Totally with you Mike. One of our contributors is leading that charge.
http://www.thirty-thousand.org/
"The framers of the Constitution and the Bill of Rights intended that the
total population of Congressional districts never exceed 50 to 60
thousand.
Currently, the average population size of the districts is nearly 700,000
and, consequently, the principle of proportionally equitable
representation
has been abandoned."
Kevin
What if we had 10,000 elected part-time congressmen (a single
representative per ~30,000 citizens)? That would seem to address
quite a few workload and expertise questions.
Not only that, it would bring many more minor parties and independents
into representation, flood out lobbyists, and increase representative
responsiveness. It would certainly also decrease the expense of
running an election, possibly leading to some middle income or working
class reps.
On Nov 26, 8:01 am, "Kevin Kervick" <[email protected]> wrote:
> The argument that size does matter comes from the idea that our
> representative system that depends on upward influence cannot be
> efficient
> if it is being asked to do too much stuff. That's why I believe it would
> be immediately helpful to shrink the beast. It cannot work if it is too
> large.
> Kevin
> Actually, the "issue" of Big Government is mostly a non-issue for me.
> I want the government to do its job, to be efficient, not to be corrupt,
> not to be owned by special interests, to spend in a ruthlessly
> responsible
> way,
> to levy taxes that are necessary and not one dime more, and to be based
> on actual justice and objective evaluations of our problems. The size
> of gvt is FAR less important to me than if it does these things
> or does not do these things.
> Billy
> -------------------------------------------------------------
> 11/23/2011 5:18:39 P.M. Pacific Standard Time, [email protected]
> writes:
> I thought that you liked big government and lots of regulators and
> regulations.
> And it should probably be titled "How Bigger Government props up Big
> Finance," because the Government would have to be big enough to support
> not only its weight, but also the weight of "Big Finance" in order to be
> able to prop the latter up.
> David
> "Remember, to a liberal, anyone who makes money in an endeavor frowned
> upon by liberals is 'greedy' and any person who expresses an idea
> contrary
> to basic liberal dogma is preaching 'hate.' How shallow these people
> are." Neal Boortz
> On 11/23/2011 5:04 PM, [email protected] wrote:
> Real Clear Politics / Real Clear Markets
> November 22, 2011
> How Government Props Up Big Finance
> By Marc Joffe & Anthony Randazzo
> Since medieval times, writers and ethicists have counted envy among the
> seven deadly sins. In utilitarian terms, envy is at best a zero-sum game
> because it can only be satisfied when someone loses.
> Given this moral and practical failing, it is a shame that envy plays
> such
> a large role in the Occupy Wall Street protests spread around the
> country.
> And, yet, the Occupy movement does have a point that transcends this
> negative emotion: the financial industry has grown large on the backs of
> government handouts, manipulated regulation, and taxpayer bailouts.
> While there is no objective size the financial industry should be, it is
> fair to say it would never have become this large without the crony
> capitalist system that has masqueraded as a free market. In the process,
> the financial industry has absorbed resources that could better be used
> elsewhere while imposing large, systemic risks on the economy. Watching
> others grow rich from special privilege understandably leads to envy,
> but
> from this perspective, the high compensation received by financial
> industry leaders is merely a symptom of a much larger problem.
> Big finance has achieved its present girth on the back of numerous
> policy
> decisions - some going back centuries. Many of these policies had the
> intention of protecting the general public, but often had the unintended
> consequence of enriching bankers beyond the product of their labor.
> For example, central banks often seek to encourage growth by lowering
> interest rates for small businesses and individuals. But in the process
> it
> is mainly large banks that benefit from higher margins, as the Fed
> provides lendable funds at a steep discount - not all of which is shared
> with borrowers. Federal policies designed to assist homebuyers also
> benefit mortgage investors and grant them taxpayer supported guarantees
> they will get paid (bailing out Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac has already
> cost $182 billion as a result).
> Subsidized mortgages also result in higher home prices - undermining
> affordability goals. Over the long term, consumers become more
> leveraged,
> while financial firms collect more interest and fees.
> But special privileges to the financial industry predate discretionary
> monetary policy and subsidized lending. Indeed, these privileges are so
> embedded in our system, they never occur to us. Perhaps the most
> distortionary of these is banking licenses that offer limited liability.
> Without such licenses, bank owners would have to use their personal
> assets
> to redeem deposits if borrowers default. Limited liability reduces the
> bank owners' risk to just their initial investment. The large number of
> state banking licenses granted during the nineteenth century allowed
> "one-percenters" of that era to profit from borrowing and lending,
> without
> worrying about large losses. They could also grow their institutions by
> making loans to less creditworthy borrowers, thereby creating systemic
> risk.
> This risk was usually shouldered by depositors, who often lost money
> during bank runs. During the Depression, the federal government solved
> this problem by creating deposit insurance. FDIC insurance enabled banks
> to grow even more, and it also freed them to take on even greater risks,
> since depositors no longer worried about how their funds were being
> deployed.
> As financial institutions have grown and consolidated over the years,
> some
> have become so systematically important that they have been deemed too
> big
> to fail. These institutions are now effectively eligible for bailouts in
> which all creditors - and not just small depositors - are made whole
> while
> management can either remain in place, or walk away with all their
> previous compensation plus a severance package to boot.
> These protections and hidden subsidies have enabled the financial
> industry
> to achieve enormous size and profitability, while placing the overall
> economy at great risk. Usually, these protections were accompanied by
> regulations such as capital requirements or size restrictions. These
> regulations usually failed to achieve their intended results -
> especially
> over the long term - because financial institutions are able to wear
> down
> the restrictions by lobbying and by hiring away key regulators.
> Instead of adding to the quantity of regulation, thereby creating more
> opportunities for the financial industry to game the system, we should
> tame the financial beast through greater accountability. One way to do
> this is to add a 10 percent co-insurance feature to FDIC insurance for
> deposits above $10,000. Depositors with $11,000 in a failed bank would
> receive $10,900; while those with a $250,000 balance would get $226,000.
> Depositors would not be wiped out in the event of a failure, but they
> would have an incentive to select banks that are more careful with their
> money (while the poorest are still fully protected). Banks would then
> have
> to compete for depositor business, in part, by demonstrating that they
> have strong risk management.
> Those with exposure above the FDIC limit should take at least a 25
> percent
> haircut through the resolution process in the event of a bank failure.
> These stakeholders are often large financial institutions, acting as
> counterparties, who have the skill and resources to more closely monitor
> the banks with which they deal. This reform would address one of the
> most
> disturbing episodes of the financial crisis: Goldman Sachs' full
> recovery
> on CDO insurance contracts that triggered the AIG bailout. Certainly low
> and middle income taxpayers had better uses for this money than awarding
> it to the highly compensated financial wizards at Goldman.
> Bank managers should also have more skin in the game. If a bank fails or
> receives a bailout, directors, senior managers and highly compensated
> employees should have to repay creditors or the government at least a
> portion of past compensation they received from their failed
> institutions - particularly compensation tied to performance. Fear of
> impoverishment would have a substantial impact on the risk appetites for
> those leading major financial institutions.
> Finally, federally subsidized or guaranteed loans should be restricted
> to
> the truly needy. Today, mortgages of up to $625,500 can be purchased by
> Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac on the federal government's credit card. This
> subsidy should be limited to homes that are below the median price for a
> given area. If financial industry players want to originate mortgages to
> members of the upper middle class, they should be willing to assume the
> full risk of providing these loans.
> Indiscriminately taxing the rich is an envy-driven policy that only
> marginally addresses Wall Street's size, profitability and systemic
> risk.
> Vindication should always be discarded in favor of an effective
> reprieve.
> Policies that require financial industry participants to shoulder more
> of
> the risks they create will reduce the burden Wall Street imposes on the
> general public, will shrink the industry, and will release human talent
> for
...
read more ยป
