January 29, 2011
 
Asia Times
 
 
The tearful origins of China's  stealth
By Peter Lee 

The recent test flight of  China's J-20 stealth fighter has occasioned 
certain uproar in international  security circles, as well as paroxysms of joy 
among China's more nationalistic  netizens. 

Despite no hard information on its stealthiness or its  capabilities beyond 
the fact that it was able to take off, fly for 15 minutes,  and land, the 
J-20 is already serving as justification for heightened concern  and its 
inevitable adjunct, higher military spending, in the United States,  South 
Korea 
and Japan. 

>From a psychological standpoint, an interesting  sidebar to the J-20 furor 
has been the reporting on allegations that China used  industrial and 
military espionage to develop its stealth

capabilities, perhaps with the implication that China's reactive and  
decadent communist system would be incapable of such innovations on its own.  

On January 24, an Indian-American engineer who had worked on the B-2  
stealth program, Noshir Gowadia, was sentenced to 32 years in prison for 
selling  
secret military aviation technology to China. The New York Times 
characterized  the technology, apparently incorrectly, as "stealth missile 
technology";  according to the Times of India, the technology in question was 
nozzle  
technology meant to reduce vulnerability to heat-seeking missiles, rather 
than  the radar-related cloak of invisibility usually associated with 
"stealth".  

It is not difficult to view the timing of Gowadia's sentencing (which  was 
reportedly originally supposed to occur in November 2010 after five years of 
 imprisonment and a trial that concluded in August 2010 with a guilty 
verdict) as  an effort to emphasize the tainted character of China's stealth 
achievement. [1]  

News reports also addressed the possibility that China had successfully  
exploited the wreckage of a US stealth fighter to develop its own 
capabilities.  

During the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) campaign against  
Serbia in 1999, an American F-117A stealth fighter was shot down. Some wreckage 
 
undoubtedly made it into Chinese hands. Slobodan Lekic and Dusan Stojanovic 
of  the Associated Press (AP) reported on January 23:  
"At the time, our intelligence reports told of Chinese agents  
crisscrossing the region where the F-117 disintegrated, buying up parts of the  
plane 
from local farmers," says Admiral Davor Domazet-Loso, Croatia's military  
chief of staff during the Kosovo war. 

"We believe the Chinese used  those materials to gain an insight into 
secret stealth technologies ... and to  reverse-engineer them," Domazet-Loso 
said 
in a telephone interview. 

A  senior Serbian military official confirmed that pieces of the wreckage 
were  removed by souvenir collectors, and that some ended up "in the hands of 
 foreign military attaches". [2]
The idea that the United States had  not taken adequate steps to secure the 
F-117A wreckage and useful technology may  have thereby found its way into 
enemy hands is apparently rather irksome to the  Pentagon. 

Elizabeth Bumiller transmitted the US official pushback in the  January 26 
New York Times article titled "US Doubts '99 Jet Debris Gave China  Stealth 
Edge":  
[I]t's hard to imagine that a great deal of applicable and useful  
information could have been culled from the site," said an Air Force official,  
who 
asked for anonymity because he was not authorized to speak publicly about  
military intelligence. [3]
Careful readers will note the conditional  remark that little useful 
information "could have been culled from the site".  There is the issue of what 
useful information could have been extracted from  wreckage removed from the 
site. 

There is a link between Serbia in 1999  and the flight of the J-20 in 2011 
that is undeniable: the US bombing of the  Chinese Embassy in Belgrade on 
May 7,1999. And the wreckage of the F-117A may  have been the crucial 
precipitating factor. 

It is safe to say that  almost no one in China believes that the 1999 
embassy bombing was accidental.  When the incident is referenced in Chinese 
media, the term "mistaken bombing"  (wuzha) is often enclosed in quotation 
marks, 
as in "alleged mistaken  bombing". 

The official US story has done little to dispel suspicion.  

George Tenet, director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA),  testified 
before the US Congress that the US intended to bomb Yugoslavia's  Federal 
Directorate for Supply and Procurement aka a warehouse suspected of  "arms 
proliferation activity", but the wrong coordinates were provided to the  
bomber, causing five 2,000-pound (909 kilograms) MK-84 JDAM GPS-guided smart  
bombs to slam into the Chinese Embassy instead, killing three (identified by 
the  Chinese as journalists), injuring 20, and gutting the structure.  

Amazingly, of the 900 target packages executed during the Kosovo war, it  
transpired that the "mistaken bombing" was the only mission developed by the  
CIA. 

Although the air war was nominally under NATO direction, the  embassy 
mission (as well as several others) was flown as a strictly US operation  using 
equipment based in the United States. [4] 

A European defense  publication reported:  
It should be noted that, in an interview with the author, NATO  spokesman 
Lee McClenny confirmed that the targeting information did not go  through JTF 
NOBLE ANVIL, or any other NATO structure, in contrast to Tennet's  [sic] 
official public statements. Instead, the co-ordinates were passed  directly 
from the CIA to Whiteman Air Force Base, the home of the 509th Bomb  Wing, 
where it was programmed into the JDAMs. Mr McClenny asserted that the  entire 
process had remained 'Stateside', hence the failure of NATO staff to  'scrub' 
the target to check its accuracy, authenticity and location.  

When asked, the CIA again asserted that the story given by Tennet  [sic] to 
the House Committee was true, but claimed that the targeting  information 
went from the CIA to the Pentagon to be processed. The Pentagon  was only 
prepared to say that "some of the F-117 and B-2 missions were used as  
'national assets' and therefore did not pass through NATO command structures",  
despite the requirement under the NATO charter to clear all missions carried  
out under NATO auspices with the NATO general council ... [Previously reported 
 in Venik's Aviation web site, citing a May 2000 report in Air Forces 
Monthly;  link no longer valid.] 
A joint investigation by the British  newspaper The Observer and Denmark's 
Politiken made the explosive allegation  that the Chinese Embassy had been 
intentionally targeted to remove a key  rebroadcast station directing the 
military activities of Slobodan Milosevic's  forces in their struggle to resist 
NATO forces. 

According to The  Observer, a US officer airily dismissed the handwringing 
of his NATO associates:   
British, Canadian and French air targeteers rounded on an American  colonel 
on the morning of May 8. Angrily they denounced the "cock-up". The US  
colonel was relaxed. "Bullshit," he replied to the complaints. "That was great  
targeting ... we put three JDAMs down into the [military] attache's office 
and  took out the exact room we wanted ... [5]
The story was largely  ignored by the US media. 

When FAIR, the organization for Fairness and  Accuracy in Reporting, pushed 
the New York Times to address the allegations, the  paper, as it would do 
again in 2011 on the stealth story, obliged the Pentagon  by pushing back. 

Today, post-Internet, post-Iraq War, post-Judith  Miller, the Times' 
self-satisfied complacency in dismissing the story has the  quaint air of a 
different era. 

In an October 22, 1999 article, FAIR  wrote:  
So far, the reaction in the mainstream US media has been a  deafening 
silence. To date, none of America's three major network evening news  programs 
has mentioned the Observer's findings. Neither has the New York Times  or USA 
Today, even though the story was covered by AP, Reuters and other major  
wires. 

The Washington Post relegated the story to a 90-word news brief  in its 
"World Briefing" (10/18/99), under the headline "NATO Denies Story on  Embassy 
Bombing. "By contrast, the story appeared in England not only in the  
Observer and its sister paper, the Guardian (10/17/99), but also in their  
leading 
rival, the Times of London, which ran a follow-up article on the  official 
reaction the next day (10/18/99). The Globe and Mail, Canada's most  
prestigious paper, ran the full Reuters account prominently in its  
international 
section (10/18/99). So did the Times of India, the Sydney  Morning Herald and 
the Irish Times (all 10/18/99). The prominent Danish daily  Politiken, 
which collaborated with the Observer on the investigation, was on  strike, but 
ran the story on its website. [6] 
FAIR and its  supporters rattled a few media cages, and got dismissive 
replies from the New  York Times and USA Today. The Times' Andrew Rosenthal 
characterized The Observer  article as "not terribly well sourced". In its 
rebuttal, FAIR stated:  
FAIR contacted journalists at both The Observer and Politiken.  According 
to The Observer's US correspondent, Ed Vulliamy, its foreign editor,  Peter 
Beaumont, and Politiken reporter Jens Holsoe, their sources included the  
following: 
A European NATO military officer serving in an operational capacity at the  
four-star level - a source at the highest possible level within NATO -  
confirmed three things: (1) That NATO targeted the Chinese Embassy  
deliberately; (2) That the embassy was emitting Yugoslav military radio  
signals; and 
(3) That the target was not approved through the normal NATO  channels but 
through a second, "American-only" track.  A European NATO staff officer at the 
two-star level in the Defense  Intelligence office confirmed the same 
story.  Two US sources: A very high-ranking former senior American intelligence 
 
official connected to the Balkans - "about as high as you can get", 
according  to one reporter - confirmed that the embassy was deliberately 
targeted. A 
 mid-ranking current US military official, also connected to the Balkans,  
confirmed elements of the story and pointedly refused to deny that the 
embassy  had been bombed deliberately.  A NATO flight controller based in 
Naples 
and a NATO intelligence officer  monitoring Yugoslav radio broadcasts from 
Macedonia each confirmed that NATO's  signals intelligence located Yugoslav 
military radio signals coming from the  Chinese Embassy in Belgrade. When 
they informed their superiors, they were  told that the matter would be handled 
further up in the chain of command. Two  weeks later, the embassy was 
bombed.  An official at the US National Imagery and Mapping Agency told the  
reporters that NATO's official explanation, which involves a faulty map of  
Belgrade, is a "damned lie". [7]
Finally, the Times, still  coasting on its Pentagon Papers reputation, 
replied to one correspondent:  
"There is nothing in the distinguished history of the Times -  where 
reporters have risked their lives, been threatened with jail and indeed  gone 
to 
jail to protect the public's right to know things the government does  not 
want to get out - to suggest that we would withhold such a  story."
The case that the US bombed the Chinese Embassy may still be  stamped "Not 
Proved", but the circumstantial evidence is pretty strong.  

As to why the US might have wanted to bomb the embassy, the theories are  
legion. 

They all center on the indisputable fact that China was  sympathetic to 
Serbia and had dispatched a team of intelligence specialists  under the 
direction of a senior military attache, Ren Bokai (identified in many  news 
reports 
as "Ven Bo Koy"), to get a first-hand look at US technology,  capabilities 
and doctrine. 


One of the JDAMs, as The Observer reported, indeed went right into the  
window of the Chinese intelligence directorate, seriously injuring Ren (who was 
 evacuated on a special plane to China for medical treatment). 

It is  variously speculated that:
The Chinese Embassy was intercepting NATO radio traffic.  China was 
monitoring the performance of US cruise missiles (which is what  Ren reportedly 
said was the case).  China was abusing its embassy immunity privileges to 
operate a radio  retransmission station that on behalf of a Serbian 
paramilitary 
bad guy.  China was testing a new kind of stealth-detecting radar in the 
embassy and  passing information to the Serbian military.  The raid was an 
attempt to assassinate Slobidan Milosevic during a visit to  the embassy.  The 
raid was an effort to punish and intimidate China for its support of  Serbia. 

The most interesting theory is that the US attacked the  embassy
to destroy wreckage of the USF-117A that China was planning to ship  back 
to China. 

The F117A had been shot down a few weeks prior to the  embassy bombing, on 
March 27, 1999, by a Serbian anti-aircraft battery.  

Apparently, the F-117A was designed to be stealthy to modern, high  
frequency radar but was at least partially visible to the antiquated long-wave  
Czech radar operated by the Serbs. 

The F-117A crashed in a field outside  Belgrade and wreckage was all over 
the place. The loss of the plane caused  extreme anxiety in the United 
States. 

A RAND study indicated that the  only thing that kept the US from bombing 
the wreckage to flinders was the  presence of a crowd of government 
officials, diplomats, journalists and gawkers  at the crash site: 
  
Heated arguments arose in Washington and elsewhere in the  immediate 
aftermath of the shootdown over whether USEUCOM had erred in not  aggressively 
having sought to destroy the wreckage of the downed F 117 in  order to keep its 
valuable stealth technology out of unfriendly hands and  eliminate its 
propaganda value ... Said a former commander of Tactical Air  Command 

"I'm surprised  we didn't bomb it because the standard operating procedure 
has always been  that when you lose something of real or perceived value - 
in this case, real  technology, stealth - you destroy it." ... Reports 
indicated  that military officials had at first considered destroying the 
wreckage 
but  opted in the end not to follow through with the attempt because they 
could not  have located it quickly enough to attack it before it was 
surrounded by  civilians and the media. [8]


 
[Unless the president happens to be named Obama and an  advanced stealth 
drone lands, intact, in Iran and despite military  requests  -as close to 
demands as it is possible for ranking officers to  make to a president-  and he 
decides to hand over an entire suite of high  tech, free of charge, so that 
Islamic sensitivities won't be  irritated  That is, Obama is a traitor.
BR comment]

As noted above, the Chinese reportedly bought some pieces from farmers;  
some found its way to a military museum in Belgrade, where it can be viewed  
today (at one time it was reportedly possible to buy souvenir fragments at 
the  museum gift shop); but much of the wreckage was apparently acquired by 
the  Serbian government, which distributed - or possibly sold - chunks to its 
allies  as reward/payment for their support. 

In 2001, the Russians confirmed  that they had received pieces of the 
F-117A and used it to improve the stealth  detection capabilities of their 
anti-aircraft missiles. 

It is not  unreasonable to assume that the Chinese got some pieces as well 
- despite the  efforts of a "Pentagon analyst" to make the case that China's 
technological  backwardness would disqualify them from any interest in 
owning some stealth  wreckage. 

An article in the September 27, 1999, issue of Aviation Week  and Space 
Technology reported, "A Russian official said that some parts had made  their 
way to Moscow, but that the bulk of the airframe was shipped to China," a  
claim that "Pentagon analysts" dismissed "because "China ... doesn't have the  
industrial capability to benefit from either the design or the systems."  

In this context, it is suggestive that the F-117A was rather abruptly  
retired in favor of the F-22A Raptor, perhaps because the Serbian shootdown  
demonstrated a rather embarrassing lack of stealthiness, and/or access to the  
wreckage enabled more effective anti-stealth measures by Russia and China 
(it  was reported that plans to deploy the F-117A in South Korea were redrawn 
after  the 1999 incident raised concerns about its vulnerability). 

Chinese  rumor-mongering on the Internet also tried to fill in the blanks, 
and link the  F-117A wreckage to the attack on the embassy. 

According to an Internet  account of "a private encounter with a Chinese 
naval officer who was slightly  tipsy" (now deleted), the Yugoslavian 
government had recovered the wreckage of  the shot down F-117 and sold key 
pieces of 
it to China. The navigation system,  fuselage fragments with the Stealth 
coating, and high temperature nozzle  components of the engine were spirited 
into the basement of the Chinese Embassy.  Unfortunately, according to this 
story, there was a locator beacon inside the  INU powered by a battery and, 
before the Chinese could discover and disable it,  the US military was 
alerted to the location of the F-117 fragments and executed  the bombing. 

It would not be out of the question that the Bill Clinton  administration 
would bomb the Chinese Embassy to deflect criticism for its  handling of the 
F-117A wreckage debacle, demonstrate its national security  muscularity, and 
score some Team America points by pummeling some  tangentially-related 
Third World asset. 

Indeed, this is what happened  the next year, in 2000, when an al-Qaeda 
attack seriously damaged the USS  Cole in Yemen, killing 17 seamen; the US 
cruise-missiled a seemingly  innocent pharmaceutical plant in Sudan - then an 
al-Qaeda stronghold - in  apparent retaliation. 

In a memoir published in 2006, China's ambassador  to Serbia, Pan Zhanlin, 
rather coyly intimated something very important had been  extracted from the 
embassy in the chaotic aftermath of the attack: 

The two comrades in charge of the embassy's important assets were  Little 
Wang and Little Zheng. One slept in the duty office on the fifth floor,  one 
slept in the dormitory on the fourth floor. Little Wang pierced through  the 
dust and smoke and by the light of the flames descended from the fifth  
floor to the fourth floor. 

At this time, Little Zheng emerged from the  bedroom. Little Wang grabbed 
hold of Little Zheng and ran back upstairs.  Little Zheng had already been 
injured and his face was flecked with blood.  People who ran into them 
urgently asked: "Why are you going back up?" Little  Wang replied: "There is 
something that needs doing. This is our job."  

They picked up four cases of national important assets and battled  through 
smoke and pierced through flames to get downstairs. The stairwell was  cut 
off, they stumbled down to the third floor. Ahead of time, the embassy had  
made various preparations for an emergency, so these four cases of important 
 things had already been prepared. If any untoward event had occurred, they 
 could be picked up and moved immediately. They knew, these things were 
more  important than life. [9]
"Something more important than life". Stealth wreckage? Pan isn't saying.  

Regardless of the motives or mistakes behind the US bombing of the  
Belgrade embassy, however, the consequences were significant. Viewed in  
retrospect, the bombing can be considered, albeit on a smaller scale, a 9/11  
moment 
for China. 

Pan Zhanlin's description of the attack awakens dark  memories of our own. 

He conveys the shock and fear as the embassy  explodes into flames, "the 
loudest sound I ever heard". Survivors found the  stairwells blocked by rubble 
and fire and desperately improvised escapes down  the exterior of the 
building using knotted drapes. Pan saw his friends and  colleagues stagger from 
the ruins of the embassy dazed and bloody, crying out  for help. 

Amid the chaos everybody ducked in fear of a follow-up attack  as NATO 
bombers thundered overhead (May 7 was one of the busiest nights for  aerial 
bombing). Then came the frantic ad hoc attempts to rally the survivors,  
account 
for the living, and search for the missing. 

First responders  were initially unable to enter the compound because the 
electric gate was  disabled when the bombing cut the power; ambulances raced 
up to the shattered  structure with sirens howling to rush away the injured 
willy-nilly; embassy  staffers mounted a frantic search through local 
hospitals for the injured.  

Finally, there was the extraction of the dead; consoling of the wounded;  
the grieving; and a defiant patriotic oration. 

One JDAM failed to  explode and buried itself in the ground near the 
embassy foundations; the  building was abandoned and the expensive and 
dangerous 
job of removing the bomb  was only accomplished five years later. 

Again viewed through a post-9/11  lens, Pan's account also paints a picture 
of a privileged Chinese elite that has  been stripped of the illusion that 
it is immune to attack, and realizing with  anger, shame and disgust that at 
that moment it is helpless, vulnerable and  unable to retaliate. 

Reports of the bombing triggered an outpouring of  populist and official 
Chinese anger that signaled a break from the  pre-democracy/pro-US popular 
Chinese outlook prevalent during the democracy  movement period, and a shift to 
the nationalist tone that dominates Chinese  opinion today. 

Chinese opinion was not mollified by the US apology,  accompanied by 
Western insistence that the incident was a simple, regrettable  mistake. 

It should also be noted in passing that Pan's memoir debunks  the canard, 
spread at the time by Western news reports seemingly anxious to  minimize the 
destructiveness of the attack, that at night the embassy was empty  
(presumably excluding Chinese spooks huddled over their equipment in the  
intelligence directory). 

In fact, at night the embassy was filled with  staffers and their families, 
who believed that it was safer to stay at the  embassy - whose coordinates 
were registered with NATO - than spend the night at  their homes as NATO 
bombing operations against Belgrade were at their height.  

One Chinese legend has a Chinese plane returning dozens of coffins -  
instead of the officially acknowledged three - to the motherland. The stealth  
wreckage, according to this story, returned to China on the same plane.  

In the reported words of the tipsy naval officer ("who spoke with tears  in 
his eyes"): 

"Although some of our people sacrificed their lives, we gained no  less 
than ten years in the development of our stealth materials. We purchased  this 
progress with our blood and international mortification."
Premier Zhu Rongji - not given to sentimental public displays - reportedly  
wept when he met the plane carrying the victims. Another Internet poster 
wrote: 

Now we know, and it causes us to appreciate even more profoundly  that a 
nation, when it is poor and weak, is without recourse and pitiful (How  
helpless and evoking bitterness in people's hearts were the tears of Premier  
Zhu 
Rongji as he wept at the airfield when the remains of the martyrs were  
transported back to China).
Whether it was a matter of stealth technology - or the conviction that  
China must strive for military parity with the United States in order to secure 
 its security and render it impervious to insults and intimidation - it is 
safe  to say that, to a certain extent, the J-20 was Made in America ... via 
Belgrade.  

Notes 
1. _Indian-American  gets 32 yrs for selling US secrets_ 
(http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Indian-American-gets-32-yrs-for-selling-secrets/artic
leshow/7364862.cms) , Times of India, Jan 26, 2011. 
2. _China's  new stealth fighter may use US technology_ 
(http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20110123/ap_on_re_eu/eu_us_stealth_technology_china)
 , Yahoo, Jan 
23, 2011.
3. _USDoubts  '99 Jet Debris Gave China Stealth Edge_ 
(http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/26/world/asia/26stealth.html?_r=1&ref=world) , 
New York Times, 
Jan 25, 2011.
4.  _USMilitary  Acted Outside NATO Framework During Kosovo Conflict, 
France Says_ 
(http://www.nytimes.com/1999/11/11/world/us-military-acted-outside-nato-framework-during-kosovo-conflict-france-says.html?pagewanted=2&src=pm)
 , 
New York  Times, Nov 11, 1999.
5. _Nato bombed Chinese  deliberately_ 
(http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/1999/oct/17/balkans) , Guardian, Oct 17, 1999.
6. _USMedia Overlook Expose on  Chinese Embassy Bombing_ 
(http://www.fair.org/index.php?page=1766) , FAIR, Oct 22, 1999.
7. _Chinese Embassy Bombing - Media  Reply_ 
(http://www.fair.org/index.php?page=1764) , FAIR Responds, FAIR, Nov 3, 1999.
8. _Friction  and operational problems_ 
(http://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1365/MR1365.ch6.pdf) , RAND.
9. Click _here_ (http://book.qq.com/s/book/0/4/4990/index.shtml)  for text 
(in  Chinese). 

Peter Lee writes on East and South Asian affairs and  their intersection 
with US foreign policy. 

(Copyright 2011 Asia  Times Online (Holdings) Ltd.

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