from the site:
The American Conservative
 
 
 
 
 
James Polk’s Realpolitik
Was the Mexican War gratuitous conquest or strategic  statesmanship?
By _Robert W.  Merry_ 
(http://www.theamericanconservative.com/author/robert-w-merry)  • _June 3, 
2015_ 
(http://www.theamericanconservative.com/articles/james-polks-realpolitik/)  

 
 
In seeking timeless lessons in the story of President James Polk and his  
Mexican War, we might best begin by noting that few presidents have been 
dogged  through history by the controversies and passions of their time as has 
the man  who presided over that war. The political emotions that buffeted 
nearly all the  consequential presidents—and Polk certainly belongs in that 
circle—have long  since ebbed as those figures reached the country’s 
historical pantheon. But Polk  and his war decisions are still caught in the 
maelstrom of controversy. They  have generated political opprobrium alongside 
spirited defenses right up to our  own day. 
As recently as 2012 we saw the latest major effort to discredit Polk with 
Amy  S. Greenberg’s A Wicked War, which portrayed the U.S. war policy as  
motivated essentially by racism and national “aggrandizement”—and hence was  “
contrary to American principles.” On the other side, as long ago as 1947  
historian Alfred Hoyt Bill felt a need to defend Polk from such accusations,  
which swirled around him even then. In Rehearsal for Conflict, he  wrote: “
It has long been our national habit to deplore the War with  Mexico as an 
act of unprovoked aggression … and, while enjoying the full fruits  of 
conquest, to shed crocodile tears over the means by which [the victories]  were 
won,
’’ adding that “against this presentation of it more recent historians  … 
appear to have labored in vain.” 
This lingering controversy shrouds some fundamental realities of that 
pivotal  time in American history. Given the internal politics of both 
countries 
and the  geopolitics of the North American continent, it was probably 
inevitable that  Mexico would lose control over lands it had neither the 
population nor the  financial resources to control and that the rambunctious 
nation 
to its north  would capitalize on that inherent Mexican weakness. 
History, after all, is the story of power interrelationships, and power  
differentials are often at the fulcrum of major events. But a full review of 
the  circumstances and actions leading up to the 1846–1848 war would suggest 
that  America didn’t stomp upon its southern neighbor simply because it 
could. Indeed,  while national aggrandizement certainly figured in the calculus 
of Polk and most  of his countrymen—Manifest Destiny was a powerful cry—the 
nation nevertheless  sought to adhere to its basic principles even as it 
struggled with the gathering  storm clouds that descended upon the continent 
when the two nations’ interests  and sense of honor were thrust into stark 
conflict. 
An understanding of the war requires an understanding of the vast gulf that 
 separated Mexico and the United States in terms of heritage, governance,  
political habit, social and cultural sensibility, and national success. The  
United States was, in Ralph Waldo Emerson’s words, “a country of 
beginnings, of  projects, of vast designs and expectations.” Mexico, on the 
other 
hand, was a  nation struggling to find its footing even 25 years after it 
gained independence  from Spain. 
The Anglo-Saxons who descended upon the lands that would become the United  
States arrived with a resolve to maintain the folkways and mores of their  
heritage. The men came with their own women and generally didn’t mix with 
the  Native Americans, who were pushed back with brutal disregard to make 
possible  the preservation and expansion of the Anglo-Saxon culture. That 
culture included  concepts eventually codified in the U.S. Constitution, 
including 
freedom of  speech and conscience, popular sovereignty, governmental checks 
and balances, a  degree of social and political equality, and capitalism. 
Alexis de Tocqueville,  the famous French intellectual, called this document “
one of those beautiful  creations of human diligence which give their 
inventors glory and riches but  remain sterile in other hands.” He cited as an 
example of “other hands” Mexico,  which he described as a land of “anarchy” 
and “military despotism.” 
While the early British settlers were looking for wealth born of toil, the  
Spanish came as conquerors and plunderers. They mixed freely with the local 
 populations—Cortes took a lovely mistress in the person of Princess 
Malintzin,  also his interpreter—and pursued riches in the form of gold and 
rare 
gems stored  away by the leaders of the highly developed civilizations of 
central Mexico,  Peru, and elsewhere. Tragically, those civilizations were 
quickly destroyed. 
Thus, modern Mexico’s bloody emergence brought with it a dual legend—of  
Tenochtitlan and its fallen heroes on the one hand and of Cortes and his 
Spanish  heritage on the other. This dual legend drove various wedges through 
Mexican  society as it struggled with the intertwined dynamics of race, the 
Spanish  Crown, and the Catholic Church—and then moved toward independence. 
The elites,  both before and after independence, imposed a rigid autocracy to 
preserve their  standing. Commerce was strictly controlled through a 
powerful mercantilist  regimen. And the church embraced this prevailing system, 
given that the system  bestowed upon it vast expanses of property and stores of 
wealth. 
All this ensured that when Mexico won its independence in 1821 it would  
become a split country beset by crosscurrents of political passion related to  
ethnicity, autocratic rule, the struggle for governmental stability, and  
horrendous inequality. The rumbling discontent among the masses was matched 
by a  growing hostility toward the United States, seen as an intrinsic 
threat. Mexico  was correct in seeing this threat, which emanated from 
disparities 
in the two  nations’ wealth and population. In 1800, total income in the 
United States was  about twice that of Mexico’s; half a century later it was 
13 times greater. In  1790, Mexico’s population approached five million 
compared to fewer than four  million in the United States. By 1840, the U.S. 
population had swelled to 17  million while Mexico’s had reached just seven 
million. 
Indeed, concerns over this population stagnation led Mexico to invite U.S.  
citizens into Texas to build communities, generate commerce, and create 
wealth.  They came in large numbers but never relinquished their fealty to 
their own  heritage, in contrast to the troubled heritage—and often 
dysfunctional  government—of Mexico. In 1836 these migrants to Texas declared 
their  
independence and employed military might to repulse efforts by the Mexican  
government to bring them to heel. There was plenty of bloodshed, culminating in 
 a de facto state of Texas independence that Mexico never accepted or 
recognized.  But Mexico also lacked the power and resources to do anything 
about 
it. Thus did  Mexico and Texas enter into an official state of war that 
lasted a decade, but  with no shots fired. Mexico couldn’t retake Texas, which 
operated as an  independent nation, recognized by many countries around the 
world. 
The United States took a cautious approach to this situation on its border. 
 Under President Andrew Jackson, a fervent expansionist, Washington 
recognized  Texas independence, but Jackson made no effort to annex the 
fledgling 
nation for  fear it would lead to a war with Mexico that could upend his 
other governmental  aims. Martin Van Buren, cautious by instinct, followed 
Jackson’s lead. But  President John Tyler, in the spring of 1844, initiated 
talks 
aimed at  annexation. It turned out to be wildly popular in the United 
States, where the  idea of westward expansion all the way to the Pacific had 
stirred powerful  national ambitions. 
These ambitions would not be thwarted. The annexation initiative was 
opposed  by Henry Clay, the clear favorite for the Whig presidential nomination 
that  year, and by Van Buren, the putative Democratic nominee. Both warned 
about  resulting hostilities with Mexico and also raised concerns about a 
resurgence of  slavery agitation in the country as it sought to absorb likely 
new 
territories.  Wrote Clay: “Annexation and war with Mexico are identical.” 
Both politicians saw  their ambitions pulverized on the issue. Van Buren 
lost his party’s nomination  in May 1844, and Clay lost his bid for the 
presidency the following autumn.  Polk, who enthusiastically embraced his 
country’s 
expansionist impulse, rode the  issue into the White House. 
When annexation finally came about under Polk’s auspices, Mexico responded  
with bellicosity, notwithstanding that it had had no control over Texas for 
 nearly a decade. It declared annexation an act of war, withdrew its 
ambassador  from Washington, and threatened to seek redress through force of 
arms. 
This was  not a surprise to Polk, nor did he particularly lament the 
Mexican response.  That’s because he had a secondary—some would say ulterior—
motive in pressing for  final annexation. He coveted certain Mexican lands for 
the United States, beyond  the vast Texas expanse. Particularly did he want 
California, with its enveloping  climate, lush agricultural soil, and 
splendid Pacific harbors at San Francisco  and San Diego. In describing this 
ambition to historian George Bancroft in 1845,  the normally sedate Polk had 
slapped his hand upon his thigh in a rare gesture  of enthusiasm. 
And he had an ace in his hip pocket—the so-called reparations issue. For  
years, American citizens attempting to do business in or near Mexico had been 
 abused by Mexican officials and citizens. These abuses included piracy,  
kidnapping, theft on a grand scale, even murder in a few instances. Some 95  
episodes of abuse were recorded by U.S. officials, adding up to millions of  
dollars in reparation claims. This was no small matter, although anti-Polk  
historians and commentators tend to dismiss its significance. A reality of  
international relations is that great nations don’t allow other nations to 
abuse  their citizens with abandon. 
Indeed, France actually invaded the Mexican port city of Vera Cruz to 
secure  redress of its own reparations claims. Britain, the global behemoth of 
the day,  threatened similar action to gain payment for its citizens. But the 
United  States took a more measured and peaceful approach, seeking redress 
through a  long series of negotiations with Mexican officials—but to no 
avail. Preoccupied  with internal strife, Mexico generally ignored the American 
claims. Jackson, in  frustration, sent the matter to Congress, suggesting 
that these “wanton …  outrages” and Mexico’s disrespectful response “would 
justify, in the eyes of all  nations, immediate war.” But he added, “We 
should act with both wisdom and  moderation by giving to Mexico one more 
opportunity to atone for the past,  before we take redress into our own hands.” 
Long before Polk’s presidency, two congressional committees grappled with 
the  matter. A Senate committee said it could “with justice, recommend an 
immediate  resort to war or reprisals,” while a House panel declared that “
ample cause  exists for taking redress into our own hands.” But both committees 
recommended  one last effort to secure an appropriate Mexican response. 
Although Mexico agreed to talks and a payment schedule was established,  
regular payments were not forthcoming, and by the time of Polk’s presidency  
Mexico was still very much in arrears on the matter. Since it was clear 
Mexico  lacked the resources to meet this obligation, Polk devised what he 
considered a  natural way out: the United States would pay the reparation—and 
add 
an  appropriate financial consideration—in exchange for Mexican territory. 
He  particularly had in mind territory that was sparsely populated since this 
was  land that Mexico couldn’t expect to maintain under its control and 
since it  wouldn’t generate complex cultural frictions and tensions once 
acquired. 
In a hope that Mexico would see merit in such an outcome, Polk entered into 
a  series of diplomatic initiatives aimed at avoiding war while slaking his 
 territorial thirst. He sent an envoy fluent in Spanish to Mexico City to  
negotiate with Mexican leaders. He told his cabinet he would gladly pay $40  
million, along with the outstanding reparations amount, to get the desired  
territory. But once the envoy arrived, the Mexican leader who had 
authorized the  diplomatic entreaty rejected it, and in any event he was soon 
deposed—
probably  because of his willingness to entertain a negotiation with the 
United States—by  a more bellicose military man.  
 
 
Polk then entered into an intrigue with a representative of Mexico’s famous 
 General Antonio Lopez de Santa Anna, the former leader who now languished 
in  exile in Cuba. If Polk would foster Santa Anna’s return to Mexico and if 
he  reemerged as the national leader, said the envoy, Santa Anna would 
negotiate an  outcome along the lines of Polk’s desire. The president promptly 
complied, and  Santa Anna did indeed re-emerge as Mexico’s leader, whereupon 
he quickly reneged  on his end of the bargain. 
That’s when Polk made a momentous decision. With annexation, the United  
States inherited a nasty territorial dispute between Texas and Mexico. Texas  
claimed its territory extended to the Rio Grande, while Mexico insisted the  
proper border was the Nueces River, far to the east. After all, said 
Mexico, the  Texas boundary, before the war for Texas independence, had never 
extended into  the state of New Mexico, and so no such claim all the way to the 
Rio Grande  could be justified. 
Texas countered that it had won all its claimed territory through force of  
arms, and hence it was the arbiter of its boundary. For 10 years its 
national  legislature had received representatives from the disputed territory 
(though  there was little population there), and Mexico had not maintained any 
kind of  national jurisdiction over the land. Polk argued that in annexing 
Texas the  United States had annexed all territory claimed by Texas. Besides, 
he wondered  how Mexico could make a separate claim upon the disputed 
territory when it  refused to recognize Texas independence at all. The 
president 
insisted that the  disputed lands were part and parcel of the entire Texas 
claim, lost to Mexico  through the same turn of events that led to what he 
considered—and America  considered—the independent state of Texas. 
Under this rationale, Polk on January 13, 1846 ordered General Zachary 
Taylor  to position his army of 3,550 officers and men on the Rio Grande, 
meaning it  would enter and claim jurisdiction over the disputed territory. 
Taylor 
built  fortifications directly across the river from the little town of 
Matamoros. He  trained his big guns on the town and raised the Stars and 
Stripes as a band  played the “Star-Spangled Banner.” Just a hundred yards 
away, 
a 3,000-troop army  of Mexican General Francisco Mejia seethed. Soon another 
1,600 cavalry soldiers  arrived to bolster the Mexican position. It was a 
tense confrontation, almost  guaranteed to generate bloodshed. Taylor sent 
General William Worth across the  river to seek a conference with the U.S. 
consul at Matamoros. He was refused  entry by his Mexican counterpart. 
“Has Mexico declared war against the United States?” Worth asked the 
Mexican  general. 
“No.” 
“Are the two countries still at peace?” 
“Yes.” 
But it was not a peace that could last, and it didn’t. On April 25, Mexican 
 officers sent a cavalry force of some 1,600 men across the river. It soon  
encountered an American force of 63 dragoons. A firefight ensued, and 11 
U.S.  soldiers were killed, six wounded. The Mexican commander took the 
surviving U.S.  contingent captive as prisoners of war. 
When Polk heard the news, he knew he had his war. Indeed, even before he 
got  word of the skirmish he was preparing to ask Congress for authorization 
to go to  war with Mexico because of its intransigence on Texas and the 
reparations issue.  Now he had an emotional trigger for his action, and he 
promptly exploited it. He  sent to Congress a message declaring that a state of 
war existed between the  United States and Mexico. He wanted Congress to pass 
a resolution acknowledging  as much, which would be a carte blanche for 
America to prosecute the war. 
Mexico, declared Polk, had “invaded our territory and shed American blood  
upon the American soil.” Many in Congress were uncomfortable with this  nar
rative, given the disputed nature of the soil involved. As Congressman  
Garrett Davis of Kentucky put it, “It is our own President who began this 
war.’’ 
 Most members insisted they would vote to send troops down to protect Taylor
’s  army from the superior Mexican force facing him, but they didn’t 
relish a vote  on the measure’s “preamble,” which encompassed Polk’s rationale. 
A leading  Senate critic was John C. Calhoun of South Carolina, who waxed 
eloquent on just  what Polk was trying to do. He declared: 
I know not whether there is a friend to stand by me … . But here I stand,  
and stand immovably … . If I could not stand here on a question of truth and 
 veracity, I should be little worthy of the small degree of respect which I 
am  desirous to retain. I cannot vote for this bill without further 
information,  because I will not agree to make war upon Mexico by making war 
upon 
the  constitution … . As the facts now stand, there is no hostility—no 
conflict but  that between the two armies on the Rio del Norte [Rio Grande]; 
and 
yet you  affirm … that mere local conflict, not authorized by either 
government, is a  state of war! That every American is an enemy of every 
Mexican! . 
. . The  doctrine is monstrous.
But Lewis Cass of Michigan argued that events and circumstances at the Rio  
Grande now dictated war policy, not Polk’s preamble. Taylor faced an  
overwhelmingly superior force and needed reinforcements immediately, he argued, 
 
and any effort to respond merely defensively was destined to fail. The logic 
of  the situation, not Polk, was driving the country to war, said Cass. He 
thundered  on the floor of the Senate: 
Are we to confine our efforts to repelling them? Are we to drive them to  
the border, and then stop our pursuit, and allow them to find a refuge in  
their own territory? And what then? To collect again to cross our frontier at  
some other point, and again to renew the same scenes, to be followed by a  
similar immunity? What sort of a condition of things would this be, sir? The 
 advantage would be altogether on the side of the Mexicans, while the loss  
would be altogether ours … . No, sir, no vote of mine shall place my 
country  in this situation.
And so the political lines were drawn. When it came time to vote, most  
members of both houses and both parties found they couldn’t resist the 
patriotic  fervor that had emerged within the electorate, irrespective of how 
they 
may have  felt about what unleashed the fighting on the Rio Grande. The 
Senate vote was 40  to 2, with Calhoun refusing to answer the roll call. In the 
House, the vote was  173 to 14; even Garrett Davis joined the majority. 
Polk’s war began with a major miscalculation, however. The president 
believed  it would be a brief conflict. He assumed that a victory or two by 
Taylor, moving  into Mexican territory from the Rio Grande, would induce Mexico 
to 
sue for  peace. This was unrealistic, as it didn’t take into account 
sufficiently the  pride and patriotism of the Mexican people. As events 
unfolded, 
Mexico didn’t  win a single battle, yet the country refused to treat with 
the enemy upon its  soil. That led Polk to send another army into Mexico via 
an amphibious landing  at Vera Cruz. Leading that expedition was General 
Winfield Scott, who had orders  to march his army all the way to Mexico City if 
necessary to force a negotiated  settlement. For good measure, Polk sent a 
State Department official named  Nicholas Trist to accompany Scott’s army and 
serve as negotiator when and if  Mexican officials decided to treat. 
But they didn’t, and Scott’s army forced its way right into the Mexican  
capital and planted the American flag upon hallowed governmental buildings  
there. His military brilliance in doing so was stunning. The Duke of 
Wellington,  probably the world’s most renowned military man at the time, 
called 
Scott “the  greatest living solder” and added his campaign “was unsurpassed in 
military  annals.” Even then it wasn’t clear that Mexican officials, who 
had fled the  capital, would agree to negotiate an end to the war. That’s 
when the “all of  Mexico” movement began in Washington, as political voices 
began to agitate for  conquering the entire country and attaching it to the 
United States. Contrary to  many historical renditions, including Amy Greenberg
’s, Polk never favored such  an approach and was in fact uncomfortable with 
the idea of the United States  attempting to absorb such a vast territory 
with a population far different in  cultural, ethnic, and religious identity. 
Yet he appeared to have no choice but to order Scott to conquer ever more  
territory in his now almost desperate effort to force Mexico into a 
negotiated  settlement before growing domestic opposition reached such 
intensity as 
to  destroy his presidency and the Democratic Party. In the end, that proved 
 unnecessary, as Santa Anna fell from power and was replaced by more 
realistic  members of the Moderado party, who clearly perceived the futility of 
 
further warfare against the U.S. military juggernaut. The final settlement,  
reached at Guadalupe Hidalgo, a few miles north of Mexico City, called for 
U.S.  acquisition of Upper California (excluding what now is known as Baja 
California)  and what is now the American Southwest (present day Nevada, Utah, 
and Arizona,  and parts of New Mexico, Colorado, and Wyoming), as well as 
the disputed  territory between the Rio Grande and Nueces rivers. In 
exchange, the United  States would pay Mexico $15 million and assume 
reparations 
payments up to $3.25  million. 
Additionally, Mexicans living in the ceded territories would have the 
choice  of staying or leaving, and no tax would be imposed on any property 
taken 
by  those who decided to leave. After a year, U.S. citizenship would fall to 
those  remaining, unless they stipulated a wish to remain Mexican citizens. 
Catholic  churches in the ceded territory would retain all church property. 
Indian tribes  in the ceded lands would fall to U.S. jurisdiction, and the 
U.S. would assume  responsibility for protecting Mexico from cross-border 
raids. 
It was a signal outcome for the United States, which completed the national 
 push west and established its contiguous territorial outline on the North  
American continent, with the exception of a small piece of territory in 
southern  Arizona and New Mexico acquired from Mexico in 1853 for $10 million. 
Adding  these vast southwestern lands to the Oregon Territory brought under 
U.S. control  through Polk’s earlier tough-minded negotiation with Great 
Britain, the 11th  president added some 500,000 square miles to the U.S. 
territorial expanse and  created a transcontinental nation facing two oceans 
and 
positioned to dominate  the globe. 
These accomplishments, along with domestic successes in the realm of tariff 
 rates and monetary policy, have cemented a high station for Polk in the 
various  academic polls conducted to assess presidential performance. He 
consistently has  been placed in the “near great” category. Yet the animosities 
that pursued him  in office still gnaw at his reputation. He is demonized as 
a territorial zealot  who lied to the American people in invading a weak 
and innocent Mexico so he  could grab lands as plunder. 
Where does the truth lie? Let’s begin with the oft-leveled allegation that 
he  lied to the American people in pressing for his war. It centers largely 
on his  declaration that Mexico had “spilled American blood upon the 
American soil.”  This was, of course, disputed soil, and most experts say the 
American claim to  the disputed land was tenuous at best. Polk biographer 
Charles 
Sellers wrote in  1966 that the claim was “indefensible.” Even conceding 
this point, it doesn’t  seem unreasonable that Polk would feel that he had an 
obligation to treat  seriously Texas’s territorial claims. And most 
presidents would feel an  obligation to defend disputed lands pending a 
negotiated 
outcome. Why would a  president cede such territory without getting 
something in return, most notably  a cessation of Mexican belligerence but 
also, 
perhaps, territory elsewhere? Had  he allowed Mexico to occupy the disputed 
lands, it’s likely that history would  have condemned such weakness with equal 
sternness. 
On the question of whether Polk lied to the American people, it seems more  
accurate to say he offered an interpretation of the disputed territory that 
 could be contested, and was contested, by his many adversaries. Mexico 
said the  territory belonged with Mexico; Polk said it had belonged to Texas 
and hence was  now U.S. territory; many others simply accepted the reality 
that ownership was  disputed. It doesn’t seem reasonable that Polk could not 
put forth his own  interpretation without being called a liar. 
Polk often has been portrayed as wanting a war with Mexico in order to grab 
 coveted territory. This is not quite true, although there’s no question 
that he  coveted Mexican land and was willing to accept war in order to get 
it. But his  preference was to get it without going to war, as his many 
efforts at  negotiation demonstrate. (This is backed up by numerous entries in 
his 
 presidential diary.) Indeed, as Polk biographer Eugene Irving McCormac 
noted in  his 1922 study, at one point early in the drama Polk authorized his 
envoy to  assume all reparations claims if Mexico would cede merely the 
disputed lands  between the Rio Grande and Nueces rivers. “Had [the envoy] been 
able to conclude  such a treaty,” wrote McCormac, “Polk would have been 
deprived of all means of  bringing pressure to bear on Mexico, except 
unprovoked 
military conquest.”  Hence, it seems fair to argue that Polk’s approach 
was more measured and less  belligerent than many of his critics have been 
willing to acknowledge. 
Still, it is indisputable that Polk was not entirely forthcoming to the  
American people about his aims and what he was willing to do to accomplish 
them.  In this he was not far different from Woodrow Wilson and Franklin 
Roosevelt, who  wanted to nudge their nations into wars for which their 
countrymen 
were not  ready. And it is also true that Polk’s efforts at negotiation 
were not always  conducted as imaginatively and effectively as they might have 
been, although it  isn’t clear whether that would have made a difference 
given the wide gap in the  outlooks and demands of the two countries. 
As for Mexico, it wasn’t precisely the blameless and exploited country 
often  portrayed by Polk’s critics. As Princeton historian Sean Wilentz, one of 
the  leading scholars of the period, has written, “Mexico, far from being a 
passive,  innocent victim of America’s lust for power and land, was ruled by 
a succession  of corrupt, conservative, autocratic and truculent 
governments that administered  a republic in name only, one that was distorted 
by 
centuries of domination by  the Spanish crown and the Roman Catholic Church.’’ 
Others have noted that  Mexico’s approach to dealing with its powerful 
neighbor to the north—with  defiant belligerence and haughty pride—could hardly 
have been more unwise or  counterproductive, given the power differential 
between the two nations. 
Polk was not a particularly sympathetic figure. He was suspicious, 
secretive,  sanctimonious, manipulative, and not always forthcoming in his 
dealings 
with  others. He was also a visionary, and he caught the imagination of the 
American  people with his vision of an America stretching from the Atlantic 
to the  Pacific, with fine harbors and ports on both oceans, and with wide 
rivers and  vast expanses of productive fields and forests in between. Clay 
and Van Buren  didn’t share that vision, which is why they were rejected by 
American voters in  1844 and why Polk emerged as the country’s first dark 
horse presidential  candidate. Far from being a scourge on the American people 
during his single  term in office, he served as an instrument of the people. 
Robert W. Merry, longtime Washington journalist and publishing executive,  
is the author of books on American history and foreign policy, including _A 
Country of Vast Designs: James K. Polk, the Mexican War, and the  Conquest 
of the American Continent_ 
(https://www.amazon.com/Country-Vast-Designs-Continent-Collection/dp/074329744X/ref=as_sl_pc_ss_til?tag=theamericonse-20&linkCo
de=w01&linkId=BSRVTQ66HMNWVB7M&creativeASIN=074329744X) . 
Excellent book  -BR note

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