The Atlantic
 
What the Media Gets Wrong About Israel
The news tells us less about  Israel than about the people writing the 
news, a former AP reporter says. 

 
_Matti Friedman_ (http://www.theatlantic.com/matti-friedman/)   Nov 30  2014
 
During the Gaza war this summer, it became clear that one of the most  
important aspects of the media-saturated conflict between Jews and Arabs is 
also 
 the least covered: the press itself. The Western press has become less an  
observer of this conflict than an actor in it, a role with consequences for 
the  millions of people trying to comprehend current events, including 
policymakers  who depend on journalistic accounts to understand a region where 
they  consistently seek, and fail, to productively intervene. 
An _essay  I wrote for Tablet_ 
(http://tabletmag.com/jewish-news-and-politics/183033/israel-insider-guide)  on 
this topic in the aftermath of the war  
sparked intense interest. In the article, based on my experiences between 
2006  and 2011 as a reporter and editor in the Jerusalem bureau of the 
Associated  Press, one of the world’s largest news organizations, I pointed out 
the 
 existence of a problem and discussed it in broad terms. Using staffing 
numbers,  I illustrated the disproportionate media attention devoted to this 
conflict  relative to other stories, and gave examples of editorial decisions 
that  appeared to be driven by ideological considerations rather than 
journalistic  ones. I suggested that the cumulative effect has been to create a 
grossly  oversimplified story—a kind of modern morality play in which the Jews 
of Israel  are displayed more than any other people on earth as examples of 
moral failure.  This is a thought pattern with deep roots in Western 
civilization. 
But how precisely does this thought pattern manifest itself in the 
day-to-day  functioning, or malfunctioning, of the press corps? To answer this 
question, I  want to explore the way Western press coverage is shaped by unique 
circumstances  here in Israel and also by flaws affecting the media beyond 
the confines of this  conflict. In doing so, I will draw on my own experiences 
and those of  colleagues. These are obviously limited and yet, I believe, 
representative. 
 

 
I’ll begin with a simple illustration. The above photograph is of a  
student rally held last November at Al-Quds University, a mainstream 
Palestinian  
institution in East Jerusalem. The rally, in support of the armed 
fundamentalist  group Islamic Jihad, featured actors playing dead Israeli 
soldiers and 
a row of  masked men whose stiff-armed salute was returned by some of the 
hundreds of  students in attendance. Similar rallies have been held 
periodically at the  school. 
I am not using this photograph to make the case that Palestinians are 
Nazis.  Palestinians are not Nazis. They are, like Israelis, human beings 
dealing 
with a  difficult present and past in ways that are occasionally ugly. I 
cite it now for  a different reason. 
Such an event at an institution like Al-Quds University, headed at the time 
 by a well-known moderate professor, and with ties to sister institutions 
in  America, indicates something about the winds now blowing in Palestinian 
society  and across the Arab world. The rally is interesting for the visual 
connection it  makes between radical Islam here and elsewhere in the region; 
a picture like  this could help explain why many perfectly rational Israelis 
fear withdrawing  their military from East Jerusalem or the West Bank, even 
if they loathe the  occupation and wish to live in peace with their 
Palestinian neighbors. The  images from the demonstration were, as photo 
editors 
like to say, “strong.” The  rally had, in other words, all the necessary 
elements of a powerful news  story. 
The event took place a short drive from the homes and offices of the 
hundreds  of international journalists who are based in Jerusalem. Journalists 
were aware  of it: The sizable Jerusalem bureau of the Associated Press, for 
example, which  can produce several stories on an average day, was in 
possession of photos of  the event, including the one above, a day later. (The 
photographs were taken by  someone I know who was on campus that day, and I 
sent 
them to the bureau  myself.) Jerusalem editors decided that the images, and 
the rally, were not  newsworthy, and the demonstration was only mentioned by 
the AP weeks later when  the organization’s Boston bureau_  reported _ 
(http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/11/21/brandeis-palestinian-univer
sity/3660975/) that Brandeis University had cut ties with Al-Quds over the  
incident. On the day that the AP decided to ignore the rally, November 6, 
2013,  the same bureau published a _report_ 
(http://bigstory.ap.org/article/us-gives-75-million-more-aid-palestinians)   
about a pledge from the U.S. 
State Department to provide a minor funding  increase for the Palestinian 
Authority; that was newsworthy. This is standard.  To offer another 
illustration, 
the construction of 100 apartments in a Jewish  settlement is always news; 
the smuggling of 100 rockets into Gaza by Hamas is,  with rare exceptions, 
not news at all.
 
I mention these instances to demonstrate the kind of decisions made 
regularly  in the bureaus of the foreign press covering Israel and the 
Palestinian  
territories, and to show the way in which the pipeline of information from 
this  place is not just rusty and leaking, which is the usual state of 
affairs in the  media, but intentionally plugged. 
There are banal explanations for problems with coverage—reporters are in a  
hurry, editors are overloaded and distracted. These are realities, and can  
explain small _errors_ 
(http://www.theblaze.com/stories/2014/10/23/bias-on-steroids-this-ap-headline-explains-why-so-many-complain-about-media-coverage-
of-israel/)   and _mishaps_ 
(http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/11/18/cnn-jerusalem-mistake_n_6179044.html) 
  like ill-conceived _headlines_ 
(http://www.theblaze.com/stories/2014/11/18/cnn-earns-online-criticism-after-running-th
is-headline-following-jerusalem-terror-attack-unreal/) ,  which is why such 
details don’t typically strike me as important or worth much  analysis. 
Some _say_ 
(http://www.onthemedia.org/story/ethan-bronner-and-matti-friedman-coverage-israel-palestine/transcript/)
   inflations and omissions are the 
inevitable results of an honest attempt to  cover events in a challenging and 
occasionally dangerous reporting environment,  which is what I initially 
believed myself. A few years on the job changed my  mind. Such excuses can’t 
explain why the same inflations and omissions recur  again and again, why they 
are common to so many news outlets, and why the simple  “Israel story” of 
the international media is so foreign to people aware of the  historical and 
regional context of events in this place. The explanation lies  elsewhere. 


* * * 
To make sense of most international journalism from Israel, it is important 
 first to understand that the news tells us far less about Israel than 
about the  people writing the news. Journalistic decisions are made by people 
who exist in  a particular social milieu, one which, like most social groups, 
involves a  certain uniformity of attitude, behavior, and even dress (the 
fashion these  days, for those interested, is less vests with unnecessary 
pockets than shirts  with unnecessary buttons). These people know each other, 
meet regularly,  exchange information, and closely watch one another’s work. 
This helps explain  why a reader looking at articles written by the 
half-dozen biggest news  providers in the region on a particular day will find 
that 
though the pieces are  composed and edited by completely different people and 
organizations, they tend  to tell the same story.
 
 
The best insight into one of the key phenomena at play here comes not from 
a  local reporter but from the journalist and author Philip Gourevitch. In 
Rwanda  and elsewhere in Africa, Gourevitch _wrote  in 2010_ 
(http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/the-moral-hazards-of-humanitarian-aid-what-is-to-be-
done) , he was struck by the ethical gray zone of ties between reporters  
and NGOs. “Too often the press represents humanitarians with unquestioning  
admiration,” he observed in The New Yorker. “Why not seek to keep them  
honest? Why should our coverage of them look so much like their own  
self-representation in fund-raising appeals? Why should we (as many  
photojournalists 
and print reporters do) work for humanitarian agencies between  journalism 
jobs, helping them with their official reports and institutional  appeals, in 
a way that we would never consider doing for corporations, political  
parties, or government agencies?” 
This confusion is very much present in Israel and the Palestinian  
territories, where foreign activists are a notable feature of the landscape, 
and  
where international NGOs and numerous arms of the United Nations are among the 
 most powerful players, wielding billions of dollars and employing many 
thousands  of foreign and local employees. Their SUVs dominate sections of East 
Jerusalem  and their expense accounts keep Ramallah afloat. They provide 
reporters with  social circles, romantic partners, and alternative employment—
a fact that is  more important to reporters now than it has ever been, given 
the disintegration  of many newspapers and the shoestring nature of their 
Internet successors. 
In my time in the press corps, I learned that our relationship with these  
groups was not journalistic. My colleagues and I did not, that is, seek to  
analyze or criticize them. For many foreign journalists, these were not 
targets  but sources and friends—fellow members, in a sense, of an informal 
alliance.  This alliance consists of activists and international staffers from 
the UN and  the NGOs; the Western diplomatic corps, particularly in East 
Jerusalem; and  foreign reporters. (There is also a local component, consisting 
of a small  number of Israeli human-rights activists who are themselves 
largely funded by  European governments, and Palestinian staffers from the 
Palestinian Authority,  the NGOs, and the UN.) Mingling occurs at places like 
the 
lovely Oriental  courtyard of the American Colony hotel in East Jerusalem, 
or at parties held at  the British Consulate’s rooftop pool. The dominant 
characteristic of nearly all  of these people is their transience. They arrive 
from somewhere, spend a while  living in a peculiar subculture of 
expatriates, and then move on.
 
In these circles, in my experience, a distaste for Israel has come to be  
something between an acceptable prejudice and a prerequisite for entry. I don’
t  mean a critical approach to Israeli policies or to the ham-fisted 
government  currently in charge in this country, but a belief that to some 
extent 
the Jews  of Israel are a symbol of the world’s ills, particularly those 
connected to  nationalism, militarism, colonialism, and racism—an idea quickly 
becoming one of  the central elements of the “progressive” Western 
zeitgeist, spreading  from the European left to American college campuses and 
intellectuals, including  journalists. In this social group, this sentiment is 
translated into editorial  decisions made by individual reporters and editors 
covering Israel, and this, in  turn, gives such thinking the means of mass 
self-replication.   
* * * 
Anyone who has traveled abroad understands that arriving in a new country 
is  daunting, and it is far more so when you are expected to show immediate  
expertise. I experienced this myself in 2008, when the AP sent me to cover 
the  Russian invasion of Georgia and I found myself 24 hours later riding in 
a convoy  of Russian military vehicles. I had to admit that not only did I 
not know  Georgian, Russian, or any of the relevant history, but I did not 
know which way  was north, and generally had no business being there. For a 
reporter in a  situation like the one I just described, the solution is to 
stay close to more  knowledgeable colleagues and hew to the common wisdom. 
Many freshly arrived reporters in Israel, similarly adrift in a new 
country,  undergo a rapid socialization in the circles I mentioned. This 
provides 
them not  only with sources and friendships but with a ready-made framework 
for their  reporting—the tools to distill and warp complex events into a 
simple narrative  in which there is a bad guy who doesn’t want peace and a good 
guy who does. This  is the “Israel story,” and it has the advantage of 
being an easy story to  report. Everyone here answers their cell phone, and 
everyone knows what to say.  You can put your kids in good schools and dine at 
good restaurants. It’s fine if  you’re gay. Your chances of being beheaded 
on YouTube are slim. Nearly all of  the information you need—that is, in most 
cases, information critical of  Israel—is not only easily accessible but 
has already been reported for you by  Israeli journalists or compiled by NGOs. 
You can claim to be speaking truth to  power, having selected the only “
power” in the area that poses no threat to your  safety. 

Many foreign journalists have come to see themselves as part of this world 
of  international organizations, and specifically as the media arm of this 
world.  They have decided not just to describe and explain, which is hard 
enough, and  important enough, but to “help.” And that’s where reporters get 
into trouble,  because “helping” is always a murky, subjective, and 
political enterprise, made  more difficult if you are unfamiliar with the 
relevant 
languages and  history. 
Confusion over the role of the press explains one of the strangest aspects 
of  coverage here—namely, that while international organizations are among 
the most  powerful actors in the Israel story, they are almost never reported 
on. Are they  bloated, ineffective, or corrupt? Are they helping, or 
hurting? We don’t know,  because these groups are to be quoted, not covered. 
Journalists cross from  places like the BBC to organizations like Oxfam and 
back. 
The current spokesman  at the UN agency for Palestinian refugees in Gaza, 
for example, is a former BBC  man. A Palestinian woman who participated in 
protests against Israel and tweeted  furiously about Israel a few years ago 
served at the same time as a spokesperson  for a UN office, and was close 
friends with a few reporters I know. And so  forth.
 
International organizations in the Palestinian territories have largely  
assumed a role of advocacy on behalf of the Palestinians and against Israel, 
and  much of the press has allowed this political role to supplant its 
journalistic  function. This dynamic explains the thinking behind editorial 
choices that are  otherwise difficult to grasp, like the example I gave in my 
first essay about  the _suppression_ 
(http://tabletmag.com/scroll/185121/former-ap-reporter-confirms-matti-friedman-account)
   by the AP’s Jerusalem bureau 
of a report about an Israeli peace offer to the  Palestinians in 2008, or 
the decision to ignore the rally at Al-Quds University,  or the idea that Hamas
’s development of extensive armament works in Gaza in  recent years was not 
worth serious coverage despite objectively being one of the  most important 
storylines demanding reporters’ attention. 
As usual, Orwell got there first. Here is his _description_ 
(http://books.google.com/books/about/All_Art_Is_Propaganda.html?id=IcyGPLqBi60C)
   from 
1946 of writers of communist and “fellow-traveler” journalism: “The  argument 
that to tell the truth would be ‘inopportune’ or would ‘play into the  
hands of’ somebody or other is felt to be unanswerable, and few people are  
bothered by the prospect that the lies which they condone will get out of the  
newspapers and into the history books.” The stories I mentioned would be  “
inopportune” for the Palestinians, and would “play into the hands” of the  
Israelis. And so, in the judgment of the press corps, they generally aren’t  
news. 
In the aftermath of the three-week Gaza war of 2008-2009, not yet quite  
understanding the way things work, I spent a week or so writing a story about  
NGOs like Human Rights Watch, whose work on Israel had just been subject to 
an  unusual public lashing in The New York Times by its own founder, Robert 
 Bernstein. (The Middle East, he _wrote_ 
(http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/20/opinion/20bernstein.html?_r=0) ,  “is 
populated by authoritarian regimes 
with appalling human rights records. Yet  in recent years Human Rights Watch 
has written far more condemnations of Israel  for violations of international 
law than of any other country in the region.”)  My article was gentle, all 
things considered, beginning like this: 
JERUSALEM (AP) _ The prickly relationship between Israel and its critics in 
 human rights organizations has escalated into an unprecedented war of 
words as  the fallout from Israel’s Gaza offensive persists ten months after 
the 
 fighting ended.
Editors killed the story. 
Around this time, a Jerusalem-based group called NGO Monitor was battling 
the  international organizations condemning Israel after the Gaza conflict, 
and  though the group was very much a pro-Israel outfit and by no means an 
objective  observer, it could have offered some partisan counterpoint in our 
articles to  charges by NGOs that Israel had committed “war crimes.” But the 
bureau’s  explicit orders to reporters were to never quote the group or its 
director, an  American-raised professor named Gerald Steinberg._*_ 
(http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2014/11/how-the-media-makes-the-isr
ael-story/383262/?single_page=true#Footnote1)   In my time as an AP writer 
moving through the local conflict, with its myriad  lunatics, bigots, and 
killers, the only person I ever saw subjected to an  interview ban was this 
professor. 
When the UN released its controversial Goldstone report on the Gaza 
fighting,  we at the bureau trumpeted its findings in dozens of articles, 
though 
there was  discussion even at the time of the report’s failure to prove its 
central charge:  that Israel had killed civilians on purpose. (The director of 
Israel’s premier  human-rights group, B’Tselem, who was critical of the 
Israeli operation, told me  at the time that this claim was “a reach given the 
facts,” an evaluation that  was eventually seconded by the report’s 
author. “If I had known then what I know  now, the Goldstone Report would have 
been a different document,” Richard  Goldstone _wrote_ 
(http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/reconsidering-the-goldstone-report-on-israel-and-war-crimes/2
011/04/01/AFg111JC_story.html)   in The Washington Post in April 2011.) We 
understood that our job was  not to look critically at the UN report, or any 
such document, but to publicize  it. 
Decisions like these are hard to fathom if you believe the foreign press  
corps’ role is to explain a complicated story to people far away. But they 
make  sense if you understand that journalists covering Israel and the 
Palestinian  territories often don’t see their role that way. The radio and 
print 
journalist  Mark Lavie, who has reported from the region since 1972, was a 
colleague of mine  at the AP, where he was an editor in the Jerusalem bureau 
and then in Cairo  until his retirement last year. (It was Lavie who first 
learned of the Israeli  peace offer of late 2008, and was ordered by his 
superiors to ignore the story.)  An Indiana-born Israeli of moderate politics, 
he 
had a long run in journalism  that included several wars and the first 
Palestinian intifada, and found little  reason to complain about the 
functioning 
of the media. 

But things changed in earnest in 2000, with the collapse of peace efforts 
and  the outbreak of the Second Intifada. Israel accepted President Bill 
Clinton’s  peace framework that fall and the Palestinians rejected it, as 
_Clinton  made clear_ 
(http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Peace/ClintonMyLife.html) . 
Nevertheless, Lavie recently told me, the bureau’s editorial  
line was still that the conflict was Israel’s fault, and the Palestinians and 
 the Arab world were blameless. By the end of Lavie’s career, he was 
editing  Israel copy on the AP’s Middle East regional desk in Cairo, trying to 
restore  balance and context to stories he thought had little connection to 
reality. In  his words, he had gone from seeing himself as a proud member of 
the  international press corps to “the Jew-boy with his finger in the dike.” 
He wrote  a book, Broken Spring, about his front-row view of the Middle East’
s  descent into chaos, and retired disillusioned and angry.
 
I have tended to see the specific failings that we both encountered at the 
AP  as symptoms of a general thought pattern in the press, but Lavie takes a 
more  forceful position, viewing the influential American news organization 
as one of  the primary authors of this thought pattern. (In _a  statement_ 
(http://www.ap.org/content/press-release/2014/ap-statement-on-mideast-co
verage) , AP spokesman Paul Colford dismissed my criticism as “distortions,  
half-truths and inaccuracies,” and denied that AP coverage is biased against  
Israel.) This is not just because many thousands of media outlets use AP  
material directly, but also because when journalists arrive in their offices in 
 the morning, the first thing many of them do is check the AP wire (or, 
these  days, scroll through it in their Twitter feed). The AP is like Ringo 
Starr,  thumping away at the back of the stage: there might be flashier 
performers in  front, and you might not always notice him, but when Ringo’s 
off, 
everyone’s  off. 
Lavie believes that in the last years of his career, the AP’s Israel  
operation drifted from its traditional role of careful explanation toward a 
kind  
of political activism that both contributed to and fed off growing 
hostility to  Israel worldwide. “The AP is extremely important, and when the AP 
turned, it  turned a lot of the world with it,” Lavie said. “That’s when it 
became harder  for any professional journalist to work here, Jewish or not. I 
reject the idea  that my dissatisfaction had to do with being Jewish or 
Israeli. It had to do  with being a journalist.” 
* * * 
In describing the realities of combat in the Second World War, the American 
 critic Paul Fussell wrote, the press was censored and censored itself to 
such an  extent that “for almost six years a large slice of actuality—
perhaps one-quarter  to one-half of it—was declared off-limits, and the 
sanitized 
and euphemized  remainder was presented as the whole.” During the same war, 
American journalists  (chiefly from Henry Luce’s magazines) were engaged in 
what Fussell called the  “Great China Hoax”—years of skewed reporting 
designed to portray the venal  regime of Chiang Kai-shek as an admirable 
Western 
ally against Japan. Chiang was  featured six times on the cover of Time, and 
his government’s  corruption and dysfunction were carefully ignored. One 
Marine stationed in China  was so disillusioned by the chasm between what he 
saw and what he read that upon  his discharge, he _said_ 
(http://books.google.com/books?id=tg4KilgfNY4C&pg=PA177&lpg=PA177&dq=“
I+switched+to+Newsweek"+Marine&source=bl&ots=iEZ-cqkrQQ&sig=6GURJzsIiJ44NnDDPk-qSLjWk_s&hl=en&sa=X&ei=-
ZxuVLXUNIKkgwTm3IGYAQ&ved=0CCAQ6AEwAA#v=onepage&q=“
I%20switched%20to%20Newsweek"%20Marine&f=false) ,  “I switched to Newsweek.” 
Journalistic hallucinations, in other words, have a precedent. They tend to 
 occur, as in the case of the Great China Hoax, when reporters are not 
granted  the freedom to write what they see but are rather expected to maintain 
a “story”  that follows predictable lines. For the international press, the 
uglier  characteristics of Palestinian politics and society are mostly 
untouchable  because they would disrupt the Israel story, which is a story of 
Jewish moral  failure. 
Most consumers of the Israel story don’t understand how the story is  
manufactured. But Hamas does. Since assuming power in Gaza in 2007, the Islamic 
 
Resistance Movement has come to understand that many reporters are committed 
to  a narrative wherein Israelis are oppressors and Palestinians passive 
victims  with reasonable goals, and are uninterested in contradictory  
information. [ BR emphasis ] Recognizing this, certain Hamas spokesmen  have 
taken 
to confiding to Western journalists, including some I know  personally, that 
the group is in fact a secretly pragmatic outfit with bellicose  rhetoric, 
and journalists—eager to believe the confession, and sometimes  unwilling to 
credit locals with the smarts necessary to deceive them—have taken  it as a 
scoop instead of as spin. 
During my time at the AP, we helped Hamas get this point across with a 
school  of reporting that might be classified as “Surprising Signs of 
Moderation”
 (a  direct precursor to the “Muslim Brotherhood Is Actually Liberal” 
school that  enjoyed a brief vogue in Egypt). In one of my favorite stories, “
More Tolerant  Hamas” (December 11, 2011), reporters _quoted_ 
(http://news.yahoo.com/hamas-gaza-says-learning-arab-spring-184847515.html)   a 
Hamas 
spokesman informing readers that the movement’s policy was that “we are  not 
going to dictate anything to anyone,” and another Hamas leader saying the  
movement had “learned it needs to be more tolerant of others.” Around the same  
time, I was informed by the bureau’s senior editors that our Palestinian  
reporter in Gaza couldn’t possibly provide critical coverage of Hamas because  
doing so would put him in danger. 
Hamas is aided in its manipulation of the media by the old reportorial  
belief, a kind of reflex, according to which reporters shouldn’t mention the  
existence of reporters. In a conflict like ours, this ends up requiring  
considerable exertions: So many photographers cover protests in Israel and the  
Palestinian territories, for example, that one of the challenges for anyone  
taking pictures is keeping colleagues out of the frame. That the other  
photographers are as important to the story as Palestinian protesters or 
Israeli  soldiers—this does not seem to be considered.
 
In Gaza, this goes from being a curious detail of press psychology to a 
major  deficiency. Hamas’s strategy is to provoke a response from Israel by 
attacking  from behind the cover of Palestinian civilians, thus drawing Israeli 
strikes  that kill those civilians, and then to have the casualties filmed 
by one of the  world’s largest press contingents, with the understanding 
that the resulting  outrage abroad will blunt Israel’s response. This is a 
ruthless strategy, and an  effective one. It is predicated on the cooperation 
of 
journalists. One of the  reasons it works is because of the reflex I 
mentioned. If you report that Hamas  has a strategy based on co-opting the 
media, 
this raises several difficult  questions, like, What exactly is the 
relationship between the media and Hamas?  And has this relationship corrupted 
the 
media? It is easier just to leave the  other photographers out of the frame 
and let the picture tell the story: Here  are dead people, and Israel killed 
them. 

In previous rounds of Gaza fighting, Hamas learned that international  
coverage from the territory could be molded to its needs, a lesson it would  
implement in this summer’s war. Most of the press work in Gaza is done by local 
 fixers, translators, and reporters, people who would understandably not 
dare  cross Hamas, making it only rarely necessary for the group to threaten a 
 Westerner. The organization’s armed forces could be made to disappear. The 
press  could be trusted to play its role in the Hamas script, instead of 
reporting that  there was such a script. Hamas strategy did not exist, 
according to Hamas—or, as  reporters would say, was “not the story.” There was 
no 
_Hamas  charter_ 
(http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2014/08/what-would-hamas-do-if-it-could-do-whatever-it-wanted/375545/)
  blaming Jews 
for centuries of perfidy, or calling for their murder;  this was not the 
story. The rockets falling on Israeli cities were quite  harmless; they were 
not the story either.
 
Hamas understood that journalists would not only accept as fact the  
Hamas-reported civilian death toll—relayed through the UN or through something  
called the “Gaza Health Ministry,” an office controlled by Hamas—but would 
make  those numbers the center of coverage. Hamas understood that reporters 
could be  intimidated when necessary and that they would not report the 
intimidation;  Western news organizations tend to see no ethical imperative to 
inform readers  of the restrictions shaping their coverage in repressive states 
or other  dangerous areas. In the war’s aftermath, the NGO-UN-media 
alliance could be  depended upon to unleash the organs of the international 
community on Israel,  and to leave the jihadist group alone. 
When Hamas’s leaders surveyed their assets before this summer’s round of  
fighting, they knew that among those assets was the international press. The 
AP  staff in Gaza City would witness a rocket launch right beside their 
office,  endangering reporters and other civilians nearby—and the AP wouldn’t 
report it,  not even in _AP  articles_ 
(http://news.yahoo.com/evidence-growing-hamas-used-residential-areas-051342974.html)
  about Israeli claims that 
Hamas was launching rockets from  residential areas. (This happened.) Hamas 
fighters would burst into the AP’s  Gaza bureau and threaten the staff—and 
the AP wouldn’t report it. (This also  happened.) Cameramen waiting outside 
Shifa Hospital in Gaza City would film the  arrival of civilian casualties 
and then, at a signal from an official, turn off  their cameras when wounded 
and dead fighters came in, helping Hamas maintain the  illusion that only 
civilians were dying. (This too happened; the information  comes from multiple 
sources with firsthand knowledge of these incidents.) 
Colford, the AP spokesman, _confirmed_ 
(http://www.ap.org/content/press-release/2014/ap-statement-on-mideast-coverage) 
  that armed militants entered 
the AP’s Gaza office in the early days of the war  to complain about a photo 
showing the location of a rocket launch, though he  said that Hamas claimed 
that the men “did not represent the group.” The AP “does  not report many 
interactions with militias, armies, thugs or governments,” he  wrote. “These 
incidents are part of the challenge of getting out the news—and  not 
themselves news.” 
This summer, with Yazidis, Christians, and Kurds falling back before the  
forces of radical Islam not far away from here, this ideology’s local 
franchise  launched its latest war against the last thriving minority in the 
Middle 
East.  The Western press corps showed up en masse to cover it. This 
conflict included  rocket barrages across Israel and was deliberately fought 
from 
behind  Palestinian civilians, many of whom died as a result. Dulled by years 
of the  “Israel story” and inured to its routine omissions, confused about 
the role they  are meant to play, and co-opted by Hamas, reporters 
described this war as an  Israeli onslaught against innocent people. By doing 
so, 
this group of  intelligent and generally well-meaning professionals ceased to 
be reliable  observers and became instead an amplifier for the propaganda of 
one of the most  intolerant and aggressive forces on earth. And that, as 
they say, is the  story.

-- 
-- 
Centroids: The Center of the Radical Centrist Community 
<[email protected]>
Google Group: http://groups.google.com/group/RadicalCentrism
Radical Centrism website and blog: http://RadicalCentrism.org

--- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Centroids: The Center of the Radical Centrist Community" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to [email protected].
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
  • [RC] Ho... BILROJ via Centroids: The Center of the Radical Centrist Community

Reply via email to