Alan, 

I think you're right that the problem of burdening non-beneficiary employees 
could be resolved by the government providing them with full coverage (as I 
think Nelson Tebbe said in an earlier post). But until that happens, those 
employees have a claim in this litigation that hasn't yet been fully presented 
-- and one that, as Gedicks argues, constrains permissive accommodations 
(including RFRA). 

I should add that government coverage for non-beneficiaries might not solve all 
the possible Establishment Clause problems with a religious exemption. If there 
are non-religious employers who object to covering, e.g., abortifacients, they 
might claim that a religious exemption treats them unfairly. And depending on 
how the costs sort out, I suppose it's possible that there might be complaints 
from non-exempted employers (as in Texas Monthly). 

Micah

On Dec 2, 2013, at 2:49 PM, Alan Brownstein wrote:

> Micah, if the issue is diffusing the burden so that it doesn't fall on a 
> limited class of identifiable individuals, why isn't that problem solved by 
> the government taking over the task of providing insurance coverage for the 
> employees of exempt organizations. Isn't the government a sufficiently 
> effective cost-spreader to resolve this concern?
>  
> Alan
> 
>  
> Eugene's suggestion that the religious exemption from the contraception 
> mandate be analogized to the draft protester cases is anticipated by Gedicks 
> and Van Tassell in their article, RFRA Exemptions from the Contraception 
> Mandate:  An Unconstitutional Accommodation of Religion 
> (http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2328516). 
> 
> Gedicks and Van Tassel argue that the burden of the exemption is not material 
> because it would not affect the decision-making of non-pacificists in 
> considering whether to participate in the draft. That is because the burden 
> is minor and remote -- for any individual, a small number of exemptions 
> amounts to a minor increase in the probability of being selected for the 
> draft. 
> 
> Whethers Gedicks and Van Tassel are right, there is at least the difference 
> that the burden of the religious exemption from the contraception mandate, 
> like the burden in Caldor, falls clearly and specifically on identifiable 
> individuals. 
> 
> 
> 
> 
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