New York Times
 
 
The Democrats’ Immigration  Problem

 
_Thomas B. Edsall_ (https://www.nytimes.com/column/thomas-b-edsall)  FEB.  
16, 2017
 
 
 
Why is immigration such a  problem for the Democratic Party? 
The issue splits  traditional Democratic constituencies. It pits groups 
with competing material  interests against each other, but it also brings those 
with vested _psychological interests_ 
(https://mobile.nytimes.com/1999/04/14/opinion/meanwhile-does-territoriality-drive-human-aggression.html)
  into  
conflict as Hispanics, African-Americans, labor and liberal advocacy groups  
clash over their conception of_territoriality_ 
(https://hbr.org/1998/07/how-hardwired-is-human-behavior) , political ownership 
and cultural  identity. 
In the fall of 2015, as  the presidential campaign began to heat up, 
Hillary Clinton broke with the Obama  administration over its ongoing 
deportation 
of undocumented  immigrants. 
During an appearance _on Telemundo_ 
(http://www.telemundo.com/noticias/2015/10/06/telemundo-news-airs-exclusive-interview-hillary-clinton-transcription)
  on Oct.  5, Clinton told María Celeste Arrarás that _Obama’s policies_ 
(https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/DHS%20Immigration%20Enfor
cement%202016.pdf)  were  too punitive: 
I think we have to go back to being a much less  harsh and aggressive 
enforcer. We need to, of course, take care of felons and  violent people. I 
mean, 
that goes without saying. But I have met too many  people in our country 
who were upright, productive people who maybe had some,  you know, minor 
offense. Like, you know, maybe they were — arrested for  speeding or they had 
some kind of — you know, one incident of drunk driving,  something like that 25 
years ago.
Clearly, Clinton’s attack  on Obama’s relatively stringent deportation 
policy was devised to maximize  Hispanic turnout in the 2016 election. 
Did the strategy work? The  evidence is mixed. 
A comparison of national  exit polls from _2008, 2012 and 2016_ 
(http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/11/29/hillary-clinton-wins-latino-vote-but-fa
lls-below-2012-support-for-obama/)  shows  that Hispanic turnout grew 
slightly, from 9 percent of the total vote in 2008 to  10 percent in 2012 to 11 
percent in 2016. But any gain that might have accrued  to Clinton from the 
increase was eliminated by the fact that her margin of  victory among Latinos, 
66 percent, was 5 points below Obama’s haul in  2012.
 
 
In  any analysis of the 2016 vote, it is difficult to separate the issues 
of  immigration and free trade. In an October 2016 report, Pew found that 
Trump  voters were decisively more hostile to both free trade agreements and  
immigration than the general public, and much more hostile than Clinton  
supporters. 
A  detailed analysis of exit polls in four key states that helped deliver 
the  election to Donald Trump — Florida, Michigan, Pennsylvania and Wisconsin 
—  produced interesting findings not only about Hispanics, but also  
African-Americans — who are less supportive of liberal immigration policies 
than  
other core Democratic constituencies — and whites. In each of these states,  
opposition to immigration was _higher_ 
(http://www.cnn.com/election/results/exit-polls/national/president)  than the 
national average. 
Take Clinton’s performance  in Florida. She should have benefited from the 
drop in the white share of the  state’s electorate from 67 percent _in 2012_ 
(http://www.cnn.com/election/2012/results/state/FL/president/)  to 62  
percent _in 2016_ 
(http://www.cnn.com/election/results/exit-polls/florida/president) .  She did 
not, however, because her margin among whites, 32-64, fell 
significantly  below that of Obama, 37-61. Black turnout grew modestly from 
13 percent in 2012  to 14 percent in 2016, but Clinton’s margin among African 
Americans, 84-8, fell  well below Obama’s, 99-1. 
The same pattern held for  Michigan, where the white share of the 
electorate fell from 77 percent _in 2012_ 
(http://www.cnn.com/election/2012/results/state/MI/president/)  to 75  percent 
_in 2016_ 
(http://www.cnn.com/election/results/exit-polls/michigan/president) ,  but 
Clinton lost the white vote in 
Michigan by 21 points, 36-57, while Obama  lost it by 11 points, 44-55. 
The patterns are not the  same in all the Trump states. In Pennsylvania, 
for example, the white vote,  which went 56-40 for Trump over Clinton, 
increased from 78 percent _in 2012_ 
(http://www.cnn.com/election/2012/results/state/PA/president/)  to 81  percent 
_in 2016_ 
(http://www.cnn.com/election/results/exit-polls/pennsylvania/president) .  This 
boosted Trump’s statewide 
totals so that he _carried Pennsylvania by 68,236 votes_ 
(http://www.politico.com/2016-election/results/map/president/pennsylvania/) out 
of 5.97 million 
cast. An additional factor in  Clinton’s defeat there was a decline in black 
turnout from 13 percent of the  electorate in 2012 to 10 percent in 2016. 
Wisconsin stands out  because there the racial and ethnic makeup of the 
electorate remained virtually  the same from 2012 to _2016_ 
(http://www.cnn.com/election/results/exit-polls/wisconsin/president) . The  
state shifted from 
blue to red for one reason: the swing among whites toward  Trump. Trump won 
53 percent of white Wisconsin voters to Clinton’s 42 percent,  an 11-point 
margin, compared to the 3-point spread between Mitt Romney and  Obama, 51-48. 
Overall, public opinion on  immigration — particularly the views of those 
opposed to immigration — played a  crucial role in the outcome of the 2016 
election. Among the _13 percent of voters_ 
(http://www.cnn.com/election/results/exit-polls/national/president)  who  
identified immigration as the most 
important issue, Trump won, 64-33. 
This data demonstrates a  key element in the politics of immigration. 
_National polls_ 
(https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/02/what-americans-actually-think-about-immigration/386036/)
  show  majorities in 
support of granting legal status or citizenship to undocumented  immigrants. 
The problem for those calling for the enactment of liberal policies,  
however, is that immigration is a voting issue for a minority of the 
electorate.  
And among those who say immigration is their top issue, opponents outnumber  
supporters by nearly two to one. In this respect, immigration is similar to 
gun  control — both mobilize opponents more than supporters. 
The Obama administration,  in an attempt to assuage immigration critics, 
had in fact acted preemptively to  forestall the problems that emerged for 
Democrats in the 2016 election. During  the Obama years, the steady rise in the 
number of undocumented immigrants in  this country _came to a halt_ 
(http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/11/03/5-facts-about-illegal-immigration-i
n-the-u-s/) . 
In  any analysis of the 2016 vote, it is difficult to separate the issues 
of  immigration and free trade. In an October 2016 report, Pew found that 
Trump  voters were decisively more hostile to both free trade agreements and  
immigration than the general public, and much more hostile than Clinton  
supporters. 
A  detailed analysis of exit polls in four key states that helped deliver 
the  election to Donald Trump — Florida, Michigan, Pennsylvania and Wisconsin 
—  produced interesting findings not only about Hispanics, but also  
African-Americans — who are less supportive of liberal immigration policies 
than  
other core Democratic constituencies — and whites. In each of these states,  
opposition to immigration was _higher_ 
(http://www.cnn.com/election/results/exit-polls/national/president)  than the 
national average. 
Take Clinton’s performance  in Florida. She should have benefited from the 
drop in the white share of the  state’s electorate from 67 percent _in 2012_ 
(http://www.cnn.com/election/2012/results/state/FL/president/)  to 62  
percent _in 2016_ 
(http://www.cnn.com/election/results/exit-polls/florida/president) .  She did 
not, however, because her margin among whites, 32-64, fell 
significantly  below that of Obama, 37-61. Black turnout grew modestly from 
13 percent in 2012  to 14 percent in 2016, but Clinton’s margin among African 
Americans, 84-8, fell  well below Obama’s, 99-1. 
The same pattern held for  Michigan, where the white share of the 
electorate fell from 77 percent _in 2012_ 
(http://www.cnn.com/election/2012/results/state/MI/president/)  to 75  percent 
_in 2016_ 
(http://www.cnn.com/election/results/exit-polls/michigan/president) ,  but 
Clinton lost the white vote in 
Michigan by 21 points, 36-57, while Obama  lost it by 11 points, 44-55. 
The patterns are not the  same in all the Trump states. In Pennsylvania, 
for example, the white vote,  which went 56-40 for Trump over Clinton, 
increased from 78 percent _in 2012_ 
(http://www.cnn.com/election/2012/results/state/PA/president/)  to 81  percent 
_in 2016_ 
(http://www.cnn.com/election/results/exit-polls/pennsylvania/president) .  This 
boosted Trump’s statewide 
totals so that he _carried Pennsylvania by 68,236 votes_ 
(http://www.politico.com/2016-election/results/map/president/pennsylvania/) out 
of 5.97 million 
cast. An additional factor in  Clinton’s defeat there was a decline in black 
turnout from 13 percent of the  electorate in 2012 to 10 percent in 2016. 
Wisconsin stands out  because there the racial and ethnic makeup of the 
electorate remained virtually  the same from 2012 to _2016_ 
(http://www.cnn.com/election/results/exit-polls/wisconsin/president) . The  
state shifted from 
blue to red for one reason: the swing among whites toward  Trump. Trump won 
53 percent of white Wisconsin voters to Clinton’s 42 percent,  an 11-point 
margin, compared to the 3-point spread between Mitt Romney and  Obama, 51-48. 
Overall, public opinion on  immigration — particularly the views of those 
opposed to immigration — played a  crucial role in the outcome of the 2016 
election. Among the _13 percent of voters_ 
(http://www.cnn.com/election/results/exit-polls/national/president)  who  
identified immigration as the most 
important issue, Trump won, 64-33. 
This data demonstrates a  key element in the politics of immigration. 
_National polls_ 
(https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/02/what-americans-actually-think-about-immigration/386036/)
  show  majorities in 
support of granting legal status or citizenship to undocumented  immigrants. 
The problem for those calling for the enactment of liberal policies,  
however, is that immigration is a voting issue for a minority of the 
electorate.  
And among those who say immigration is their top issue, opponents outnumber  
supporters by nearly two to one. In this respect, immigration is similar to 
gun  control — both mobilize opponents more than supporters. 
The Obama administration,  in an attempt to assuage immigration critics, 
had in fact acted preemptively to  forestall the problems that emerged for 
Democrats in the 2016 election. During  the Obama years, the steady rise in the 
number of undocumented immigrants in  this country _came to a halt_ 
(http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/11/03/5-facts-about-illegal-immigration-i
n-the-u-s/) . 
Obama’s _deportation policies_ 
(https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/02/what-americans-actually-think-about-immigration/386036/)
  called  
for aggressive enforcement against 
individuals who pose a clear risk to national  security; serious felons, 
repeat offenders, or individuals with a lengthy  criminal record of any kind; 
known gang members or other individuals who pose  a clear danger to public 
safety; and individuals with an egregious record of  immigration violations, 
including those with a record of illegal re-entry and  those who have 
engaged in immigration fraud.

 
 
An Increased Focus on  Crime
 
 
 
  
 
100%
 
92%
 
80
 
Criminals as a  percentage 
of aliens deported from the  United States.
 
67%
 
60
 
40
 
20
 
FY11
 
FY12
 
FY13
 
FY14
 
FY15
 
FY16




 
Does not include those  apprehended at the border.
Source: U.S.  Immigration and Customs Enforcement
 
By The New York Times


 
 
 
On the other hand, with an  eye to the Hispanic vote and immigration 
supporters, the administration called  for “prosecutorial discretion,” meaning 
the relaxation of enforcement, if not  the ending of enforcement altogether, 
in the case of undocumented immigrants in  the following categories: 
Veterans and members of the U.S. armed forces;  long-time lawful permanent 
residents; minors and elderly individuals;  individuals present in the 
United States since childhood; pregnant or nursing  women; victims of domestic 
violence, trafficking, or other serious crimes;  individuals who suffer from a 
serious mental or physical disability; and  individuals with serious health 
conditions.
Obama’s policies produced  results — particularly the administration’s 
success in deporting those with  serious criminal records — that served him 
well in the 2012 election and, in all  likelihood, would ordinarily have worked 
for the Democratic candidate in  2016. 
But in the 2016 election,  Clinton was under strong pressure from 
immigration advocacy groups to move to a  significantly more liberal stance 
than the 
position Obama had  adopted. 
This wasn’t just Clinton’s  doing, of course. For the past fifty years, 
the Democratic Party has been the  moving force behind rights movements 
generally, including, prominently,  immigrant rights. Over that same time 
period, 
the Republican Party has been, and  still is, the political arm of those 
opposed to the expansion of civil rights.  This division has been a mixed 
blessing for both parties. 
The political advantage of  pro-rights positioning for the Democrats is 
that it has put the party at the  forefront of social and cultural movements 
that have steadily gained public  acceptance. The payoff was evident in Bill 
Clinton’s victories in 1992 and 1996  and in Obama’s in 2008 and 2012. 
The political disadvantage  emerges when a majority of voters see the 
Democratic Party as too far out in  front of the electorate — as the proponent 
of 
new rights that do not yet have  majority support. Republicans reaped the 
benefits of Democratic overreach in the  1980 election of Ronald Reagan; the “
wave” midterm elections of 1994, 2010 and  2014; and the Nov. 8 election of 
Donald Trump. 
I asked a number of  political operatives and election analysts for their 
views on these volatile  issues. There was no consensus. 
Steve Murphy, a Democratic  campaign consultant, argues that the power of 
anti-immigrant messages will be  short-lived: 
Trump and other  Republicans, he wrote, are 
simply going for a higher percentage of white votes  with bigotry toward 
ALL people of color. America is headed toward majority  minority status and 
these Republicans are simply betting on a white backlash.  Last year they got 
it with a record percentage of the white vote. Will it  continue to grow? 
History says these racist waves eventually crash on the  shoals of decency.
Others  disagreed. 
Simon Rosenberg, president  and founder of NDN (formerly the New Democratic 
Network), a center-left think  tank in Washington, has his own argument: 
Democrats will have a hard time winning this debate  unless we acknowledge 
people’s legitimate concerns about having a functioning  border and keeping 
people safe. Countering Trump will require us to lean into  Obama’s success 
at halting the unauthorized flow into the country, and  preventing foreign 
fighter terror attacks on US soil, We can be for legalizing  the 11 million 
and more generous immigration policies while also being for a  strong border 
and counterterrorism efforts. They aren’t mutually exclusive and  shouldn’t 
be seen that way.
Then, addressing the 2016  campaign, Rosenberg said: 
The Clinton campaign did not adequately rebut, or  even really address, the 
xenophobic open borders/weak on terror arguments  Trump made, and I think 
it hurt her particularly in the parts of the country  where immigrants haven’
t been settling in large numbers.
Nolan McCarty, a political  scientist at Princeton, put it this way: 
Purely in terms of politics and strategy, the  Democrats have played 
immigration badly. They have allowed their position to  be associated with open 
borders and sanctuary cities. They have based their  opposition to the 
immigration restrictionists in terms of identity politics  rather the economic 
benefits of well-managed immigration. This has caused them  to be deaf to 
concerns that many voters have about the effects of immigration  on wages and 
public services. While I do not think the evidence shows  immigration has these 
alleged harms, the Democrats have to do better than  dismiss all opposition 
to immigration as racism.
McCarty specifically  disputed the argument that Clinton’s lenient position 
was a net plus because it  was crucial in mobilizing Hispanic voters. 
It was probably her underperformance in mobilizing  African-Americans that 
hurt her most, and they are generally the group least  enthusiastic about 
open door immigration policies.
McCarty cited an _October 2016 Pew poll_ 
(http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/10/07/americans-less-concerned-than-a-decade-ago-over-immigrants-imp
act-on-workforce/)  to show  that “African-Americans support for 
immigration is about 15 points below  Democrats overall.”
 
 
 
 
Jonathan Haidt, a social psychologist at N.Y.U., took  a similar but 
broader view in disagreeing with Clinton’s immigration  strategy: 
Political thinkers going back to Hobbes have noted  that people crave 
safety and will give up many freedoms to a strong leader or  state if it can 
deliver safety. In the 1970s and 1980s, the Democrats were  seen as being on 
the 
side of those accused of crime – they reflexively sided  with the accused, 
to defend their rights and fight systemic prejudice. This  made them easy 
targets for the Republicans, who became the party of law and  order under 
Nixon and Reagan.
Now, in Haidt’s view,  adoption of a very liberal immigration stance 
carries substantial  liabilities: 
In these times of heightened fear of ISIS attacks  and slow economic 
growth, if you are seen to favor open borders, or to not be  concerned about 
illegal immigration, you will be an easy target for the party  of law and order.
It is, however, possible  that Trump’s excesses will revive support for an 
immigration policy somewhere  between Obama’s and Clinton’s. 
Adam Bonica, a political  scientist at Stanford, said that in looking 
toward the future 
everything points to a strategic advantage for the  Democrats in promoting 
immigration and the core values of decency and  inclusiveness that their 
base stands for.
I asked Marc Farinella, a  former political consultant and the executive 
director of the Project on  Political Reform at the University of Chicago’s 
Harris School of Public Policy,  about the direction of the debate going 
forward, and he wrote  back:
 
 
Trump has left the Democrats an enormous amount of  running room on this 
issue. From a strictly strategic perspective, all  Democrats have to do to 
capitalize politically is sound more compassionate and  stand up against 
excessive government oppression.” In the process, the party  “could also reap 
additional political rewards by giving voice to Americans’  desire for fairness 
and concerns about cheating and  safety.
Farinella added that  Democrats would benefit politically by making it 
clear that while they oppose amnesty, they do  support a path to 
citizenship for long-time, law-abiding and productive  undocumented residents 
that has 
real work and assimilation requirements, and  recognize that we do have to 
have efforts to identify and remove violent  criminals and improve border 
security. 
Speaking exclusively in terms of the politics of the  issue, all they’ll 
have to do is sound reasonable, humane and  compassionate.
Farinella’s analysis sounds logical, but after an  election that gave the 
White House to Donald Trump, the argument that victory  will go to the 
candidate who sounds “reasonable, humane and compassionate” is no  longer 
persuasive.

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