Marci
In a message dated 2/26/2004 5:10:30 PM Eastern Standard Time, [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
I am not clear about your argument. Are you saying that Rehnquist changed his mind (he joined Scaliaâs opinion in Lukumi, objecting to any probing in to legislative motivation) and now favors precisely that kind of probing?
In any event, I am not persuaded that the two cases easily âspeakâ to each other, give the extraordinary factual differences, which Rehnquist points out, of course, in Locke.
-----Original Message-----
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
Sent: Thursday, February 26, 2004 2:16 PM
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: Locke v. Davey and expanded free exercise rights
On the one hand, Alan is absolutely correct that the Court refers to expansive state constitutional rights. On the other hand, the Court dramatically narrows the usefulness of Lukumi in attacking laws for violation of the federal Free Exercise Clause. The argument that Lukumi's strict scrutiny applied simply because religion is mentioned, excluded, or treated differently in a law is defunct. Lukumi's rationale was narrowed to instances where there is "animus" and "hostility" to religion. The Court could not have said it more often.
Marci
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