Finally found time to read this. Great find. Forwarded to my friends in Truth Bowl.
Sent from my iPhone > On Feb 1, 2019, at 09:36, Billy Rojas <1billyro...@buglephilosophy.com> wrote: > > The New Yorker Interview > Does Democracy Need Truth?: A Conversation with the Historian Sophia Rosenfeld > > By Isaac Chotiner > > January 31, 2019 > > Ever since Donald Trump announced his Presidential candidacy, in June of > 2015, there has been considerable concern about whether his allergy to truth > is endangering American democracy. Without a public sphere dominated by > agreed-upon-facts, many say, a healthy society—and wise polity—become > impossible to sustain. In her new book, “Democracy and Truth: A Short > History,” Sophia Rosenfeld, a professor of history at the University of > Pennsylvania, argues that the relationship between truth and democracy was > fraught for centuries before the time of Twitter and Trump. “Does democratic > politics really ‘need truth to do its business well,’ as some have recently > claimed?” she asks in the book. In addition to trying to answer that > question, she argues that questions of truth have always been litigated and > disputed, and that a politics dominated by shared notions of the truth has > never really existed. > > > > With Trump halfway through his four-year term in office, it seemed like a > good time to talk about the state of truth in American society, so I called > up Rosenfeld. During our conversation, which has been edited and condensed > for clarity, we discussed whether it is healthy for a democratic society to > debate issues like evolution and global warming, why people distrust experts, > and whether public fact-checking is a good solution to the problem of fake > news. > > > > What came across from your book is that the fretting about the future of > truth in a democracy, as it relates to Trump, has irked you, even though > you’re obviously not a fan of the President. Is that fair? > > > > Well, you’re right, I’m not a fan of the President, so I’m not in any way > trying to excuse what I think is a demonstrably terrible Presidency. That > said, I don’t think that we have to rush into the idea that we’re heading > full force into fascism every time he opens his mouth, either. I do think > that taking a longer historical look, not simply looking at the last two to > five years, allows you to see the way even this moment, with all its > obviously unusual features, still belongs to a much longer story. > > > > What’s that story? > > > > That story is twofold. One, it’s a story about how democracy itself is always > based on uncertain notions of truth, in moral terms and in epistemological > terms. The other is a story about a continual conflict between a kind of > expert truth and a more populist, everyday, common-sense truth that > supposedly stems not from experts but the wisdom of the crowd. > > > > Even if truth in a democracy has always been up for grabs, and we’ve always > had politicians use fake news, that still raises the question of whether we > require some fundamental baseline of truth to have an actual democracy. > > > > Right. It’s in some ways the great problem of democracy. Democracy insists on > the idea that truth both matters and that nobody gets to say definitively > what it is. That’s a tension that’s built into democracy from the beginning, > and it’s not solvable but is, in fact, intrinsic to democracy. I think both > things matter. We don’t want to have one definitive source of truth. Part of > the reason ideas evolve and culture changes is that we’re constantly debating > what is an accurate rendition of reality in some form. But, on the other > hand, it makes for a lot of instability. That instability can be productive > or unproductive at different moments and in different ways. You know, the > aspiration for knowing more and getting closer to the truth is a really > important one, because it lets us constantly rethink what we know to be true > and often decide that what we know to be true isn’t. > > > > Have there been societies that you would consider democracies whose > foundations started to shake because that pursuit of truth stopped? > > > There’s always the risk that if there’s too much instability in truth, people > will find life in general unstable, that you won’t know what to believe in at > all. I do think there’s a serious risk in a politics anywhere that doesn’t > have some agreed-upon foundation, even if it’s a loose consensus. The classic > example would be something like Weimar Germany, when there ceases to be a > real commitment to seeing the world collectively. Then you get some kind of > revolution, you get some kind of really abrupt change. You might just get > apathy. People stop caring about truth, as sometimes happened in former > Eastern European states where people retreated into private life and > dismissed public life as just filled with untruth. That’s the great risk, but > democracies do thrive on a certain amount of combative truth claims, always. > If you run through American history, you can see sometimes they’re explosive, > but most of the time they’re part of public life. > > > > What would be some examples of truth claims that you think are either > important to the lifeblood of democracy or explosive and dangerous? > > > > Something like Darwinian claims about evolution, which were heavily > contested. To some degree, they still are, and they’ve been part of > democratic life and part of legal life. Can we accept evolution as a set > truth or not? They have not exploded to the point where they’ve destabilized > our political or social life, but they’ve been a controversial question for > over a hundred years. That’s a public contest that, actually, democracy’s > pretty good for. You know, you contest things in court, you contest things in > universities, you contest things in the public sphere. > > > > You said democracy’s good for them, but are they good for democracy? Could I > argue that the battle over evolution has not brought down American democracy > or done damage in the way that other things have, but that, if everyone just > accepted the broad claims of evolution, we would have a healthier democracy? > > > > I’m not really sure. I think it’s important that there be a contest about > what is true and also about, How do you know what’s true? Where does your > information come from? I would say, largely, science has won. That is, that > the mainstream educational institutions, the National Institutes of Health, > et cetera, all accept that evolution is as close as we’re going to get to > truth. Is it dangerous that there’s still some people who don’t believe that? > Probably not really dangerous to democracy as a whole. We’ve long contested > not just what’s true but how we know anything: What are the sources of truth? > I think the issue today that has people most upset is not either of those > questions as much as whether we’ve stopped caring about what’s true. The > whole phenomenon of post-truth has taken us to the question of whether we’re > indifferent to truth now, as opposed to contesting what it is and how we find > it. > > > > You could say that the battle over whether climate change is, in part, > man-made is a contest over truth, and that’s a democracy. You could also say > that, well, if everyone accepted that as true, the planet might be a lot > safer. > > > > Yes. I agree entirely. The question is: How do we find some way [to insure] > that the better answer prevails? We’re not so upset that people are arguing > about this. We’re upset that we haven’t been able to fashion policies that > rest on what seems to be the consensus of ninety-nine per cent of scientists > and almost anybody who’s had any involvement in climate-related issues. Why > it is that so many people are not persuaded, at the moment, by what seems to > be scientific consensus—and, in many cases, not persuaded even by the > evidence that’s right in front of them? > > > > This gets at some of the things you say in the book about experts. There are > two current critiques of them, and I am wondering if you think they are worth > distinguishing. The first would be that experts are often wrong, and so > something that we view as technocratic actually brings about a bad result. > The second critique would be that experts don’t bring about bad results, in > terms of human flourishing, but they are unpopular or cause a populist > backlash despite this. > > > > That’s a really important and, I think, excellent distinction. One says that > experts often make [bad] decisions because there’s been no popular input on > them—not just because they don’t know enough but because they haven’t > actually taken account of popular knowledge. The most common example involves > things like the World Bank coming up with a plan about water use in some part > of the world without studying how people actually think and use water, simply > imagining a kind of technocratic solution with no local input, and it turns > out to be totally ineffective because it runs contrary to cultural norms and > everyday life. There’s every chance that experts alone get things wrong. > > > > Your second point is really more of a social question. It’s the critique of > people who are over-educated, generally wealthier than average, and, in some > ways, not part of the mainstream, making decisions for everybody else. You > see that in cases like the E.U., where, whether their policies are effective > or not, there’s resentment at what’s called the democratic deficit, the fact > that people have very little say, often, about what policies are enacted. > That breeds resentment, too, whether or not the policies themselves result in > beneficial outcomes. > > > The first critique you made is almost that experts are not expert enough. > That these experts do not have enough expertise to get water to people > properly, right? > > > > It depends how you define expertise when you say they don’t have enough > expertise at the World Bank—say, in a water program. They do, within the > boundaries of what they consider to be expert. What they might not have is > the voices of people who they wouldn’t consider experts but whose knowledge > of things is local and specific and is valuable for knowing what to do. > > > > To what degree do you think the general freak-out over truth has to do with > the rise of social media? > > > > Social media and the Internet more broadly have clearly had a rather > revolutionary effect on not just what we take to be true but how truths > circulate, what we believe, how we know anything. You know, we’re all > addicted to these information streams. Rumors have always spread, but they > spread person to person. Now a rumor can spread, and in some ways you might > say this is a kind of atavistic technology, right? It’s making us act like we > once did, before we had good sources of information. > > > > The quickness and the spread is extraordinary, and we don’t have many tools, > most of us, for distinguishing between legitimate stories and illegitimate > ones, or we don’t care that much. The end result is a world of truth and > falsehood all circulating, undifferentiated, globally. > > > > Did you find other examples of new technology sparking panics about truth? > > > > Yes. I would say every new technology causes certain kinds of panics about > truth. The Internet is particularly important because of its reach and > because of the algorithmic way in which it promotes what’s popular rather > than what’s true. It creates a culture of untruth, probably, that other forms > of publishing can’t easily. And the law’s always catching up. The law is > always behind in trying to figure out new ways to regulate what is a changing > public sphere. Certainly, I think the jury’s still out in modern law about > what to do about Facebook, or Google, or anything else. > > > > You said that there’s a fear about the distinction between truth and fiction > disappearing in public life and people retreating into their own private > lives, as you said happened in Eastern Europe. I had that fear, too, but > Trump has been President for two years. His approval rating is pretty low. It > seems like, on issues of public concern, sixty per cent of the country just > tunes him out. So, in something like the government shutdown, he just can’t > get his point across and no one thinks he’s honest. Far from being > disengaged, we just had a midterm election with the highest turnout in > decades. Where do you think we are after two years of Trump? > > > > I think that the doomsayers may have been a bit premature, in that there > certainly is a contest going on right now, and American political life is > obviously very divided, but there’s also a contest even just about truth. > Different people are looking to different places. New York Times > subscriptions have soared. At the same time, Trump’s list of numbers of > falsehoods has soared, as well, and his lies are repeated by many people. We > are kind of in the balance between the two. > > > > So I don’t think the idea we have all suddenly gone over to post-truth is > accurate. [There is] resistance to both kinds of his untruths, by which I > mean the moral position in which he lies as an opposite of truth, and the > epistemological position in which he spouts false information or unverified > beliefs in contrast to truth. There’s been a big pushback on both, and it > comes in the form of journalism, it comes in the form of publishing of all > kinds, and it comes in protests of various kinds, resistance both at the > ballot box and in the street. We have not succumbed entirely to his charms or > something like that. It’s hard to predict. > > > > What have you made of the journalistic concept, seen more recently and often, > of the public fact-check? > > > > I actually approve of fact-checking, even if I think it’s often not very > effective, because it doesn’t persuade people who aren’t already inclined to > want to look at fact-checking. And I don’t think it’s much of a substitute > for real politics. It’s not politics, and we don’t want to get caught up in > the idea that simply correcting a record is a good way to counter anything. > You have to make a persuasive argument. It’s a rhetorical field. That said, I > do think it’s important to fact-check because, in some long-term way, it > holds public figures accountable and provides a running record of both what > was said and what actually happened. > > I don’t think facts are pure in any sense. You know, if I give you something > like an unemployment rate, it implies all kinds of interpretative work > already about what is work and who should be looking for it and how old you > should be when you’re working. All kinds of things are built into even what > looks like a fact. That said, we can’t have a public life without any > agreement on any set of facts. It’s impossible to build policy if some people > think unemployment is up and some people think unemployment is down. Holding > onto facts really does matter to democratic political life, though I do also > think fact-checking by itself is no panacea for either political problems or > truth problems. > > > > What is the solution then? > > > > The solution, to my mind, is both big and small. The small part is certainly > continuing to engage in corrections of the record, but, by itself, that’s not > a particularly effective solution. There also has to be a shoring up of > institutions that try to provide shared norms of truth, whether that’s > government agencies, scientific research institutions, universities, the > press, elections, all the parts of the kind of democratic machinery that > ostensibly work to provide some kind of shared truths. > > > > Then probably there’s a piece that’s elusive but important, if we want to get > past this moment, which is trying to do something about both the power of > technology companies and reining in, in some ways, the free-market approach > to communication, because I think the model of the free market that will > regulate itself and produce truth is really obsolete. That’s not how online > communication works. Then probably the last piece is the one that’s critical, > I think, for politics in general, which is rethinking how we’ve gotten to a > world with such enormous economic disparity and cultural disparity and > disparity in opportunity that it looks so radically different to different > citizens in the United States. Of course that applies to other places, too. > > > > There seem, to me, to be fake news and falsehoods that arise organically, > which is not to say they’re not stoked, but they have to do with suspicions > of people from different places, or suspicions of people who are more > educated. But something like belief that global warming is not happening, it > seems to me, could only be believed if, basically, rich people, for their own > interests, have convinced others that this is the case. I’m wondering if you > think it’s worth distinguishing between those two types of things, because it > does seem like there’s a difference there. > > > > That’s actually a very interesting question, because of course not only are > some conspiracies promoted from the top and some from below but some > conspiracy theories turn out to be right, so you don’t want people to never > be skeptical, right? It’s important that that’s part of democracy, > too—questioning received wisdom. If somebody says that’s how it is, it’s > correct to think, Is that really how it is? Do I have enough information to > be sure that’s how it is? > > > > Conspiracy theories, the complex ones that arise from the bottom, tend to > involve seeing through official truths and often seeing how the rich and > powerful have pulled the wool over people’s eyes, that what looked like this > turned out to be that because there was a kind of subterfuge going on from > above. Whereas, the climate-change one, which we know has been sort of > promoted by the Koch brothers and others in business interest groups, as you > say, didn’t start really organically as much as it became a kind of position > of industry that then took on a life of its own because it got mixed in with > a whole bunch of other assumptions, whether it was about political norms, > government overreach, guns. > > > > It’s part of a mix. Very few people are opposed to the idea that the planet > is getting warmer and don’t hold any other part of a constellation of beliefs > that go with it: that government is overreaching and that sort of thing, and > that it’s a plot by the state to take away your autonomy, deny people jobs, > take guns. Those obviously didn’t have a popular foundation to begin with. > > > -- > -- > Centroids: The Center of the Radical Centrist Community > <RadicalCentrism@googlegroups.com> > Google Group: http://groups.google.com/group/RadicalCentrism > Radical Centrism website and blog: http://RadicalCentrism.org > > --- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Centroids: The Center of the Radical Centrist Community" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to radicalcentrism+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- -- Centroids: The Center of the Radical Centrist Community <RadicalCentrism@googlegroups.com> Google Group: http://groups.google.com/group/RadicalCentrism Radical Centrism website and blog: http://RadicalCentrism.org --- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Centroids: The Center of the Radical Centrist Community" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to radicalcentrism+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
