Hey Fred! Welcome aboard, and very well said. :-)
Would love to hear more about your journey to the "extreme center". Sent from my iPhone > On Feb 23, 2017, at 06:26, [email protected] wrote: > > Fantastic points; I would urge caution in overestimating the ability of any > single entity to 'come to power' as is suggested and suddenly be given free > reign over the country. This is the main reason I am intrigued more than most > by our current predicament: we have Trump in office and the system of checks > and balances, be them in the condition that they are in, are churning away to > keep him as dead center as could be expected. It is not enough, of course, > and many of us in the extreme center argue for a redo of the Constitution > altogether - but it is pretty cool that at least some of the Centrist > mechanisms put in place still hold up to some degree. While acknowledging > Trump as somewhat Authoritarian I also submit that the system he is playing > in is more Center than many previously imagined. > >> On Wednesday, February 22, 2017 at 4:44:13 PM UTC-8, Dr. Ernie Prabhakar >> wrote: >> Don't get me wrong - Facebook has enormous power to impose its values on the >> world. That is precisely why an open ecosystem for building trust is so >> essential as a counterweight. >> >> https://stratechery.com/2017/manifestos-and-monopolies/ >> >> Manifestos and Monopolies >> Tuesday, February 21, 2017 >> It is certainly possible that, as per recent speculation, Facebook CEO Mark >> Zuckerberg is preparing to run for President. It is also possible that >> Facebook is on the verge of failing “just like MySpace”. And while I’m here, >> it’s possible that UFOs exist. I doubt it, though. >> >> The reality is that Facebook is one of the most powerful companies the tech >> industry — and arguably, the world — has ever seen. True, everything posted >> on Facebook is put there for free, either by individuals or professional >> content creators; >> >> and true, Facebook isn’t really irreplaceable when it comes to the >> generation of economic value; >> and it is also true that there are all kinds of alternatives when it comes >> to communication. However, to take these truths as evidence that Facebook is >> fragile requires a view of the world that is increasingly archaic. >> Start with production: there certainly was a point in human history when >> economic power was derived through the control of resources and the >> production of scarce goods: >> >> >> >> However, for most products this has not been the case for well over a >> century; first the industrial revolution and then the advent of the >> assembly-line method of manufacturing resulted in an abundance of products. >> The new source of economic power became distribution: the ability to get >> those mass-produced products in front of customers who were inclined to buy >> them: >> >> >> >> Today the fundamental impact of the Internet is to make distribution itself >> a cheap commodity — or in the case of digital content, completely free. And >> that, by extension, is why I have long argued that the Internet Revolution >> is as momentous as the Industrial Revolution: it is transforming how and >> where economic value is generated, and thus where power resides: >> >> >> >> In this brave new world, power comes not from production, not from >> distribution, but from controlling consumption: all markets will be >> demand-driven; the extent to which they already are is a function of how >> digitized they have become. >> >> This is why most Facebook-fail-fundamentalists so badly miss the point: that >> the company pays nothing for its content is not a weakness, it is a >> reflection of the fundamental reality that the supply of content (and >> increasingly goods) is infinite, and thus worthless; that the company is not >> essential to the distribution of products is not a measure of its economic >> importance, or lack thereof, but a reflection that distribution is no longer >> a differentiator. And last of all, the fact that communication is possible >> on other platforms is to ignore the fact that communication will always be >> easiest on Facebook, because they own the social graph. Combine that with >> the fact that controlling consumption is about controlling billions of >> individual consumers, all of whom will, all things being equal, choose the >> easy option, and you start to appreciate just how dominant Facebook is. >> >> Given this reality, why would Zuckerberg want to be President? He is not >> only the CEO of Facebook, he is the dominant shareholder as well, answerable >> to no one. His power and ability to influence is greater than any President >> subject to political reality and check-and-balances, and besides, as >> Zuckerberg made clear last week, his concern is not a mere country but >> rather the entire world. >> >> Facebook Unease >> >> The argument that Facebook is more powerful than most realize is not a new >> one on Stratechery; in 2015 I wrote The Facebook Epoch that made similar >> points about just how underrated Facebook was, particularly in Silicon >> Valley. In my role as an analyst I can’t help but be impressed: I have >> probably written more positive pieces about Facebook than just about any >> other company, and frankly, still will. >> >> And yet, if you were to take a military-type approach to analysis — >> evaluating Facebook based on capabilities, not intent — the company is, for >> the exact same reasons, rather terrifying. Last year in The Voters Decide I >> wrote: >> >> Given their power over what users see Facebook could, if it chose, be the >> most potent political force in the world. Until, of course, said meddling >> was uncovered, at which point the service, having so significantly betrayed >> trust, would lose a substantial number of users and thus its lucrative and >> privileged place in advertising, leading to a plunge in market value. In >> short, there are no incentives for Facebook to explicitly favor any type of >> content beyond that which drives deeper engagement; all evidence suggests >> that is exactly what the service does. >> >> The furor last May over Facebook’s alleged tampering with the Trending >> Topics box — and Facebook’s overwrought reaction to even the suggestion of >> explicit bias — seemed to confirm that Facebook’s incentives were such that >> the company would never become overtly political. To be sure, algorithms are >> written by humans, which means they will always have implicit bias, and the >> focus on engagement has its own harms, particularly the creation of filter >> bubbles and fake news, but I have longed viewed Facebook’s use for explicit >> political ends to be the greatest danger of all. >> >> This is why I read Zuckerberg’s manifesto, Building a Global Community, with >> such alarm. Zuckerberg not only gives his perspective on how the world is >> changing — and, at least in passing, some small admission that Facebook’s >> focus on engagement may have driven things like filter bubbles and fake news >> — but for the first time explicitly commits Facebook to playing a central >> role in effecting that change in a manner that aligns with Zuckerberg’s >> personal views on the world. Zuckerberg writes: >> >> This is a time when many of us around the world are reflecting on how we can >> have the most positive impact. I am reminded of my favorite saying about >> technology: “We always overestimate what we can do in two years, and we >> underestimate what we can do in ten years.” We may not have the power to >> create the world we want immediately, but we can all start working on the >> long term today. In times like these, the most important thing we at >> Facebook can do is develop the social infrastructure to give people the >> power to build a global community that works for all of us. >> >> For the past decade, Facebook has focused on connecting friends and >> families. With that foundation, our next focus will be developing the social >> infrastructure for community — for supporting us, for keeping us safe, for >> informing us, for civic engagement, and for inclusion of all. >> >> It all sounds so benign, and given Zuckerberg’s framing of the >> disintegration of institutions that held society together, helpful, even. >> And one can even argue that just as the industrial revolution shifted >> political power from localized fiefdoms and cities to centralized >> nation-states, the Internet revolution will, perhaps, require a shift in >> political power to global entities. That seems to be Zuckerberg’s position: >> >> Our greatest opportunities are now global — like spreading prosperity and >> freedom, promoting peace and understanding, lifting people out of poverty, >> and accelerating science. Our greatest challenges also need global responses >> — like ending terrorism, fighting climate change, and preventing pandemics. >> Progress now requires humanity coming together not just as cities or >> nations, but also as a global community. >> >> There’s just one problem: first, Zuckerberg may be wrong; it’s just as >> plausible to argue that the ultimate end-state of the Internet Revolution is >> a devolution of power to smaller more responsive self-selected entities. >> And, even if Zuckerberg is right, is there anyone who believes that a >> private company run by an unaccountable all-powerful person that tracks your >> every move for the purpose of selling advertising is the best possible form >> said global governance should take? >> >> The Cost of Monopoly >> >> My deep-rooted suspicion of Zuckerberg’s manifesto has nothing to do with >> Facebook or Zuckerberg; I suspect that we agree on more political goals than >> not. Rather, my discomfort arises from my strong belief that centralized >> power is both inefficient and dangerous: no one person, or company, can >> figure out optimal solutions for everyone on their own, and history is >> riddled with examples of central planners ostensibly acting with the best of >> intentions — at least in their own minds — resulting in the most horrific of >> consequences; those consequences sometimes take the form of overt costs, >> both economic and humanitarian, and sometimes those costs are foregone >> opportunities and innovations. Usually it’s both. >> >> Facebook is already problematic for society when it comes to opportunity >> costs. While the Internet — specifically, the removal of distribution as a >> bottleneck — is the cause of journalism’s woes, it is Facebook that has >> gobbled up all of the profits in publishing. Twitter, a service I believe is >> both unique and essential, was squashed by Facebook; I suspect the company’s >> struggles for viability are at the root of the service’s inability to evolve >> or deal with abuse. Even Snapchat, led by the most visionary product person >> tech has seen in years, has serious questions about its long-term viability. >> Facebook is too dominant: its network effects are too strong, and its data >> on every user on the Internet too compelling to the advertisers other >> consumer-serving businesses need to be viable entities. >> >> I don’t necessarily begrudge Facebook this dominance; as I alluded to above >> I myself have benefited from chronicling it. Zuckerberg identified a market >> opportunity, ruthlessly exploited it with superior execution, had the >> humility to buy when necessary and the audacity to copy well, and has >> deservedly profited in the face of continual skepticism. And further, as I >> noted, as long as Facebook was governed by the profit-maximization >> incentive, I was willing to tolerate the company’s unintended consequences: >> whatever steps would be necessary to undo the company’s dominance, >> particularly if initiated by governments, would have their own unintended >> consequences. And besides, as we saw with IBM and Windows, markets are far >> more effective than governments at tearing down the ecosystem-based >> monopolies they enable — in part because the pursuit of profit-maximizing >> strategies is a key ingredient of disruption. >> >> That, though, is why for me this manifesto crosses the line: contra >> Spiderman, Facebook’s great power does not entail great responsibility; said >> power ought to entail the refusal to apply it, no matter how altruistic the >> aims, and barring that, it is on the rest of us to act in opposition. >> >> Limiting Facebook >> >> Of course it is one thing to point out the problems with Facebook’s >> dominance, but it’s quite another to come up with a strategy for dealing >> with it; too many of the solutions — including demands that Zuckerberg use >> Facebook for political ends — are less concerned with the abuse of power and >> more with securing said power for the “right” causes. And, from the opposite >> side, it’s not clear that a traditional antitrust is even possible for >> companies governed by Aggregation Theory, as I explained last year in >> Antitrust and Aggregation: >> >> To briefly recap, Aggregation Theory is about how business works in a world >> with zero distribution costs and zero transaction costs; consumers are >> attracted to an aggregator through the delivery of a superior experience, >> which attracts modular suppliers, which improves the experience and thus >> attracts more consumers, and thus more suppliers in the aforementioned >> virtuous cycle… >> >> The first key antitrust implication of Aggregation Theory is that, thanks to >> these virtuous cycles, the big get bigger; indeed, all things being equal >> the equilibrium state in a market covered by Aggregation Theory is monopoly: >> one aggregator that has captured all of the consumers and all of the >> suppliers. >> >> This monopoly, though, is a lot different than the monopolies of yesteryear: >> aggregators aren’t limiting consumer choice by controlling supply (like oil) >> or distribution (like railroads) or infrastructure (like telephone wires); >> rather, consumers are self-selecting onto the Aggregator’s platform because >> it’s a better experience. >> >> Facebook is a particularly thorny case, because the company has multiple >> lock-ins: on one hand, as per Aggregation Theory, Facebook has completely >> modularized and commoditized content suppliers desperate to reach Facebook’s >> massive user base; it’s a two-sided market in which suppliers are completely >> powerless. But so are users, thanks to Facebook’s network effects: the >> number one feature of any social network is whether or not your friends or >> family are using it, and everyone uses Facebook (even if they also use >> another social network as well). >> >> To that end, Facebook should not be allowed to buy another network-based >> app; I would go further and make it prima facie anticompetitive for one >> social network to buy another. Network effects are just too powerful to >> allow them to be combined. For example, the current environment would look a >> lot different if Facebook didn’t own Instagram or WhatsApp (and, should >> Facebook ever lose an antitrust lawsuit, the remedy would almost certainly >> be spinning off Instagram and WhatsApp). >> >> Secondly, all social networks should be required to enable social graph >> portability — the ability to export your lists of friends from one network >> to another. Again Instagram is the perfect example: the one-time >> photo-filtering app launched its network off the back of Twitter by enabling >> the wholesale import of your Twitter social graph. And, after it was >> acquired by Facebook, Instagram has only accelerated its growth by >> continually importing your Facebook network. Today all social networks have >> long since made this impossible, making it that much more difficult for >> competitors to arise. >> >> Third, serious attention should be given to Facebook’s data collection on >> individuals. As a rule I don’t have any problem with advertising, or even >> data collection, but Facebook is so pervasive that it is all but impossible >> for individuals to opt-out in any meaningful way, which further solidifies >> Facebook’s growing dominance of digital advertising. >> >> Anyone who has read Stratechery for any length of time knows I have great >> reservations about regulation; the benefits are easy to measure, but the >> opportunity costs are both invisible and often far greater. That, though, is >> why I am also concerned about Facebook’s dominance: there are significant >> opportunity costs to the social network’s dominance. Even then, my >> trepidation about any sort of intervention is vast, and that leads me back >> to Zuckerberg’s manifesto: it’s bad enough for Facebook to have so much >> power, but the very suggestion that Zuckerberg might utilize it for >> political ends raises the costs of inaction from not just opportunity costs >> to overt ones. >> >> Moreover, my proposals are in line with Zuckerberg’s proclaimed goals: if >> the Facebook CEO truly wants to foster new kinds of communities, then he >> ought to unleash the force that can best build the tools those disparate >> communities might need. That, of course, is the market, and Facebook’s >> social graph is the key. That Zuckerberg believes Facebook can do it alone >> is evidence enough that for Zuckerberg, saving the world is at best a close >> second to saving Facebook; the last thing we need are unaccountable leaders >> who put their personal interests above those they purport to govern. >> >> >> >> Sent from my iPhone > > -- > -- > Centroids: The Center of the Radical Centrist Community > <[email protected]> > Google Group: http://groups.google.com/group/RadicalCentrism > Radical Centrism website and blog: http://RadicalCentrism.org > > --- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Centroids: The Center of the Radical Centrist Community" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- -- Centroids: The Center of the Radical Centrist Community <[email protected]> Google Group: http://groups.google.com/group/RadicalCentrism Radical Centrism website and blog: http://RadicalCentrism.org --- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Centroids: The Center of the Radical Centrist Community" group. 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