have to use their personal assets to redeem 
deposits if borrowers default. Limited liability reduces the bank owners' risk 
to just their initial investment. The large number of state banking licenses 
granted during the nineteenth century allowed "one-percenters" of that era to 
profit from borrowing and lending, without worrying about large losses. They 
could also grow their institutions by making loans to less creditworthy 
borrowers, thereby creating systemic risk.

      This risk was usually shouldered by depositors, who often lost money 
during bank runs. During the Depression, the federal government solved this 
problem by creating deposit insurance. FDIC insurance enabled banks to grow 
even more, and it also freed them to take on even greater risks, since 
depositors no longer worried about how their funds were being deployed.

      As financial institutions have grown and consolidated over the years, 
some have become so systematically important that they have been deemed too big 
to fail. These institutions are now effectively eligible for bailouts in which 
all creditors - and not just small depositors - are made whole while management 
can either remain in place, or walk away with all their previous compensation 
plus a severance package to boot.

      These protections and hidden subsidies have enabled the financial 
industry to achieve enormous size and profitability, while placing the overall 
economy at great risk. Usually, these protections were accompanied by 
regulations such as capital requirements or size restrictions. These 
regulations usually failed to achieve their intended results - especially over 
the long term - because financial institutions are able to wear down the 
restrictions by lobbying and by hiring away key regulators.

      Instead of adding to the quantity of regulation, thereby creating more 
opportunities for the financial industry to game the system, we should tame the 
financial beast through greater accountability. One way to do this is to add a 
10 percent co-insurance feature to FDIC insurance for deposits above $10,000. 
Depositors with $11,000 in a failed bank would receive $10,900; while those 
with a $250,000 balance would get $226,000.

      Depositors would not be wiped out in the event of a failure, but they 
would have an incentive to select banks that are more careful with their money 
(while the poorest are still fully protected). Banks would then have to compete 
for depositor business, in part, by demonstrating that they have strong risk 
management.

      Those with exposure above the FDIC limit should take at least a 25 
percent haircut through the resolution process in the event of a bank failure. 
These stakeholders are often large financial institutions, acting as 
counterparties, who have the skill and resources to more closely monitor the 
banks with which they deal. This reform would address one of the most 
disturbing episodes of the financial crisis: Goldman Sachs' full recovery on 
CDO insurance contracts that triggered the AIG bailout. Certainly low and 
middle income taxpayers had better uses for this money than awarding it to the 
highly compensated financial wizards at Goldman.

      Bank managers should also have more skin in the game. If a bank fails or 
receives a bailout, directors, senior managers and highly compensated employees 
should have to repay creditors or the government at least a portion of past 
compensation they received from their failed institutions - particularly 
compensation tied to performance. Fear of impoverishment would have a 
substantial impact on the risk appetites for those leading major financial 
institutions.

      Finally, federally subsidized or guaranteed loans should be restricted to 
the truly needy. Today, mortgages of up to $625,500 can be purchased by Fannie 
Mae and Freddie Mac on the federal government's credit card. This subsidy 
should be limited to homes that are below the median price for a given area. If 
financial industry players want to originate mortgages to members of the upper 
middle class, they should be willing to assume the full risk of providing these 
loans.

      Indiscriminately taxing the rich is an envy-driven policy that only 
marginally addresses Wall Street's size, profitability and systemic risk. 
Vindication should always be discarded in favor of an effective reprieve. 
Policies that require financial industry participants to shoulder more of the 
risks they create will reduce the burden Wall Street imposes on the general 
public, will shrink the industry, and will release human talent for higher and 
better purposes.

      Rather than demotivate the next Steve Jobs, or reduce the resources Bill 
Gates deploys to fight AIDS and malaria, let's instead focus the Occupiers' 
energy on advocating solutions that truly improve the lives of the 99 percent.

      -- 
      Centroids: The Center of the Radical Centrist Community 
<[email protected]>
      Google Group: http://groups.google.com/group/RadicalCentrism
      Radical Centrism website and blog: http://RadicalCentrism.org


    -- 
    Centroids: The Center of the Radical Centrist Community 
<[email protected]>
    Google Group: http://groups.google.com/group/RadicalCentrism
    Radical Centrism website and blog: http://RadicalCentrism.org



  -- 
  Centroids: The Center of the Radical Centrist Community 
<[email protected]>
  Google Group: http://groups.google.com/group/RadicalCentrism
  Radical Centrism website and blog: http://RadicalCentrism.org

-- 
Centroids: The Center of the Radical Centrist Community 
<[email protected]>
Google Group: http://groups.google.com/group/RadicalCentrism
Radical Centrism website and blog: http://RadicalCentrism.org

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