Hi Scott,

On Thu, Feb 18, 2021 at 04:51:52PM +0000, Hollenbeck, Scott wrote:
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: Benjamin Kaduk via Datatracker <[email protected]>
> > Sent: Tuesday, February 16, 2021 7:51 PM
> > To: The IESG <[email protected]>
> > Cc: [email protected]; [email protected];
> > [email protected]; Jasdip Singh <[email protected]>; [email protected]
> > Subject: [EXTERNAL] Benjamin Kaduk's No Objection on draft-ietf-regext-
> > rfc7483bis-04: (with COMMENT)
> > 
> > Caution: This email originated from outside the organization. Do not click 
> > links
> > or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content
> > is safe.
> > 
> > Benjamin Kaduk has entered the following ballot position for
> > draft-ietf-regext-rfc7483bis-04: No Objection
> > 
> > When responding, please keep the subject line intact and reply to all email
> > addresses included in the To and CC lines. (Feel free to cut this 
> > introductory
> > paragraph, however.)
> 
> [SAH] [snip]
> 
> > ----------------------------------------------------------------------
> > COMMENT:
> > ----------------------------------------------------------------------
> > 
> > Should the errata against RFC 7483 in state "reported" be verified or
> > otherwise processed before this document gets approved?
> 
> [SAH] I verified them and took care of the necessary fixed in 7483bis. 
> Someone who has permissions to do so needs to update the Datatracker.

Indeed, that was mostly directed at Barry :)

> > My understanding (based on the draft name and shepherd writeup) is that
> > this document is intended to Obsolete: RFC 7483.  If so, that should be
> > indicated in the header, abstract, and introduction, as (in my
> > understanding) the Gen-ART reviewer pointed out.
> 
> [SAH] Yes, will fix.
> 
> > Thank you for keeping the diff from RFC 7483 minimal -- that made things
> > very easy to read!  (FWIW, I do consider converting all the links to the 
> > "https"
> > scheme worth the churn; thank you for that as well.)
> > 
> > Some of the examples have gone stale, though (or were inaccurate from the
> > start), particularly with respect to the cryptographic digests and 
> > algorithms
> > used for DNSSEC.  I do not think that we can in good conscience publish, in
> > 2021, an Internet Standard that shows RSA/MD5 signatures as an example!
> > (Specifics in the editorial section-by-section remarks.)
> 
> [SAH] I'll look at those below.
> 
> > Also, for Section 1.1, RFC 8174 has an updated BCP 14 boilerplate text to 
> > use.
> 
> [SAH] Will fix.
> 
> > It's probably worth making a pass through the examples to check for cases
> > where the handle "XXXX" is being used for distinct entities within a single
> > example (as that's not really self-consistent).
> 
> [SAH] I *think* I got all that straight when WG reviewers made the same 
> comment some time ago.

I was pretty sure that I had seen at least one go by when I made this note
... perhaps Figure 23, that uses XXXX as the handle for Joe User's entity
and also for the containing domain?  Figure 24 has a lot of "XXXX"s as
well, looking now (but not getting any further than there).

> > It may be worth noting in the security considerations that, while these RDAP
> > responses allow for retrieval of DNSSEC (key) related information,
> > (AFAICT) the RRSIG DS from the parent zone is not conveyed alongisde it.
> > This means that the DNSSEC keys retrieved by RDAP are disconnected from
> > their containing PKI, and as such are not generally expected to be trusted
> > without additional information.  In particular, just the HTTPS channel
> > protecting the RDAP connection is not expected to be authorized to certify
> > the validity of the DNSSEC keys.
> 
> [SAH] This is true, and it may be useful to add some additional text to make 
> it clear. I'll see what I can do.

Thanks.

> > The rest of my remarks are basically editorial or nit level, and I don't 
> > expect
> > specific responses to them.
> > 
> > Section 3
> > 
> >    Contact information is defined using jCards as described in
> >    [RFC7095].  The "fn" member is required and MUST NOT be null
> >    according to [RFC6350], where an empty "fn" member MAY be used when
> >    the contact name does not exist or is redacted.
> > 
> > (editorial) The way the last sentence is written suggests that [use of empty
> > "fn" when the name does not exist or is redacted] is a behavior specified in
> > RFC 6350, but based on text searches in RFC 6350 I suspect that this
> > statement is actually a clarification new to this document about how the
> > jCard format is being used.
> 
> [SAH] I'm going to adopt the fix suggested by Roman.

That looks good; I guess I missed Roman's note when I was submitting my own 
ballot.

> > Section 4.1
> > 
> > Going from 7483 to this document we now say that "rdapConformance"
> > MUST appear in the topmost JSON object of a response (vs "appears only" in
> > it).  Is the intent to forbid "rdapConformance" from appearing anywhere else
> > in addition to the topmost JSON object?  If so, the current text seems
> > insufficient to me.
> 
> [SAH] Correct, it shouldn't appear anywhere else. "MUST appear in the topmost 
> JSON object " is a requirement for both presence and location. "appears only" 
> seems to leave some wiggle room in whether it needs to be present. Can you 
> suggest a re-wording if it's not clear?

I think we'd have to make a separate requirement in order for it to be
clear, a la "MUST appear in the topmost JSON object of a response and MUST
NOT appear anywhere else".

> > Section 4.2
> > 
> >    The following is an example of the link structure:
> > 
> >        {
> >          "value" : "https://secure-
> > web.cisco.com/1La4d1rUpkdc92phDKa17sS991fnDuBO3-
> > WlVJA0xMmd_qEBBMSmmELpoLRKNGUY-
> > imAXRq9_AvdWQjlzWt3luV4LFt9WxmMVg2mZGwUVWWomY2hbsjwIgvnJh
> > _20H8RJpsOqAxMFgG5D1BvBCuDa1EbDK3AoI3gWm88UiAWhMRm-
> > 4MZ5k8k8yj3CK1Aa0XktWyKGVeudlOYWfzklhIgtAVm95YyDba8426iSBJGe5Ip
> > 7bKEcZtk66HHMDVtZhWAi/https%3A%2F%2Fexample.com%2Fcontext_uri",
> >          "rel" : "self",
> >          "href" : "https://secure-web.cisco.com/1-
> > D4mH9SAtoE0W_T2b1RTQj6AyDwBgtdEBBe7JI5e-3C9uje37wTNu2-Q-
> > IBrYmxigaIv2kOotFrlQQH7b2qdlzhDnKOQeNOg97C4BkoPxOQ52LQDnCfdCeZ
> > yVxjyLp-
> > NT9eKwfByij0oHQ9Dnqcdw1Xv_ge8nPrp0r460RDfYZxjUfqN3d3ZeE_yi8qKCF
> > UKgM-
> > lQqK1eAO0GZviQ9_dXCp8WtqL7w68zlmsTI6s_t4vMpNUIjyFJLzrkvRXxqgQ/ht
> > tps%3A%2F%2Fexample.com%2Ftarget_uri",
> > 
> > I am prone to confusing myself about RFC 8288 links, but it surprised me 
> > that
> > "href" differed from "value" for a relation of type "self".

(Not sure if this one was skipped intentionally or not...I have pretty low
confidence that there's an issue, to be clear.)

> >    The JSON name/values of "rel", "href", "hreflang", "title", "media",
> >    and "type" correspond to values found in Section 3 of [RFC8288].  The
> >    "value" JSON value is the context URI as described by [RFC8288].  The
> >    "value", "rel" and "href" JSON values MUST be specified.  [...]
> > 
> > Looking just at the diff from RFC 7483 makes it seem that we gain a MUST-
> > level requirement for the "rel" value to be specified, which would not
> > normally be allowed in a transition to Internet Standard.  However, it seems
> > that RFC 8288 itself requires the presence of "rel", so this is not in 
> > practice a
> > new requirement, and thus safe.
> 
> [SAH] That's my interpretation as well.
> 
> > Section 4.5
> > 
> > I think it's vCard that has a LANGUAGE property; in jCard that would be the
> > "language" key.
> 
> [SAH] Agreed, that should be "vCard". Thanks for the catch.
> 
> > Section 5.1
> > 
> > [I did not attempt to validate that the jCards contained in any of the
> > examples conform to RFC 7095.]
> > 
> >    and names of organizations and individuals.  Many of the types of
> >    information that can be represented with jCard have no use in RDAP,
> >    such as birthdays, anniversaries, and gender.
> > 
> > (nit) I suggest s/no use/little or no use/, just on my instinct of avoiding
> > absolutes when not needed.  ("Only a Sith deals in absolutes",
> > right?)
> 
> [SAH] OK, makes sense.
> 
> >    The following is an elided example of an entity with embedded
> >    entities.
> > 
> > (nit) I'd suggest "abbreviated" or "condensed" instead of "elided", which as
> > written would seem to imply that the entire example is omitted.
> > This applies to more than one instance, but I will only mention it once.
> 
> [SAH] I think I'll leave this one as-is. Elided does mean "To eliminate or 
> leave out", which is what's going on here.
> 
> > Section 5.3
> > 
> >       -  idnTable -- the name of the Internationalized Domain Name (IDN)
> >          table of codepoints, such as one listed with the IANA (see IDN
> >          tables [IANA_IDNTABLES]).
> > 
> > (nit) the definite article "the" in "the [IDN] table of codepoints"
> > implies that the context should indicate which one we are referring to
> > (perhaps the one used in the variant names?), but I am failing to tell from
> > context which table is being indicated.
> 
> [SAH] I see your point. How about this: "The name of the Internationalized 
> Domain Name (IDN) table that has been registered in the IANA Repository of 
> IDN Practices [IANA_IDNTABLES]."?

I think that still leaves me uncertain how the table relates to the domain
object and the variant names thereof.

> >            "keyTag": 12345,
> >            "algorithm": 3,
> >            "digestType": 1,
> >            "digest": "49FD46E6C4B45C55D4AC"
> > 
> > Could we maybe use SHA-256 for the example instead of the no-longer-safe-
> > for-general-use SHA-1 (so, digest type 2 instead of 1, and corresponding
> > digest length)?  [Hmm, the existing SHA-1 example is
> > 20 hex digits, which is only 80 bits, not the full 160-bit SHA-1 output...]
> > Likewise for the signature algorithm (algorithm 3 is DSA/SHA-1, and there 
> > are
> > lots of stronger alternatives listed at
> > https://secure-
> > web.cisco.com/1I8Di5U8y3NTUQw9mWzM4wGSzTlafm8s8sYb-
> > SwOMAkssj9r5pszzi1Zs5Ygzl0D1Sxx91nPpgnsoDjiB2VXMAoYIZZ82y2Mz1s3W
> > CPr3vOuK0Np5p1XQajn3FkaGC5QH4shVzJOhnXe06ta3H9wOgSA571FTY-
> > MXVDpk1O7iymHeaMwMphD3nOyxr1yZ1GTgu01Na1ljPIpXHTmfyaBabu8fn3
> > axVeaEj7PFao8o6jTCClRIQwElbE6MmesdpaRd/https%3A%2F%2Fwww.iana.o
> > rg%2Fassignments%2Fdns-sec-alg-numbers%2Fdns-sec-alg-numbers.xhtml)
> > 
> >             "flags": 257,
> >             "protocol": 3,
> >             "algorithm": 1,
> >             "publicKey": "AQPJ////4Q==",
> > 
> > Similarly, the key data here indicates the algorithm 1, or RSA/MD5 which is
> > deprecated.  (The public key is also a laughably small 40-bit modulus when
> > decoded.  A nice strong Ed25519 key, algorithm 15, would not expand the
> > example unreasonably in my opinion.)
> 
> [SAH] I'll see if can find a more modern example.
> 
> >          "eventAction" : "expiration",
> >          "eventDate" : "2016-12-31T23:59:59Z",
> >          "eventActor" : "[email protected]"
> > 
> > (side note) Perhaps an expiration in the future is more useful as an 
> > example,
> > though it is clearly not wrong to list the expiration event even when it is 
> > in
> > the past.
> 
> [SAH] I'd prefer to leave this one alone since it's just an example inherited 
> from 7483.
> 
> > Section 5.5
> > 
> >    The following is an example of a JSON object representing an autnum.
> > 
> >    {
> >      "objectClassName" : "autnum",
> >      "handle" : "XXXX-RIR",
> >      "startAutnum" : 10,
> >      "endAutnum" : 15,
> > 
> > IIUC AS numbers 10 through 15 are assigned by ARIN, including AS 11 that is
> > assigned to Harvard University (last updated 2019-08-12) and appears to be 
> > in
> > current use.  Perhaps the reserved ASN 0 would make for a safer example?
> 
> [SAH] Perhaps. I'll check with my ARIN colleagues.
> 
> >      [...]
> >      "links" :
> >      [
> >        {
> >          "value" : "https://example.net/autnum/xxxx";,
> >          "rel" : "self",
> >          "href" : "https://example.net/autnum/xxxx";,
> >          "type" : "application/rdap+json"
> > 
> > Hmm, my reading of 7482bis suggests that the bit after /autnum/ should be
> > an actual AS number, not a handle.  But it doesn't seem to give much
> > guidance on how to represent a block of AS numbers as opposed to a single
> > one within a block...
> 
> [SAH] The "xxxx" used here is just an attempt to mask an autnum, but if that 
> seems to confusingly look like it's a handle I can use a different mask, 
> perhaps "yyyy"?

If we're giving explicit values for "startAutnum" and "endAutnum", I would
have thought that we could just pick a distinguished value from that range
and use it instead of a placeholder.  (But see also my remark about not
knowing how to represent a range in an autnum URL...)

> >    *  type -- a string containing an RIR-specific classification of the
> >       autnum
> > 
> > (nit) is this the RIR's classification of the number itself, or the
> > allocation/registration?
> 
> [SAH] I'll check with my ARIN colleagues.
> 
> > Section 10
> > 
> > I think that sometimes we see "-bis" documents that just say "IANA has
> > updated the registrations made by RFCXXXX to refer to this document", but I
> > don't particularly mind repeating the registration information in the now-
> > primary reference document.
> > 
> > Section 10.1
> > 
> >       Published specification: RFC 7483
> > 
> > Presumably we want this updated to the rfc-to-be?
> 
> [SAH] Correct.
> 
> > Section 10.2.4
> > 
> >       Description: The entity object instance represents a third party
> >       through which the registration was conducted (i.e. not the
> >       registry or registrar).
> > 
> > (nit/side-note) I am pretty sure the RFC Editor is going to add the comma
> > back after "i.e." (but expect that leaving it for them to do will cause the 
> > right
> > thing to happen).  Perhaps we should ask IANA and the RFC Editor to get on
> > the same page...
> > 
> > Section 13.1
> > 
> >    The default text encoding for JSON responses in RDAP is UTF-8
> >    [RFC3629], and all servers and clients MUST support UTF-8.
> > 
> > (I note that UTF-8 preference is one of the things that changed from RFC
> > 7159 to RFC 8259, so this may be redundant now.  I didn't think about it 
> > very
> > hard and don't expect anyone else to, as there's no harm in leaving it 
> > alone.)
> > 
> > Section A.1
> > 
> >    The following is an elided example of a registrant with information
> >    changed to reflect that of a third party.
> > 
> >    {
> >      ...
> >      "entities" :
> >      [
> >        {
> >          "objectClassName" : "entity",
> >          "handle" : "XXXX",
> >          ...
> >          "roles" : [ "registrant", "administrative" ],
> >          "status" : [ "proxy", "private", "obscured" ]
> > 
> > (editorial) it might be nice to show a little more, so that we can contrast 
> > "Joe
> > User" with "Anonymizing Proxy Service" (or whatever).
> > 
> > Section A.1
> > 
> >              ["email",
> >                { "type":"work" },
> >                "text", "[email protected]"
> > 
> > I wonder if the 'example' TLD might be more apropos for this case (e.g.,
> > [email protected]).  (The link might be altered
> > similarly as well.)
> > 
> > Section D
> > 
> >    DNSSEC provides data integrity for DNS through the digital signing of
> >    resource records.  [...]
> > 
> > It also provides source authenticity, which is equally important.
> 
> [SAH] I'm inclined to leave the examples alone, but I can add "source 
> authenticity".

Okay, that's your prerogative.

Thanks,

Ben

_______________________________________________
regext mailing list
[email protected]
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/regext

Reply via email to