Hi Ali,

please find my comments inline.

Il 22/12/2020 07:33, Ali Hussain ha scritto:
Hi Dr. Mario,
[ML] please simply Mario :-)

Apologies for replying too late.

First of all thanks for your detailed comments about the proposed tentative iea to make reverse search more privacy complaints keeping hrpc guidelines as reference.

One possible new work in giving better privacy to reverse search would be to have privacy by design implementation in addition to federated access using HTTP and limiting the response. The proposed mechanism may use an integrity protection mechanism HMAC or standard authorization mechnaum like JSON web token to bring in additional data confidentiality and privacy benefits. This way we would be able to easily define the custom access control policies.

What do you think about it.?

[ML] The WG has already adopted a document written by Scott Hollenbeck (i.e. https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-regext-rdap-openid <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-regext-rdap-openid>) about how to implement a federated authentication in RDAP context. OpenId is based on tokens exchanged between the various actors involved (e.g. RDAP client, RDAP server, Authorization Server). In particular, the ID Token is provided according the JWT format and contains information regarding the user identification and a set of claims describing the user. The RDAP server can then make identification, authorization, and access control decisions based on local policies and the information included in the ID Token.

Furthermore, the rdap-openid document defines RDAP specific claims in addition to the standard ones. In my opinion, the combination of OpenId and RDAP specific claims are appropriate to make an authorization decision for a client submitting a reverse search. Especially the set of values defined for the "purpose" claim seems to me comprehensive enough to include purposes which might be used to legitimate a reverse search request. Note also that the set of admissible "purpose" values can be extended.

Therefore, it seems to me that your requirements/solutions have been addressed by rdap-openid.

Definitively, reverse search is only one of the possible queries clients can submit and servers can authorize so I don't think we need to add in the reverse-search draft anything beyond what is stated by RFC7481 and rdap-openid.

Neither we must explicitly require an RDAP provider to accept always a reverse search only if previously authorized. As it is stated in section 7, we can only require that this capability must be compliant with the rules about privacy protection each RDAP provider is subject to and each RDAP provider is responsible for pursuing this objective.


Best,

Mario


Thanks,

Regards,
Ali Hussain


On Fri, Dec 4, 2020 at 1:27 AM Mario Loffredo <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:

    Hi Ali,

    thanks a lot for your interest.

    Obviously, I'm willing to collaborate with anyone who plans to
    implement the reverse-search capability and I'm open to any idea
    that can contribute to make the proposal more comprehensive.

    I'm also available to give my humble contribution to harmonize the
    reverse-search specification with the concepts described in the
    hrpc draft.

    That being said, if I interpreted your idea correctly, you are
    proposing an operation model where the capability is open to
    everyone but the access to possible sensitive response data are
    reserved only to authenticated users, right?

    If so, I have a couple of comments:

    - The RDAP servers are already engaged in tailoring their
    responses on different user profiles due to GDPR. Sensitive data
    redaction is usually achieved through a combination of practices
    like not returning optional sensitive data, replacing the value
    of  mandatory sensitive data (like jCard "fn" for individuals),
    publishing only those sensitive data which the owner has
    previously given the explicit consent for. So which additional
    issues should your proposal address?

    - In the case of a reverse-search, what must be allowed to
    authenticated users is not the access to the data returned by the
    capability but rather the capability itself.  Of course, the
    reverse search is not the only query capability that can be
    controlled. For example, at .it we don't permit everyone to submit
    a generic search query.  This can be done either through the
    well-known HTTP authentication methods as described in RFC7480 or
    by applying a federated authentication to RDAP as defined by
    Scott's rdap-openid extension.  To make an ad-hoc access control
    easy to implement, the reverse-search draft introduces the
    specific "/reverse" path and lets servers furtherly regulate the
    access on a per-entiy-role basis.

    Definitively, maybe I'm missing something but do we really need
    anything other than what already exists?

    Best,

    Mario


    Il 04/12/2020 01:47, Ali Hussain ha scritto:
    Hi All,

    It wa  interesting to see the interest during REGEXT IETF 109
    meeting call to address the the privacy aspects of draft
    (draft-ietf-regext-rdap-reverse-search).
    So far my idea to improve the reverse search to first make the
    JSON object for the required level of privacy critical data.
    Based on the tag the partial response suppresses the privacy part
    of responses by encoding and in order to decode it, it must
    present an identity to federated access control.
    I am also reviewing the hrpc draft to bring some valuable input
    form their guidance.
    Please let me know what you think and is anyone else interested
    to work on this?
    Thanks,
    Regards,
    Ali Hussain

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-- Dr. Mario Loffredo
    Technological Unit “Digital Innovation”
    Institute of Informatics and Telematics (IIT)
    National Research Council (CNR)
    via G. Moruzzi 1, I-56124 PISA, Italy
    Phone: +39.0503153497
    Web:http://www.iit.cnr.it/mario.loffredo  
<http://www.iit.cnr.it/mario.loffredo>

--
Dr. Mario Loffredo
Technological Unit “Digital Innovation”
Institute of Informatics and Telematics (IIT)
National Research Council (CNR)
via G. Moruzzi 1, I-56124 PISA, Italy
Phone: +39.0503153497
Web:http://www.iit.cnr.it/mario.loffredo

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