[Billy, let me know if an unformatted version would be easier for you to read]
Hi everyone, We are trying something new for Mediating Trump #14 (next Friday). We are posting various articles we could study and discuss together on the podcast. Our proposed theme (coming out of a discussion on economics) is how to create effective governance. There’s a great review of Elinor Ostrom’s work on the tension between internal and external competition that I think is incredibly relevant. I was impressed enough to summarize her thesis in a blog post: > https://radicalcentrism.org/2016/11/02/8-design-principles-for-self-governance/ > > <https://radicalcentrism.org/2016/11/02/8-design-principles-for-self-governance/> > From Elinor Ostrom > <http://evonomics.com/tragedy-of-the-commons-elinor-ostrom/> via Evonomics. > > Eight core design principles: > > Clearly defined boundaries > Proportional equivalence between benefits and costs > Collective choice arrangements > Monitoring > Graduated sanctions > Fast and fair conflict resolution > Local autonomy > Appropriate relations with other tiers of rule-making authority (polycentric > governance). > This work was so groundbreaking that Ostrom was awarded the Nobel Prize in > economics in 2009. > Would love reactions and counter-proposals, — Ernie P. > > http://evonomics.com/tragedy-of-the-commons-elinor-ostrom/ > <http://evonomics.com/tragedy-of-the-commons-elinor-ostrom/> > > The Tragedy of the Commons: How Elinor Ostrom Solved One of Life’s Greatest > Dilemmas > The design principles for solving the tragedy of the commons can be applied > to all groups > > By David Sloan Wilson > > As an evolutionary biologist who received my PhD in 1975, I grew up with > Garrett Hardin’s essay “The Tragedy of the Commons,” published in Science > magazine in 1968. His parable of villagers adding too many cows to their > common pasture captured the essence of the problem that my thesis research > was designed to solve. The farmer who added an extra cow gained an advantage > over other farmers in his village but it also led to an overgrazed pasture. > The biological world is full of similar examples in which individuals who > behave for the good of their groups lose out in the struggle for existence > with more self-serving individuals, resulting in overexploited resources and > other tragedies of non-cooperation. > > Is the so-called tragedy of the commons ever averted in the biological world > and might this possibility provide solutions for our own species? One > plausible scenario is natural selection at the level of groups. A selfish > farmer might have an advantage over other farmers in his village, but a > village that somehow solved the tragedy of the commons would have a decisive > advantage over other villages. Most species are subdivided into local > populations at various scales, just as humans are subdivided into villages, > cities and nations. If natural selection between groups (favoring > cooperation) can successfully oppose natural selection within groups > (favoring non-cooperation), then the tragedy of the commons can be averted > for humans and non-human species alike. > > > Get Evonomics in your inbox > > > At the time that Hardin published his article and I was working on my thesis, > this possibility had been considered and largely rejected. A book titled > Adaptation and Natural Selection <http://amzn.to/2ftkK3B>, written by > evolutionary biologist George C. Williams and published in 1966, was on its > way to becoming a modern classic. Williams described between-group selection > as theoretically possible but almost invariably weak compared to within-group > selection. By his account, attempts to explain evolutionary adaptations as > “for the good of the group” reflected sloppy and wishful thinking. Hardin’s > article reflected the same pessimism about avoiding the tragedy of the > commons other than by top-down regulation. My interest in rethinking the > plausibility of group selection placed me in a very small group of heretics > (see Okasha 2006, Sober and Wilson 1998, Wilson and Wilson 2007, and Wilson > 2015 for more on the controversy over group selection, which in my opinion > has now been mostly resolved). > > Evolutionary theory’s individualistic turn coincided with individualistic > turns in other areas of thought. Economics in the postwar decades was > dominated by rational choice theory, which used individual self-interest as a > grand explanatory principle. The social sciences were dominated by a position > known as methodological individualism, which treated all social phenomena as > reducible to individual-level phenomena, as if groups were not legitimate > units of analysis in their own right (Campbell 1990). And UK Prime Minister > Margaret Thatcher became notorious for saying during a speech in 1987 that > “there is no such thing as society; only individuals and families.” It was as > if the entire culture had become individualistic and the formal scientific > theories were obediently following suit. > > Unbeknownst to me, another heretic named Elinor Ostrom was also challenging > the received wisdom in her field of political science. Starting with her > thesis research on how a group of stakeholders in southern California cobbled > together a system for managing their water table, and culminating in her > worldwide study of common-pool resource (CPR) groups, the message of her work > was that groups are capable of avoiding the tragedy of the commons without > requiring top-down regulation, at least if certain conditions are met (Ostrom > 1990, 2010). She summarized the conditions in the form of eight core design > principles: 1) Clearly defined boundaries; 2) Proportional equivalence > between benefits and costs; 3) Collective choice arrangements; 4) Monitoring; > 5) Graduated sanctions; 6) Fast and fair conflict resolution; 7) Local > autonomy; 8) Appropriate relations with other tiers of rule-making authority > (polycentric governance). This work was so groundbreaking that Ostrom was > awarded the Nobel Prize in economics in 2009. > > I first met Lin (as she preferred to be called) just a few months before she > was awarded the prize, at a workshop held in Florence, Italy, titled “Do > Institutions Evolve?” (recounted in Wilson 2011a). Similar events were taking > place all over the world in 2009 to celebrate the 200th anniversary of > Darwin’s birth and the 150th anniversary of On the Origin of Species > <http://amzn.to/2f2kZiO>. Multilevel selection theory, which envisions > natural selection operating on a multi-tier hierarchy of units, had become > more widely accepted by then, especially with respect to human cultural > evolution, making me much in demand as a speaker. I had also cofounded a > think tank called the Evolution Institute2 that formulates public policy from > an evolutionary perspective, giving me a strong interest in the workshop > topic. I had become somewhat familiar with Lin’s work but having the > opportunity to talk with her at length had a transformative impact. > > I quickly realized that Lin’s core design principle approach dovetailed with > multilevel selection theory, which my fellow-heretics and I had worked so > hard to revive. Her approach is especially pertinent to the concept of major > evolutionary transitions, whereby members of groups become so cooperative > that the group becomes a higher-level organism in its own right. This idea > was first proposed by cell biologist Lynn Margulis (1970) to explain how > nucleated cells evolved from symbiotic associations of bacteria. It was then > generalized during the 1990s to explain other major transitions, such as the > rise of the first bacterial cells, multicellular organisms, eusocial insect > colonies and human evolution (Maynard Smith and Szathmary 1995, 1999). > > Hunter-gatherer societies are famously egalitarian, not because everyone is > nice, but because members of a group can collectively suppress bullying and > other self-aggrandizing behaviors within their ranks – the defining criterion > of a major evolutionary transition (Boehm 1993, 1999, 2011). With disruptive > competition within groups held largely in check, succeeding as a group became > the main selective force in human evolution. The entire package of traits > regarded as distinctively human – including our ability to cooperate in > groups of unrelated individuals, our ability to transmit learned information > across generations, and our capacity for language and other forms of symbolic > thought – can be regarded as forms of physical and mental teamwork made > possible by a major evolutionary transition. > > Lin’s design principles (DP) had “major evolutionary transition” written all > over them. Clearly defined boundaries (DP1) meant that members knew they were > part of a group and what the group was about (e.g., fisherman with access to > a bay or farmers managing an irrigation system). Proportional equivalence of > costs and benefits (DP2) meant that members had to earn their benefits and > couldn’t just appropriate them. Collective choice arrangements (DP3) meant > that group members had to agree upon decisions so nobody could be bossed > around. Monitoring (DP4) and graduated sanctions (DP5) meant that disruptive > self-serving behaviors could be detected and punished. Fast and fair conflict > resolution (DP6) meant that the group would not be torn apart by internal > conflicts of interest. Local autonomy (DP7) meant that the group had the > elbow room to manage its own affairs. Appropriate relations with other tiers > of rule making authority (DP8) meant that everything regulating the conduct > of individuals within a given group also was needed to regulate conduct among > groups in a multi group population. > > The concordance between Lin’s core design principle approach and multilevel > selection theory had three major implications. First, it placed the core > design principle approach on a more general theoretical foundation. Lin’s > “Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD)” framework emanated from > political science and she was an early adopter of economic game theory, but > her main case for the design principle approach was the empirical database > that she compiled for common-pool resource groups around the world, as > described in her most influential book Governing the Commons > <http://amzn.to/2dSP2MG>(Ostrom 1990). Multilevel selection theory showed how > the core design principle approach follows from the evolutionary dynamics of > cooperation in all species and from our own evolutionary history as a highly > cooperative species. > > Second, because of its theoretical generality, the core design principle > approach is likely to apply to a much broader range of human groups than > those attempting to manage common-pool resources (CPRs). Almost any group > whose members must work together to achieve a common goal is vulnerable to > self-serving behaviors and should benefit from the same principles. An > analysis of business groups, churches, voluntary associations and urban > neighborhoods should yield the same results as Lin’s analysis of CPR groups. > > Third, the core design principle approach can provide a practical framework > for improving the efficacy of groups in the real world. It should be possible > for almost any kind of group to assess itself with respect to the design > principles, address shortcomings, and function better as a result. This > prospect was especially appealing to me as president of the Evolution > Institute <http://evolution-institute.org/>, since I was now actively engaged > in formulating and implementing public policy from an evolutionary > perspective. > > Lin inspired me to begin several projects in parallel with each other. One > was to collaborate with her and her postdoctoral associate Michael Cox to > write an academic article, “Generalizing the Core Design Principle for the > Efficacy of Groups” that established the three major implications listed > above for an academic audience (Wilson, Ostrom and Cox 2013). Michael was the > lead author of a 2010 article that evaluated the core design principle > approach for the literature on CPR groups that had accumulated since Lin’s > original analysis (Cox et al. 2010). Our article was published in a special > issue of the Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization titled “Evolution as > a General Theoretical Framework for Economics and Public Policy.” Both the > article and the special issue should be consulted for more on the theoretical > framework that underpins the design principle approach. > > In addition, I started to use the design principle approach in projects that > involved working with real-world groups in Binghamton, New York. One was a > collaboration with the City of Binghamton and United Way of Broome County > called “Design Your Own Park,” which used the opportunity to turn a neglected > space into a neighborhood park. Neighborhood groups that formed to create a > park would be coached in the core design principles and start to manage the > affairs of their neighborhood in other respects. This project led to the > creation of four neighborhood parks—and their groups—in our city (Wilson > 2011b). > > The second project was a collaboration with the Binghamton City School > District to create a “school within a school” for at-risk youth called the > Regents Academy (Wilson, Kaufmann, and Purdy 2011). This was our most > ambitious and best documented project because we were able to employ the gold > standard of scientific assessment, the randomized control trial, which > randomly assigns participants into an experimental group and a control group > to identify significant variables that might affect outcomes. To the best of > its ability, the Regents Academy implemented the eight core design principles > and two auxiliary design principles deemed to be important in a learning > context (a relaxed and playful atmosphere and short-term rewards for > long-term learning goals). Not only did the Regents Academy students vastly > outperform the comparison group, but they even performed on a par with the > average high school student on the state-mandated Regents exam (see Wilson, > Kauffman and Purdy 2011 for details). This is a strong indication that the > design principle approach can be generalized beyond CPR groups and can be > used as a practical framework for improving the efficacy of groups in our > everyday lives. > > The third project was a collaboration with a number of religious > congregations in Binghamton to reflect upon the core design principles in > relation to their faith and social organization. These conversations did not > lead to a formal effort to change practices but they were invaluable for > exploring how the success of religious groups can be understood in terms of > the design principles approach. > > All of these projects were instructive and broadly confirmed the relevance of > the core design principle approach for any group whose members must work > together to achieve a common purpose. They also showed how the design > principles can be sadly lacking in some groups, such as disadvantaged > neighborhoods and public schools. It is important to remember that Ostrom was > able to derive the core design principles for CPR groups because they varied > in how well the design principles were implemented. Some did well without > needing to be taught, while others did poorly and might benefit from some > coaching. Based on my own projects, I became convinced that all groups are > likely to face similar challenges in implementing the core design principles. > > > Get Evonomics in your inbox > > > Sadly, Lin died of cancer in June 2012. I was with her only a few months > before at a workshop, “Rules as Genotypes in Cultural Evolution,” which we > organized together and hosted at her Workshop in Political Theory and Policy > Analysis, at Indiana University. She was simultaneously trying to care for > her aging husband Vincent, satisfy the worldwide demand for speaking > appearances, manage her projects and care for herself. I am grateful to be > among the many who were touched by her and proud to contribute to her legacy > by helping to generalize the core design principle approach and make it > available to any group whose members must work together to achieve shared > goals.* > > Adapted from Patterns of commoning, co-edited by David Bollier and Silke > Helfrich <http://patternsofcommoning.org/generalizing-the-commons/>. > > 2016 October 29 > > *PROSOCIAL <https://www.prosocialgroups.org/> is the first Internet platform > that enables any group, anywhere in the world, to evaluate itself and > increase its efficacy based on a fusion of the core design principle approach > and evidence-based methods from the applied behavioral sciences. > > References > > Boehm, Christopher. 1993. “Egalitarian Society and Reverse Dominance > Hierarchy.” Current Anthropology, 34:227 – 254. > > ———. 1999. Hierarchy in the Forest: Egalitarianism and the Evolution of Human > Altruism. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press. > > ———. 2011. Moral Origins: The Evolution of Virtue, Altruism, and Shame. New > York: Basic Books. > > Campbell, Donald T. 1990. “Levels of Organization, Downward Causation, and > the Selection-Theory Approach to Evolutionary Epistemology.” In G. Greenberg > & E. Tobach, editors, Theories of the Evolution of Knowing, 1 – 17. > Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. > > Cox, M., G. Arnold & S. Villamayor-Tomas. 2010. “A Review of Design > Principles for Community-based Natural Resource Management.” Ecology and > Society. 15. > > Hardin, Garrett. 1968. “The Tragedy of the Commons.” Science. 162:1243-1248. > > Margulis, Lynn. 1970. Origin of Eukaryotic cells. New Haven: Yale University > Press. > > Maynard Smith, John, & E. Szathmary. 1995. The Major Transitions of Life > <http://amzn.to/2ebhhoc>. New York: W.H. Freeman. > > ———. 1999. The Origins of Life: From the Birth of Life to the Origin of > Language. Oxford: Oxford University Press. > > Okasha, Samir. 2006. Evolution and the Levels of Selection > <http://amzn.to/2f5S7VV>. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. > > Ostrom, Elinor. 1990. Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions > for Collective Action. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. > > ———. 2010. “Polycentric Systems for Coping with Collective Action and Global > Environmental Change.” Global Environmental Change. 20:550 – 557. > > Sober, Elliot, & Wilson, D. S. 1998. Unto Others: The Evolution and > Psychology of Unselfish Behavior <http://amzn.to/2f5PPWJ>. Cambridge, MA: > Harvard University Press. > > Williams, George. C. 1966. Adaptation and Natural Selection: A Critique of > Some Current Evolutionary Thought. Princeton: Princeton University Press. > > Wilson, D.S. 2011a. The Neighborhood Project: Using Evolution to Improve My > City, <http://amzn.to/2e1g9jC>One Block at a Time. New York: Little, Brown. > > ———. 2011b. “The Design Your Own Park Competition: Empowering Neighborhoods > and Restoring Outdoor Play on a Citywide Scale.” American Journal of Play. > 3:538 – 551. > > ———. 2014. “Introducing PROSOCIAL: Using the Science of Cooperation to > Improve the Efficacy of Your Group.” This View of Life. > > ———. 2015. Does Altruism Exist? Culture, Genes, and the Welfare of Others. > New Haven: Yale University Press. > > Wilson, D.S., Kauffman, R. A., & Purdy, M. S. 2011. “A Program for At-risk > High School Students Informed by Evolutionary Science.” PLoS ONE, 6(11), > e27826. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0027826 > > Wilson, D.S., & Gowdy, J. M. 2013. “Evolution as a General Theoretical > Framework for Economics and Public Policy.” Journal of Economic Behavior & > Organization. 90:S3 – S10. doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2012.12.008 > > Wilson, D.S., Hayes, S. C., Biglan, A., & Embry, D. 2014. “Evolving the > Future: Toward a Science of Intentional Change.” Behavioral and Brain > Sciences. 37:395 – 460. > > Wilson, D.S., E. Ostrom & M. Cox. 2013. “Generalizing the Design Principles > for Improving the Efficacy of Groups.” Journal of Economic Behavior & > Organization. 90:supplement, S21 – S32. > > Wilson, D.S., & E.O. Wilson. 2007. “Rethinking the Theoretical Foundation of > Sociobiology.” Quarterly Review of Biology. 82:327 – 348. > > Donating = Changing Economics. And Changing the World. > > Evonomics is free, it’s a labor of love, and it's an expense. We spend > hundreds of hours and lots of dollars each month creating, curating, and > promoting content that drives the next evolution of economics. If you're like > us — if you think there’s a key leverage point here for making the world a > better place — please consider donating. 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