This explains the interaction between a signed bootloader and TrustZone.
Signed-off-by: Denis 'GNUtoo' Carikli <[email protected]>
---
freedom-privacy-security-issues.php | 1 +
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
diff --git a/freedom-privacy-security-issues.php
b/freedom-privacy-security-issues.php
index cf380d2..ee57822 100644
--- a/freedom-privacy-security-issues.php
+++ b/freedom-privacy-security-issues.php
@@ -87,6 +87,7 @@
However, it also occurs that the bootloaders
are cryptographically signed with a private key.
In that case, the bootrom will check the
signature against a public key that cannot be replaced and only run the
bootloader if the signature matches.
That sort of tivoization prevents replacing
pre-installed bootloaders, even when their sources are released as free
software.
+ This is even more problematic when the
bootloader is in charge of loading code into TrustZone as that code gives full
control of the processor to software that is proprietary and/or cannot be
modified.
There are some good platforms that don't
perform such signature checks and can run free bootloaders (e.g.
Allwinner Ax, TI OMAP General-Purpose).
</p>
--
2.15.1
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