from the site:
Professor Bainbridge.com
 
July 7, 2011
 
Derivatives and the Legal Origin of the 2008 Credit  Crisis
 
 
My friend and UCLAW colleague Lynn Stout has posted an interesting paper to 
 SSRN entitled _Derivatives and the Legal Origin of the 2008 Credit  
Crisis_ (http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1874806) : 
Experts still debate what caused the credit crisis of 2008. This Article  
argues that dubious honor belongs, first and foremost, to a little-known  
statute called the Commodities Futures Modernization Act of 2000 (CFMA). Put  
simply, the credit crisis was not primarily due to changes in the markets; it 
 was due to changes in the law. In particular, the crisis was the direct 
and  foreseeable (and in fact foreseen by the author and others) consequence 
of the  CFMA’s sudden and wholesale removal of centuries-old legal 
constraints on  speculative trading in over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives.

Derivative  contracts are probabilistic bets on future events. They can be 
used to hedge,  which reduces risk, but they also provide attractive 
vehicles for  disagreement-based speculation that increases risk. Thus, as an 
empirical  matter, the social welfare consequences of derivatives trading 
depend 
on  whether the market is dominated by hedging or speculative transactions. 
The  common law recognized the differing welfare consequences of hedging and 
 speculation through a doctrine called “the rule against difference 
contracts”  that treated derivative contracts that did not serve a hedging 
purpose 
as  unenforceable wagers. Speculators responded by shifting their 
derivatives  trading onto organized exchanges that provided private enforcement 
through  clearinghouses in which exchange members guaranteed contract 
performance. 
The  clearinghouses effectively cabined and limited the social cost of 
derivatives  risk. In the twentieth century, the Commodity Exchange Act (CEA) 
largely  replaced the common law. Like the common law, the CEA confined 
speculative  derivatives trading to the organized (and now-regulated) 
exchanges. 
For many  decades, this regulatory system also kept derivatives speculation 
from posing  significant problems for the larger economy.

These traditional legal  restraints on OTC speculation were systematically 
dismantled during the 1980s  and 1990s, culminating in 2000 with the 
enactment of the CFMA. That  legislation set the stage for the 2008 crises by 
legalizing, for the first  time in U.S. history, speculative OTC trading in 
derivatives. The result was  an exponential increase in the size of the OTC 
market, culminating in 2008  with the spectacular failures of several 
systemically important financial  institutions (and the near-failures of 
several 
others) due to bad derivatives  bets. In the wake of the crisis, Congress 
passed 
the Dodd-Frank Wall Street  Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 
(Dodd-Frank Act). Title VII of the  Act is devoted to turning back the 
regulatory 
clock by restoring legal limits  on speculative derivatives trading outside 
of a clearinghouse. However, Title  VII is subject to a number of possible 
exemptions that may limit its  effectiveness, leading to continuing concern 
over whether we will see more  derivatives-fueled institutional collapses in 
the  future.


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