The New Yorker 
Interview<https://www.newyorker.com/news/the-new-yorker-interview>
Does Democracy Need Truth?: A Conversation with the Historian Sophia Rosenfeld
<https://www.newyorker.com/contributors/isaac-chotiner>

By Isaac Chotiner<https://www.newyorker.com/contributors/isaac-chotiner>

January 31, 2019

Ever since Donald Trump<https://www.newyorker.com/tag/donald-trump> announced 
his Presidential candidacy, in June of 2015, there has been considerable 
concern about whether his allergy to truth is endangering American democracy. 
Without a public sphere dominated by agreed-upon-facts, many say, a healthy 
society—and wise polity—become impossible to sustain. In her new book, 
“Democracy and Truth: A Short 
History<https://www.amazon.com/dp/0812250842/?tag=thneyo0f-20>,” Sophia 
Rosenfeld, a professor of history at the University of Pennsylvania, argues 
that the relationship between truth and democracy was fraught for centuries 
before the time of Twitter and Trump. “Does democratic politics really ‘need 
truth to do its business well,’ as some have recently claimed?” she asks in the 
book. In addition to trying to answer that question, she argues that questions 
of truth have always been litigated and disputed, and that a politics dominated 
by shared notions of the truth has never really existed.


With Trump halfway through his four-year term in office, it seemed like a good 
time to talk about the state of truth in American society, so I called up 
Rosenfeld. During our conversation, which has been edited and condensed for 
clarity, we discussed whether it is healthy for a democratic society to debate 
issues like evolution and global warming, why people distrust experts, and 
whether public fact-checking is a good solution to the problem of fake news.


What came across from your book is that the fretting about the future of truth 
in a democracy, as it relates to Trump, has irked you, even though you’re 
obviously not a fan of the President. Is that fair?


Well, you’re right, I’m not a fan of the President, so I’m not in any way 
trying to excuse what I think is a demonstrably terrible Presidency. That said, 
I don’t think that we have to rush into the idea that we’re heading full force 
into fascism every time he opens his mouth, either. I do think that taking a 
longer historical look, not simply looking at the last two to five years, 
allows you to see the way even this moment, with all its obviously unusual 
features, still belongs to a much longer story.


What’s that story?


That story is twofold. One, it’s a story about how democracy itself is always 
based on uncertain notions of truth, in moral terms and in epistemological 
terms. The other is a story about a continual conflict between a kind of expert 
truth and a more populist, everyday, common-sense truth that supposedly stems 
not from experts but the wisdom of the crowd.


Even if truth in a democracy has always been up for grabs, and we’ve always had 
politicians use fake news, that still raises the question of whether we require 
some fundamental baseline of truth to have an actual democracy.


Right. It’s in some ways the great problem of democracy. Democracy insists on 
the idea that truth both matters and that nobody gets to say definitively what 
it is. That’s a tension that’s built into democracy from the beginning, and 
it’s not solvable but is, in fact, intrinsic to democracy. I think both things 
matter. We don’t want to have one definitive source of truth. Part of the 
reason ideas evolve and culture changes is that we’re constantly debating what 
is an accurate rendition of reality in some form. But, on the other hand, it 
makes for a lot of instability. That instability can be productive or 
unproductive at different moments and in different ways. You know, the 
aspiration for knowing more and getting closer to the truth is a really 
important one, because it lets us constantly rethink what we know to be true 
and often decide that what we know to be true isn’t.


Have there been societies that you would consider democracies whose foundations 
started to shake because that pursuit of truth stopped?


There’s always the risk that if there’s too much instability in truth, people 
will find life in general unstable, that you won’t know what to believe in at 
all. I do think there’s a serious risk in a politics anywhere that doesn’t have 
some agreed-upon foundation, even if it’s a loose consensus. The classic 
example would be something like Weimar Germany, when there ceases to be a real 
commitment to seeing the world collectively. Then you get some kind of 
revolution, you get some kind of really abrupt change. You might just get 
apathy. People stop caring about truth, as sometimes happened in former Eastern 
European states where people retreated into private life and dismissed public 
life as just filled with untruth. That’s the great risk, but democracies do 
thrive on a certain amount of combative truth claims, always. If you run 
through American history, you can see sometimes they’re explosive, but most of 
the time they’re part of public life.


What would be some examples of truth claims that you think are either important 
to the lifeblood of democracy or explosive and dangerous?


Something like Darwinian claims about evolution, which were heavily contested. 
To some degree, they still are, and they’ve been part of democratic life and 
part of legal life. Can we accept evolution as a set truth or not? They have 
not exploded to the point where they’ve destabilized our political or social 
life, but they’ve been a controversial question for over a hundred years. 
That’s a public contest that, actually, democracy’s pretty good for. You know, 
you contest things in court, you contest things in universities, you contest 
things in the public sphere.


You said democracy’s good for them, but are they good for democracy? Could I 
argue that the battle over evolution has not brought down American democracy or 
done damage in the way that other things have, but that, if everyone just 
accepted the broad claims of evolution, we would have a healthier democracy?


I’m not really sure. I think it’s important that there be a contest about what 
is true and also about, How do you know what’s true? Where does your 
information come from? I would say, largely, science has won. That is, that the 
mainstream educational institutions, the National Institutes of Health, et 
cetera, all accept that evolution is as close as we’re going to get to truth. 
Is it dangerous that there’s still some people who don’t believe that? Probably 
not really dangerous to democracy as a whole. We’ve long contested not just 
what’s true but how we know anything: What are the sources of truth? I think 
the issue today that has people most upset is not either of those questions as 
much as whether we’ve stopped caring about what’s true. The whole phenomenon of 
post-truth has taken us to the question of whether we’re indifferent to truth 
now, as opposed to contesting what it is and how we find it.


You could say that the battle over whether climate change is, in part, man-made 
is a contest over truth, and that’s a democracy. You could also say that, well, 
if everyone accepted that as true, the planet might be a lot safer.


Yes. I agree entirely. The question is: How do we find some way [to insure] 
that the better answer prevails? We’re not so upset that people are arguing 
about this. We’re upset that we haven’t been able to fashion policies that rest 
on what seems to be the consensus of ninety-nine per cent of scientists and 
almost anybody who’s had any involvement in climate-related issues. Why it is 
that so many people are not persuaded, at the moment, by what seems to be 
scientific consensus—and, in many cases, not persuaded even by the evidence 
that’s right in front of them?


This gets at some of the things you say in the book about experts. There are 
two current critiques of them, and I am wondering if you think they are worth 
distinguishing. The first would be that experts are often wrong, and so 
something that we view as technocratic actually brings about a bad result. The 
second critique would be that experts don’t bring about bad results, in terms 
of human flourishing, but they are unpopular or cause a populist backlash 
despite this.


That’s a really important and, I think, excellent distinction. One says that 
experts often make [bad] decisions because there’s been no popular input on 
them—not just because they don’t know enough but because they haven’t actually 
taken account of popular knowledge. The most common example involves things 
like the World Bank coming up with a plan about water use in some part of the 
world without studying how people actually think and use water, simply 
imagining a kind of technocratic solution with no local input, and it turns out 
to be totally ineffective because it runs contrary to cultural norms and 
everyday life. There’s every chance that experts alone get things wrong.


Your second point is really more of a social question. It’s the critique of 
people who are over-educated, generally wealthier than average, and, in some 
ways, not part of the mainstream, making decisions for everybody else. You see 
that in cases like the E.U., where, whether their policies are effective or 
not, there’s resentment at what’s called the democratic deficit, the fact that 
people have very little say, often, about what policies are enacted. That 
breeds resentment, too, whether or not the policies themselves result in 
beneficial outcomes.


The first critique you made is almost that experts are not expert enough. That 
these experts do not have enough expertise to get water to people properly, 
right?


It depends how you define expertise when you say they don’t have enough 
expertise at the World Bank—say, in a water program. They do, within the 
boundaries of what they consider to be expert. What they might not have is the 
voices of people who they wouldn’t consider experts but whose knowledge of 
things is local and specific and is valuable for knowing what to do.


To what degree do you think the general freak-out over truth has to do with the 
rise of social media?


Social media and the Internet more broadly have clearly had a rather 
revolutionary effect on not just what we take to be true but how truths 
circulate, what we believe, how we know anything. You know, we’re all addicted 
to these information streams. Rumors have always spread, but they spread person 
to person. Now a rumor can spread, and in some ways you might say this is a 
kind of atavistic technology, right? It’s making us act like we once did, 
before we had good sources of information.


The quickness and the spread is extraordinary, and we don’t have many tools, 
most of us, for distinguishing between legitimate stories and illegitimate 
ones, or we don’t care that much. The end result is a world of truth and 
falsehood all circulating, undifferentiated, globally.


Did you find other examples of new technology sparking panics about truth?


Yes. I would say every new technology causes certain kinds of panics about 
truth. The Internet is particularly important because of its reach and because 
of the algorithmic way in which it promotes what’s popular rather than what’s 
true. It creates a culture of untruth, probably, that other forms of publishing 
can’t easily. And the law’s always catching up. The law is always behind in 
trying to figure out new ways to regulate what is a changing public sphere. 
Certainly, I think the jury’s still out in modern law about what to do about 
Facebook, or Google, or anything else.


You said that there’s a fear about the distinction between truth and fiction 
disappearing in public life and people retreating into their own private lives, 
as you said happened in Eastern Europe. I had that fear, too, but Trump has 
been President for two years. His approval rating is pretty low. It seems like, 
on issues of public concern, sixty per cent of the 
country<https://www.washingtonpost.com/page/2010-2019/WashingtonPost/2019/01/28/National-Politics/Polling/question_21223.xml?uuid=LmQIVCL0Eem1tB0Y37ewhA>
 just tunes him out. So, in something like the government shutdown, he just 
can’t get his point across and no one thinks he’s honest. Far from being 
disengaged, we just had a midterm election with the highest turnout in decades. 
Where do you think we are after two years of Trump?


I think that the doomsayers may have been a bit premature, in that there 
certainly is a contest going on right now, and American political life is 
obviously very divided, but there’s also a contest even just about truth. 
Different people are looking to different places. New York Times subscriptions 
have soared. At the same time, Trump’s list of numbers of falsehoods has 
soared, as well, and his lies are repeated by many people. We are kind of in 
the balance between the two.


So I don’t think the idea we have all suddenly gone over to post-truth is 
accurate. [There is] resistance to both kinds of his untruths, by which I mean 
the moral position in which he lies as an opposite of truth, and the 
epistemological position in which he spouts false information or unverified 
beliefs in contrast to truth. There’s been a big pushback on both, and it comes 
in the form of journalism, it comes in the form of publishing of all kinds, and 
it comes in protests of various kinds, resistance both at the ballot box and in 
the street. We have not succumbed entirely to his charms or something like 
that. It’s hard to predict.


What have you made of the journalistic concept, seen more recently and often, 
of the public fact-check?


I actually approve of fact-checking, even if I think it’s often not very 
effective, because it doesn’t persuade people who aren’t already inclined to 
want to look at fact-checking. And I don’t think it’s much of a substitute for 
real politics. It’s not politics, and we don’t want to get caught up in the 
idea that simply correcting a record is a good way to counter anything. You 
have to make a persuasive argument. It’s a rhetorical field. That said, I do 
think it’s important to fact-check because, in some long-term way, it holds 
public figures accountable and provides a running record of both what was said 
and what actually happened.

I don’t think facts are pure in any sense. You know, if I give you something 
like an unemployment rate, it implies all kinds of interpretative work already 
about what is work and who should be looking for it and how old you should be 
when you’re working. All kinds of things are built into even what looks like a 
fact. That said, we can’t have a public life without any agreement on any set 
of facts. It’s impossible to build policy if some people think unemployment is 
up and some people think unemployment is down. Holding onto facts really does 
matter to democratic political life, though I do also think fact-checking by 
itself is no panacea for either political problems or truth problems.


What is the solution then?


The solution, to my mind, is both big and small. The small part is certainly 
continuing to engage in corrections of the record, but, by itself, that’s not a 
particularly effective solution. There also has to be a shoring up of 
institutions that try to provide shared norms of truth, whether that’s 
government agencies, scientific research institutions, universities, the press, 
elections, all the parts of the kind of democratic machinery that ostensibly 
work to provide some kind of shared truths.


Then probably there’s a piece that’s elusive but important, if we want to get 
past this moment, which is trying to do something about both the power of 
technology companies and reining in, in some ways, the free-market approach to 
communication, because I think the model of the free market that will regulate 
itself and produce truth is really obsolete. That’s not how online 
communication works. Then probably the last piece is the one that’s critical, I 
think, for politics in general, which is rethinking how we’ve gotten to a world 
with such enormous economic disparity and cultural disparity and disparity in 
opportunity that it looks so radically different to different citizens in the 
United States. Of course that applies to other places, too.


There seem, to me, to be fake news and falsehoods that arise organically, which 
is not to say they’re not stoked, but they have to do with suspicions of people 
from different places, or suspicions of people who are more educated. But 
something like belief that global warming is not happening, it seems to me, 
could only be believed if, basically, rich people, for their own interests, 
have convinced others that this is the case. I’m wondering if you think it’s 
worth distinguishing between those two types of things, because it does seem 
like there’s a difference there.


That’s actually a very interesting question, because of course not only are 
some conspiracies promoted from the top and some from below but some conspiracy 
theories turn out to be right, so you don’t want people to never be skeptical, 
right? It’s important that that’s part of democracy, too—questioning received 
wisdom. If somebody says that’s how it is, it’s correct to think, Is that 
really how it is? Do I have enough information to be sure that’s how it is?


Conspiracy theories, the complex ones that arise from the bottom, tend to 
involve seeing through official truths and often seeing how the rich and 
powerful have pulled the wool over people’s eyes, that what looked like this 
turned out to be that because there was a kind of subterfuge going on from 
above. Whereas, the climate-change one, which we know has been sort of promoted 
by the Koch brothers and others in business interest groups, as you say, didn’t 
start really organically as much as it became a kind of position of industry 
that then took on a life of its own because it got mixed in with a whole bunch 
of other assumptions, whether it was about political norms, government 
overreach, guns.


It’s part of a mix. Very few people are opposed to the idea that the planet is 
getting warmer and don’t hold any other part of a constellation of beliefs that 
go with it: that government is overreaching and that sort of thing, and that 
it’s a plot by the state to take away your autonomy, deny people jobs, take 
guns. Those obviously didn’t have a popular foundation to begin with.

-- 
-- 
Centroids: The Center of the Radical Centrist Community 
<[email protected]>
Google Group: http://groups.google.com/group/RadicalCentrism
Radical Centrism website and blog: http://RadicalCentrism.org

--- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Centroids: The Center of the Radical Centrist Community" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to [email protected].
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Reply via email to