Realpolitik
 
>From Wikipedia
 
 
Realpolitik (from _German_ (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/German_language) 
: real "realistic", "practical", or "actual"; and  Politik "politics", 
German  pronunciation: _[ʁeˈaːlpoliˌtɪk]_ 
(https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Help:IPA_for_German) ) is politics or  diplomacy 
based primarily on power and on 
practical and material factors and  considerations, rather than explicit 
ideological notions or moral or ethical  premises. In this respect, it shares 
aspects of its philosophical approach with  those of _realism_ 
(https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Realism_(international_relations))   and 
_pragmatism_ 
(https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pragmatism) ; often, its  simply referred to as 
"pragmatism" in politics, i.e. 'pursuing pragmatic  policies' (Singapore). The 
term Realpolitik is sometimes used  pejoratively to imply politics that are 
_coercive_ (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Coercion) , _amoral_ 
(https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Amorality) , or _Machiavellian_ 
(https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Machiavellian) .


 
 
 
 
 
 
Origin of the term
The term Realpolitik was coined by _Ludwig von Rochau_ 
(https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ludwig_von_Rochau) , a  German writer and 
politician in the 19th 
century._[1]_ 
(https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Realpolitik&printable=yes#cite_note-haslam-1)
  His 1853 book  Grundsätze der Realpolitik 
angewendet auf die staatlichen Zustände  Deutschlands describes the meaning of 
the term:_[2]_ (https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Realpol
itik&printable=yes#cite_note-2)  
The study of the powers that shape, maintain and alter the state is the  
basis of all political insight and leads to the understanding that the law of  
power governs the world of states just as the law of gravity governs the  
physical world.
Historian John Bew suggests that much of what stands for modern realpolitik 
 today deviates from the original meaning of the term. Realpolitik emerged 
in  mid-19th century Europe from the collision of the enlightenment with 
state  formation and power politics. The concept, Bew argues, was an early 
attempt at  answering the conundrum of how to achieve liberal enlightened goals 
in a world  that does not follow liberal enlightened rules. Publicist, 
journalist and  liberal political reformer Von Rochau coined the term in 1853 
and 
added a second  volume in 1869 that further refined his earlier arguments. 
Rochau, exiled in  Paris until the 1848 uprising, returned during the 
revolution and became  well-known figure in the national liberal party. As the 
liberal gains of the  1848 revolutions fell victim to coercive governments or 
were swallowed by  powerful social forces such as class, religion and 
nationalism, Rochau -  according to Bew - began to think hard about how the 
work 
that had begun with  such enthusiasm had failed to yield any lasting results. 
He said that the great  achievement of the Enlightenment had been to show 
that might is not necessarily  right. The mistake liberals made was to assume 
that the law of the strong had  suddenly evaporated simply because it had 
been shown to be unjust. Rochau wrote  that "to bring down the walls of 
Jericho, the Realpolitiker knows the simple  pickaxe is more useful than the 
mightiest trumpet." Rochau's concept was seized  upon by German thinkers in the 
mid and late-nineteenth century, and became  associated with _Otto von 
Bismarck_ (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Otto_von_Bismarck) 's  practical and 
ruthless statecraft in unifying Germany. By 1890, usage of the  word 
realpolitik 
was widespread, yet increasingly detached from its original  meaning._[3]_ 
(https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Realpolitik&printable=yes#cite_no
te-Bew-3)  
Realpolitik in  Europe
In the U.S. the term is often analogous to _power politics_ 
(https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Power_politics) , while in  Germany Realpolitik 
has a 
somewhat less negative connotation, referring  to realistic politics in 
opposition 
to idealistic (unrealistic) politics. It is  particularly associated with 
the era of 19th century _nationalism_ 
(https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nationalism) .  Realpolitik policies were 
employed in response to the failed _re
volutions of  1848_ (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Revolutions_of_1848) , as 
means to strengthen states and tighten social order. 
The most famous German advocate of Realpolitik was _Otto von Bismarck_ 
(https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Otto_von_Bismarck) ,  the First Chancellor (1862–
1890) to _Wilhelm I_ 
(https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/William_I,_German_Emperor)  of  the _Kingdom of 
Prussia_ 
(https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kingdom_of_Prussia) .  Bismarck used Realpolitik 
in his quest to achieve Prussian 
dominance in  _Germany_ (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Germany) . He  
manipulated 
political issues such as the _Schleswig-Holstein  Question_ 
(https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Schleswig-Holstein_Question)  and the 
Hohenzollern 
candidature to antagonize other countries and  cause wars if necessary to 
attain his 
goals. Such policies are characteristic of  _Bismarck_ 
(https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Otto_von_Bismarck) ,  demonstrating a pragmatic 
view of the "real" 
political world. Another example  was his willingness to adopt some social 
policies of the socialists such as  employee insurance and pensions; in doing 
so, he used small changes from the top  down to avoid the possibility of 
major change from the bottom up. Likewise,  Prussia's seemingly illogical move 
of not demanding territory from a defeated  Austria, a move that later led 
to the _unification of  Germany_ 
(https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Unification_of_Germany) , is an oft-cited 
example of Realpolitik. 
_Adolf Hitler_ (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Adolf_Hitler) 's attempt to  
annex the predominantly German region of _Czechoslovakia_ 
(https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Czechoslovakia)  called  the _Sudetenland_ 
(https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sudetenland)  in 1938 may  also be described as 
Realpolitik. At 
first, Hitler unsuccessfully  demanded that Czech president _Edvard Beneš_ 
(https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Edvard_Beneš)  hand  over that region of the 
country. However, _British  Prime Minister_ 
(https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Prime_Minister_of_the_United_Kingdom)  _Neville 
Chamberlain_ 
(https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Neville_Chamberlain)   subsequently gave the 
Sudetenland to 
Hitler in the (ultimately unsuccessful)  hope of preventing a war, as codified 
in the _Munich Agreement_ (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Munich_Agreement) . 
With  Britain a guarantor of Czech independence, Hitler knew that Beneš' 
opinion on  the matter was immaterial if Chamberlain was prepared to give 
Hitler what he  desired. 
_E. H.  Carr_ (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/E._H._Carr)  (Edward Hallett 
Carr) was a liberal realist and later _left-wing_ 
(https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Left-wing)  _British_ 
(https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_Kingdom)  
historian and _international  relations_ 
(https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_relations)  theorist who argued 
for realistic international policies 
versus  utopian ones. Carr described realism as the acceptance that what 
exists is  right, and the belief that there is no reality or force outside 
history such as  _God_ (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/God) . He argued that in  
realism there is no moral dimension, and that what is successful is right, 
and  what is unsuccessful is wrong. Carr was convinced that the _Bolsheviks_ 
(https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bolshevik)   were destined to win the 
_Russian Civil War_ (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Russian_Civil_War) ,  and 
approved of the Prime Minister _David Lloyd George_ 
(https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/David_Lloyd_George) 's  opposition to the 
anti-Bolshevik ideas of the War 
Secretary _Winston Churchill_ 
(https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Winston_Churchill)   under the grounds of 
Realpolitik. In Carr's opinion, Churchill's 
support  of the _White Russian_ (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/White_movement)  
movement  was folly, as Russia was likely to be a great power once more under 
the  leadership of the Bolsheviks. 
Examples of U.S.  Realpolitik
The policy of Realpolitik was formally introduced to the _Richard  Nixon_ 
(https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Richard_Nixon)  _White House_ 
(https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/White_House)  by _Henry Kissinger_ 
(https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Henry_Kissinger) . In  this context, the policy 
meant dealing with 
other powerful nations in a  practical manner rather than on the basis of 
political doctrine or ethics—for  instance, Nixon's diplomacy with the 
_People's  
Republic of China_ 
(https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/People's_Republic_of_China) , despite U.S. 
opposition to _communism_ 
(https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Communism)  and the previous  doctrine of 
_containment_ 
(https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Containment) . Another  example is Kissinger's 
use of _shuttle 
diplomacy_ (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shuttle_diplomacy)   after the _1973 
Arab-Israeli  war_ (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1973_Arab-Israeli_war) , 
where he persuaded the Israelis to withdraw partially from the Sinai in  
deference to the political realities created by the oil crisis. 
Realpolitik is distinct from ideological politics in that it is not  
dictated by a fixed set of rules, but instead tends to be goal-oriented, 
limited  
only by practical exigencies. Since Realpolitik is ordered toward the  most 
practical means of securing national interests, it can often entail  
compromising on ideological principles. For example, during the _Cold War_ 
(https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cold_War) , the  _United  States often supported 
authoritarian regimes_ 
(https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_support_of_authoritarian_regimes)  
that were _human rights  violators_ 
(https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Human_rights_violations) , in order to 
theoretically secure 
the greater national interest of  regional stability. After the end of Cold 
War this practice continued. 
Most recently, former ambassador _Dennis Ross_ 
(https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dennis_Ross)  advocated this  approach to 
foreign policy in his 2007 book 
Statecraft: And How to Restore  America's Standing in the World. For the 
purposes of contrast, and speaking  in _ideal  types_ 
(https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ideal_type) , political _ideologues_ 
(https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ideologue)  would tend to  favor principle over 
other considerations. Such 
individuals or groups can reject  compromises which they see as the 
abandonment of their ideals, and so may  sacrifice political gain in favor of 
adhering 
to principles they believe to be  constitutive of long-term goals. 
Examples of Realpolitik in other countries
_Mao  Zedong_ (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mao_Zedong) 's _Three Worlds 
Theory_ (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Three_Worlds_Theory)   is described as 
Realpolitik by his critics, including _Enver  Hoxha_ 
(https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Enver_Hoxha) , who point out that it was not 
based on a strong 
ideological  grounding, being used only to justify China's alignment with the 
West rather  than the Soviet Union. 
Singapore 
Kenneth Paul Tan of the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy states: 
"Chua Beng Huat (1997) argued that the rhetoric of pragmatism in Singapore 
is  ideological and hegemonic in nature, adopted and disseminated in the 
public  sphere by the People's Action Party (PAP) government and 
institutionalized  throughout the state in all its administrative, planning and 
policy-making  functions. By doggedly describing itself as pragmatic, the 
Singapore 
state is  actually disguising its ideological work and political nature 
through an  assertion of the absence of ideology and politics. Chan Heng Chee 
(1975) earlier  described Singapore as a depoliticized "administrative state", 
where ideology  and politics had triumphantly been replaced by rational and 
scientific modes of  public administration." 
"The PAP government has taken pains to present its principles of 
meritocracy  and pragmatism as a viable alternative to liberal democracy and 
multi-party  competition, sometimes by drawing from a specious notion of 
Confucian 
values and  Asian culture to construct ideological bulwarks - like "Asian 
democracy" -  against the criticisms of the so-called liberal West. By 
crediting 
meritocracy  and pragmatism for creating the right conditions for economic 
success, the PAP  government has been able not only to justify its (liberal) 
democratic deficit,  but also to produce ideological resources and a 
structure of authorization for  the maintenance of a one-party dominant regime. 
In 
"pragmatic" terms,  Singapore's considerable economic success is 
justification enough for its  authoritarian means." 
"A major source for this legitimizing work has, therefore, been pragmatism, 
a  complex and dynamic ideological formation through which different and 
not  necessarily compatible meanings are articulated hegemonically. Its 
internal  contradictions make it inherently fragile, particularly in practice." 
"The pragmatist in Lee Kuan Yew displayed contempt for the rigid and  
uncompromising pursuit of ideals, high principles and timeless values. He  
regarded this as a debased quality associated with childish naivete, the  
academic 
ivory tower built from elaborate concepts and theories, the unrealistic  
expectations of the inexperienced, the quixotic ramblings of the irresponsible 
 of the egotism and hypocrisy of high-mindedness. Politically, this- at 
times  boorish -dismissal of ideals has been useful to the PAP government for  
deflecting criticism or opposition based on specific ideals, such as 
freedom,  equality, democracy and human rights, even if some of these ideals 
are  
represented in national symbols and foundational rhetoric like the pledge.  
Opposition parties that canvas on the platform of making Singapore a more  
genuine multiparty democracy in practice are described as being out of touch  
with that the people are really interested in - the "bread-and-butter" 
issues -  or else as stooges of foreign interests who hope to see Singapore 
fail 
(Chee  2001). Foreign and local critics who wish for more accountability and 
 transparency in the business of government - even if they tactically avoid 
 framing them in liberal democratic language - are dismissed as uninformed 
about  or insensitive to Singapore's special circumstances which render such 
ideals  irrelevant, unsuitable and even dangerous 
"Anti-Utopian pragmatism dismisses the social, cultural and political value 
 of being able to imagine alternative realities and better worlds, and to  
formulate strategies of transitioning from the status quo to these better  
realities and worlds. Chan and Evers (1978) argue that the PAP government of  
newly independent Singapore - in spite of its own social democratic party  
foundations -rejected a "progressive identity" based on ideological and 
Utopia  foundations such as socialism, in favor of an "ideology of pragmatism." 
In fact,  in response to criticism from other social democratic parties 
around the world,  the PAP leadership put together a highly polemical book of 
essays in 1976  defending their "socialism that works" - a supposedly 
pragmatic approach that  was consistent with a non-communist and democratic 
Singapore (Nair, 1976) 
"Pragmatists are willing to adopt any means as long as the ends are  
successfully achieved through these means. The ends justify the means, is the  
basic principle behind Singapore's results-orientated policies and decisions.  
Often, this means that the focus is on exercising technical and instrumental 
 reason to formulate and implement solutions, while the outcomes and goals 
are  kept beyond the horizon of critical reason." 
"One implication of this is that the most important public administrators  
will be economists or those who think like economists, involving choices 
based  on a calculus of cost and benefit, and assuming that people will respond 
 rationally to reward and threat. A second implication is that public  
administrators should be selected, deployed and promoted on the basis of their  
mastery over the tools and techniques of policy making; they should approach 
 policy making as technocratic problem-solvers whose job is to provide 
seemingly  "value-free" technical solutions, and not to get mired in 
metaphysics 
and  ethical questioning. When combined with an attitude among the elite 
that Ezra  Vogel (1989) described as "macho-meritocracy," this technical 
mastery that many  policy makers believe they firmly possess often translates 
into an arrogant  intolerance of _alternative views_ 
(https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alternative_views)   expressed by the general 
public and even 
independent experts whose opinions,  they also believe, should count for less 
since 
they cannot see the "big  picture." A third implication is that value-neutral 
technocrats may find that  they may have to dress up their policies with 
ideals, values and principles that  enjoy popular appeal, in order to gain 
widespread acceptance of these policies  and to ensure their successful 
implementation. This pick-and-choose approach to  policy making has extended 
beyond 
the use of economic tools, as Ian Austin  (2001) argues, to the 
appropriation of culture as political-economic resource.  Culture can be seen 
as a 
synthetic technology for capitalism that motivates,  supports and justifies the 
desired productive and consuming behaviors. It is  pragmatism, then, that 
explains the government's interest in constructing and  re-constructing an 
official culture and value system - a Singapore "ideology" as  it were. They do 
this by appropriating "Western values" such as rugged  individualism and 
"Asian values" such as thrift, diligence, group orientation  and respect for 
authority that are imagined and strategically drawn up to  describe the ideal 
Singapore worker-consumer-citizen. The state also excludes  unsuitable 
values, such as "Asian" surreptitiousness, Confucian contempt for  merchants 
and 
soldiers..." 
Relation to  realism
Realpolitik is often confused with the philosophy of _political realism_ 
(https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Political_realism) ,  including by political 
_pundits_ (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pundits)  such as _Noam  Chomsky_ 
(https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Noam_Chomsky)  who intentionally confuse or 
conflate the two. Both are often  believed to suggest working from the 
hypothesis that it is chiefly based on the  pursuit, possession, and 
application of 
power. (See also _power  politics_ 
(https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Power_politics) ) However, some _International  
Relations_ 
(https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Relations)  _Realists_ 
(https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Realism_(international_relations)) ,  such as 
_Kenneth Waltz_ 
(https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kenneth_Waltz)  and _Hans Morgenthau_ 
(https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hans_Morgenthau) , have  viewed states as 
pursuing immediate survival 
or security, rather than the  pursuit of power. 
Realpolitik is distinct from realism in that it is a prescriptive  
guideline limited to policy-making (like foreign policy), while realism is a  
descriptive _paradigm_ (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Paradigm) , a wider 
theoretical  and methodological framework, aimed at describing, explaining and, 
eventually,  predicting events in the international relations domains.
 
 
References
    *   John Bew: _"The Real Origins of Realpolitik"_ 
(http://nationalinterest.org/article/the-real-origins-realpolitik-9933) , _The 
National  
Interest_ (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_National_Interest) , 2014 
    *   John Bew: _"Real Realpolitik: A History"_ 
(http://www.loc.gov/today/cyberlc/feature_wdesc.php?rec=6285) , The _John W. 
Kluge  Center_ 
(https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_W._Kluge_Center)  at the _Library of  
Congress_ 
(https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Library_of_Congress) , April 10, 2014. 
Accessed July 29, 2014. 
    *   David Robertson: The Routledge Dictionary of Politics. Routledge  
2004. _ISBN  978-0-415-32377-2_ 
(https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Special:BookSources/9780415323772) , p. 420 
(_restricted online copy_ 
(https://books.google.com/books?id=vrnzsJhPbuMC&pg=PA420) , p. 420, at _Google  
Books_ 
(https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Google_Books) ) 
    *   Hajo Holborn: History of Modern Germany: 1840-1945. Princeton  
University Press 1982, _ISBN  978-0-691-00797-7_ 
(https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Special:BookSources/9780691007977) , p. 117 
(_restricted online copy_ 
(https://books.google.com/books?id=Y4pLQ1jC1JIC&pg=PA117) , p. 117, at _Google  
Books_ (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Google_Books) ) 
    *   Ruth Weissbourd Grant: Hypocrisy and integrity: Machiavelli, 
Rousseau,  and the ethics of politics. University of Chicago Press 1997, _ISBN  
978-0-226-30582-0_ 
(https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Special:BookSources/9780226305820) , p. 40-41 
(_restricted online copy_ 
(https://books.google.com/books?id=uWUQM_4IW14C&pg=PA40) , p. 40, at _Google 
Books_ 
(https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Google_Books) ) 
    *   Frank Whelon Wayman (ed.), Paul Francis Diehl (ed.): Reconstructing 
 Realpolitik. University of Michigan Press 1994, _ISBN  978-0-472-08268-1_ 
(https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Special:BookSources/9780472082681)  
(_restricted  online copy_ (https://books.google.com/books?id=DcG9KoU-wO0C)  at 
_Google Books_ (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Google_Books) ) 
    *   Federico Trocini: L’invenzione della «Realpolitik» e la scoperta 
della  «legge del potere». August Ludwig von Rochau tra radicalismo e  
nazional-liberalismo, il Mulino, Bologna  2009

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