WELCOME TO IWPR'S REPORTING CENTRAL ASIA, No. 678, June 26, 2012 KAZAKSTAN PROTEST MOVEMENT FALTERS Group formed after December’s violence in Janaozen fails to capture public imagination. By Saule Mukhametrakhimova
INTERVIEW GOVERNMENT STRUGGLING FOR CONTROL IN KYRGYZSTAN Central authorities weak, vulnerable and barely able to manage provincial politics. By Timur Toktonaliev COMMENT KYRGYZ ELITES EXPLOIT DISENFRANCHISED YOUTH Political classes mobilise young people for their own ends. By Pavel Dyatlenko **** NEW ************************************************************************************ KYRGYZSTAN ELECTION UPDATES 2011: http://iwpr.net/focus/kyrgyz-election-2011 LATEST PROJECT REVIEWS: http://iwpr.net/make-an-impact/project-reviews VACANCIES: http://iwpr.net/what-we-do/vacancies **** IWPR RESOURCES ****************************************************************** CENTRAL ASIA PROGRAMME HOME: http://www.iwpr.net/programme/central-asia CENTRAL ASIA RADIO: http://iwpr.net/programme/central-asia/central-asia-radio NEWS BRIEFING CENTRAL ASIA: http://iwpr.net/programme/news-briefing-central-asia CENTRAL ASIA HUMAN RIGHTS: http://iwpr.net/programme/central-asia-human-rights-reporting-project BECOME A FAN OF IWPR ON FACEBOOK http://facebook.com/InstituteforWarandPeaceReporting https://www.facebook.com/iwprkazakhstan https://www.facebook.com/iwprkg FOLLOW US ON TWITTER http://twitter.com/iwpr http://twitter.com/IWPR_Kazakhstan http://twitter.com/iwprkg **** http://iwpr.net/ ********************************************************** DONATE TO IWPR: http://iwpr.net/donate **** http://iwpr.net/ ********************************************************** KAZAKSTAN PROTEST MOVEMENT FALTERS Group formed after December’s violence in Janaozen fails to capture public imagination. By Saule Mukhametrakhimova A protest movement launched in Kazakstan in the wake of December’s violence in the western town of Janaozen is losing momentum after failing to gain widespread public support. Fourteen demonstrators were killed and more than 100 injured when police opened fire on protesting oil workers in Janaozen on December 16. Witnesses said police fired indiscriminately into the crowd, and footage posted on YouTube appeared to support this account. Police countered that they were forced to defend themselves, and the authorities backed their version of events. Anger over the violence and the official response to it led to the creation of a new movement of self-styled “Dissenters” (Nesoglasnye), which staged monthly protests calling for justice over Janaozen, as well as for wider democratic reforms. Analysts say the Dissenters’ Movement initially captured the mood of anger over Janaozen, shared by an admittedly small community of concerned citizens. They also note the significance of a movement that has latterly been led mainly by civil society activists, unlike most opposition groups which are commonly associated with former government officials and businessmen. The movement was born on January 17 at a protest in Kazakstan’s second city Almaty held by the opposition National Social Democratic Party, also known as OSDP-Azat, two days after a parliamentary election, predictably won by President Nursultan Nazarbaev’s Nur Otan party. A second protest arranged by OSDP-Azat on January 28, proved to be the Dissenters’ high point, though this attracted only a few hundred. Similar rallies were held subsequently in Almaty, in the capital Astana, as well as in several other cities, but were typically attended by only a handful of people. The authorities did not grant permission for these public gatherings and arrested some organisers and participants, jailing them for 15 days or imposing fines. Ermek Narymbaev, a protester and leader of the Arman workers’ movement, described how activists including Bakytjan Toregojina, head of human rights group Ar-Rukh-Hak, take charge of the Dissenters’ Movement after OSDP-Azat’s involvement was scaled down. Top OSDP-Azat figures failed to attend a protest on February 25 because the authorities arrested their co-leader Bulat Abilov and deputy leader Amirjan Kosanov before the event even began, Narymbaev said. “Toregojina picked up [the leadership] baton and set up a Facebook group called the Dissenters, which was targeted twice by hackers from the Committee for National Security.” One reason why OSDP-Azat assumed a lower profile in the movement may have been to avoid suffering the same fate as another opposition party, Alga. Not only was Alga’s leader Vladimir Kozlov among those rounded up in the wake of Janaozen, Kazak prosecutors have said associates of exiled banker Mukhtar Ablyazov – who is connected to the party – were planning terror attacks in Almaty. Ablyazov has said the allegations are unfounded. (For more on this, see Questions Over Kazakstan ‘Terror Plot’.) Narymbaev joined the Dissenters’ Movement when he was released on amnesty in February after serving part of a four-year prison sentence on a conviction of "resisting police" while he was in custody after being detained at an opposition protest. According to Narymbaev, the Dissenters’ Movement is seeking fair trials for the protestors accused of sparking the violence in Janaozen. It wants officials who ordered the shooting to be held to account, and the government to stop prosecuting opposition activists and others on political grounds. More generally, the movement wants democratic rights to be honoured, such as freedom of assembly, free and fair elections, and an independent judiciary. The Dissenters’ latest outing on June 2 saw around 100 people gather around the statue of the iconic 19th-century Kazak poet Abay Kunanbai-Uly in Almaty. They dispersed quickly, apparently to avoid the risk of protest leaders being arrested. As the event drew to a close, one of the organisers announced that the Dissenter’s Movement would take a break until autumn. Given the government clampdown on opposition and rights groups since Janaozen, and the localised form that protests take in Kazakstan some observers say it is unsurprising that the Dissenters' Movement has failed to make more of an impact. Since Kazakstan is the world’s ninth biggest country but has a population of only 16 million, discontent in one area does not necessarily spread quickly to another, and people in different parts of the country do not always identify with each other’s concerns. Now that the Janaozen trials are drawing to a close, public attention is drifting away from the issue. This is likely to further marginalise the protest movement and further reduce the public attention it receives. On June 4, sentences were handed down to those accused of inciting the unrest. Of the 37 people charged, 13 received between three and seven years in prison and 24 were released. Of those released, some were found not guilty, others were convicted but amnestied, while the remainder received suspended sentences. At a separate trial involving residents of Shetpe, a village close to Janaozen where one person died in smaller-scale violence in December, 11 men were convicted in May. Four were sent to prison for between four and seven years, and the rest were released under amnesty or given a suspended sentence. The only case involving police implicated in the shootings ended in late May with five officers sentenced to between five and seven years for overstepping their powers. Another officer was given five years for detaining people illegally in Janaozen. Some commentators say poor leadership and lack of imagination explain why the Dissenters’ Movement failed to make a lasting impact on a population that is by and large apathetic. Alisher Elikbaev, blogger and founder of the popular photography and video website Vox Populi, said people wanted leaders who were charismatic and recognisable personalities, rather than opposition politicians or rich businessmen. Many opposition groups feature former politicians or businessmen who turned against the government after falling from favour, leading some to suspect that their real ambition is to restore their own power and influence rather than build a democratic society. “[A leader] should be someone who isn’t tainted by past association with the authorities,” Elikbaev said. Several thousand people signed up to the Dissenters’ Facebook campaign, but Elikbaev pointed out that online followers sitting at home would not necessarily be prepared to come out and face the police. “Going online and clicking the mouse to join a protest is so much easier than going into the streets and joining a protest,” he said. “Some of them may think they’ve expressed their support by clicking ‘Like’ on Facebook, so the problem has been solved,” he said. That way, people get to feel part of the opposition without making any effort or risking the loss of a state salary or benefits, he added. The movement was also undermined by its failure to expand outside Almaty, where life is relatively comfortable and opportunities more available than, say, in the countryside. “Unfortunately, young people in Almaty are largely apolitical. Only handful are interested in politics,” Elikbaev said. Adil Jalilov, editorial director of the Vlast.kz news website, said that despite a promising start, the Dissenters failed to grow into an opinion-shaping organisation. “There are many reasons for that – fear, lack of clear planning and rules, and demands that are too broad,” he said. “What’s more, many urbanites like those in Almaty don’t feel an affinity with the people of Janaozen.” The movement also failed to find ways of reaching out beyond the traditional opposition-leaning constituency to mobilise broader support. It could, Jalilov argues, have recruited pop musicians and well-known actors to build support. “They failed to engage young people, leading intellectuals, opinion-formers and celebrities,” Jalilov said. Narymbaev acknowledged the weaknesses of the protest movement, including lack of coordination and overall leadership. He noted that a hard core of activists identifying themselves as the “Almaty Dissenters’ Club” plan to continue operating through the summer, and to engage special-interest campaigning groups. “We want to organise activities tied to various groups working on social issues like the rising price of public transport and petrol, and to arrange public meetings to discuss these matters,” he said. After engaging these groups, the Almaty Dissenters plan to build up their numbers and get 7,000 protesters out into the streets to mark the first anniversary of Janaozen this December, Narymbaev said. Given what happened at the June 2 protest, where the actual participants were nearly outnumbered by plain-clothes officers and journalists, the movement has some way to go. Saule Mukhametrakhimova is IWPR Central Asia editor in London. INTERVIEW GOVERNMENT STRUGGLING FOR CONTROL IN KYRGYZSTAN Central authorities weak, vulnerable and barely able to manage provincial politics. By Timur Toktonaliev Kyrgyzstan’s recent history of springtime revolts, which in 2005 and again in 2010 led to presidents being ousted from office, created some trepidation about possible unrest this year. But a series of anti-government protests since early March have not escalated into a real threat to stability. Demonstrations have been staged by the Ata Jurt party, which came first in the 2010 parliamentary election but is now in opposition after leaving the governing coalition, by its political ally Butun Kyrgyzstan, and by another opposition party Ar Namys. In an IWPR interview, Zaidinin Kurmanov, director of the Institute for Parliamentarism and Democracy in Kyrgyzstan, said that even if the opposition is incapable of mustering forces for another revolt, central government remains chronically weak, and is threatened by its own underperformance, declining living standards, and a loss of control at local level. IWPR: The opposition rallies have come to a halt, and Ata Jurt leader Kamchybek Tashiev has said recently that he will cease his attacks on Prime Minister Omurbek Babanov after leading protests demanding his resignation. What has happened? Zaidinin Kurmanov: There could be several reasons for this. First, the attempt to stage protests across the country has failed. There was support for the opposition only in the south [stronghold of Ata Jurt]. Opposition forces have yet to build up adequate support in the north. Second, the protests were designed to force those in power to sit down at the negotiating table and start horse-trading on political positions. They’ve delivered their message – the question is whether it will be heard and what kind of response it will get. Third, maybe this was a trial-run designed to gauge what the opposition is capable of – a kind of dress rehearsal for events yet to come. Government has been very weak in recent years, which gives its opponents the potential to win. Its performance has been inert and ill-conceived, and few of its electoral promises have been delivered. That’s worrying now and for the future. Recent opinion polls suggest that the local council elections held in March 2012 have made people somewhat less fearful of a civil war, although some 43 per cent still believe this is likely. IWPR: Might these anti-government protests be repeated, and if so, when? Kurmanov: Probably this autumn, when the country will be facing a budget deficit. IWPR: How can one can explain the lack of nationwide backing for the opposition? Kurmanov: It is obvious that in its current form, the opposition doesn’t have a great deal of potential, and that its chances of success are limited. The current leaders can only make the running in the south of Kyrgyzstan. In order to change its image and expand its support-base, the opposition needs to overhaul its membership and rid itself of careerists, and instead attract intelligent, authoritative figures of unblemished character. IWPR: If the authorities face another wave of unrest, will they be able to stay in control? Kurmanov: The coup d’etat seems to have become the standard, simplest way to come to power. You get 10,000 or 20,000 of your followers to come to Bishkek’s central square on some pretext, and the White House [former presidents’ office] surrenders. You don’t need to do the humdrum tasks of organising and campaigning, you don’t need to think, explain your point of view or publish articles. In both uprisings [2005 and 2010], marginalised sections of society and immature young people were the prime movers. Now they are thirsting for another revolution, or to be more precise, for another opportunity to do a bit of looting. Kyrgyzstan’s law-enforcement agencies are demoralised, and will not defend the authorities, particularly given the ongoing trials of policemen who are charged with shooting demonstrators in April 2010. Political party leaders no longer trust the police to uphold the law, so they are setting up their own armed units, disguised as volunteer forces. IWPR: What do you think it would take to swing the popular mood towards the opposition in the north as well as the south? Kurmanov: A decline in living standards. If that happens, nothing can save the authorities. The shortage of investment is forcing them to take unpopular measures, which could trigger a social explosion. There could be another cause as well – if relations worsen with another state, or if the opposition gets support from major external outside players. IWPR: Why isn’t the opposition properly integrated into the political mainstream? Kurmanov: The opposition is represented in parliament – it holds the post of deputy speaker as well as chairing two parliamentary committees. But that isn’t enough to harness it to the common cause. It should be more integrated into government, as well. At the moment, there is no one from the opposition in the executive, with the one exception of Culture Minister Ibrahim Junusov. But that appointment didn’t come out of negotiations; it was more of a goodwill gesture by the prime minister or the president. Hence, Ata Jurt feels itself at liberty to express its unhappiness out in the open, and that is what is happening. IWPR: Ideologically and intellectually, there seems little to choose between the political groups that are in opposition and in power. Kurmanov: The parties are built around their leaders, and consist of followers who serve the interests of their leader and his immediate circle. There isn’t much in the way of ideology or values, and party programmes don’t count for much. Voters choose the individual, not the programme. None of the parties has a strong membership. For example, the candidate list of the Social Democratic Party at the last election consisted of its leaders’ friends, relatives, wives, sons and daughters. In Kyrgyzstan, competition is not about ideas, it’s about power, position, assets and influence. That explains why there’s little substance to parliament’s activities, and why the government has no priorities or values. So there’s a sense that the country is constantly swaying from side to side, in its foreign policy as well as in its domestic politics. There’s no fundamental difference between those who are in power and the opposition. It’s difficult for ordinary people to make conscious and effective choices. So voters go for personalities, clan or region – even though that brings them no real personal benefit. IWPR: How would you describe the current state of the government? Kurmanov: It has little authority, nor is it in a position to coerce others. Its only option is to shape a consensus among various forces, but there’s limited capacity to negotiate solutions and to stick to them. No one feels that’s necessary. So it’s difficult for the government, president and parliament to do anything. After the March 4 local elections in which mayors [of Osh, Karakol and Tokmok] were also selected, it became apparent that real power on the ground lies not with the parliamentary parties, but with other political forces. In other words, there’s a disconnect between the centre and the local level. More local elections are on their way [in October], and it’s hard to predict who will win. The gulf between central and local levels is likely to widen, so that the local councils, of which there around 500, slip away from the control of the state. Interview conducted by Timur Toktonaliev, an IWPR journalist in Bishkek. COMMENT KYRGYZ ELITES EXPLOIT DISENFRANCHISED YOUTH Political classes mobilise young people for their own ends. By Pavel Dyatlenko The weakness of central government in Kyrgyzstan has encouraged the growth of amorphous youth movements which are manipulated by sections of the elite trying to gain more power. Youth groups were at the forefront of Kyrgyzstan’s two revolutions, in which one president, Askar Akaev, was ousted in 2005 and replaced by Kurmanbek Bakiev, who was himself forced out in April 2010. Among those who took to the streets and stormed government buildings, there were many idealists who genuinely wanted democratic change and held legitimate grievances against their rulers. They took to the streets and faced government forces, and some of them were killed. These were not, however, genuinely grassroots movements. Instead, they were an instrument which disgruntled elite figures used to topple their political foes and seize power. The various youth movements in Kyrgyzstan are fragmented rather than homogenous. Some draw on young people from rural areas, and a smaller number are identified with city dwellers, notably in the capital Bishkek and the southern city of Osh. A minority are independent and tend to be liberal, left-leaning and focused mainly on human rights. They do hold demonstrations but their organisational capacity and media profile is limited. Other youth groups are backed by politicians and parties, and it is they which always seem to be in the public eye, making vocal statements and organising attention-grabbing campaigns, sometimes on controversial issues like ethnicity and language. Despite attempts to position themselves as independent players, they have largely become proxies for the influential groups that dictate their agendas, as the 2005 and 2010 uprisings demonstrated. For politicians, they are a useful way of demonstrating broad public support for their agendas. Because it is easy to set up a “public organisation” un der Kyrgyzstan’s law, these groups have proliferated. Some are well-established, others are loose associations that are propelled onto the national stage by a single-issue campaign before fading into the background, often never to be heard of again. They are not to be confused with the formal youth wings of political parties, which tend to be drawn from the immediate entourage of the leadership and more noted for their loyalty than for their effectiveness as mobilisers. Informal youth groups were involved, for example, in protests against the planned deployment of international police in southern Kyrgyzstan in the wake of the June 2010 ethnic conflict that left more than 400 people dead. They were also a key part of a campaign earlier in 2012 calling for ethnic Uzbek school pupils to be prevented from taking exams in their own language. (See Row Over Uzbek Language in Kyrgyzstan.) These “managed” youth groups operate like rapid-response units, mobilising large numbers of people in a short space of time, and making themselves heard by holding press conferences as well as rallies. The existence of groups of marginalised young people can be traced to demographic changes that began in the late 1980s, when significant numbers of people began moving from countryside to town. Mostly ethnic Kyrgyz and poor, they struggled to find work and a place to live. Because education, welfare and healthcare entitlements require official registration as a resident, the newcomers were often denied basic services. They naturally campaigned on such issues and pressured town authorities to provide them with state-owned land to build houses on. Young people now make up a substantial proportion of Kyrgyzstan’s population, and many fall into this marginalised category. Those born around the time that the Soviet Union was collapsing fell between two stools – young to benefit from Soviet-era free education and guaranteed employment, but ill-equipped to cope with the transition to life in a hard-nosed market economy. There is little social mobility within this class of rural and first- or second-generation urban poor. With no money or connections, it is hard to set up a business, get a decent jobs, or go to university. It is hardly surprising that many were drawn towards populist, Kyrgyz nationalist ideas as a way of articulating their grievances. Because of the leading role they played in the two revolutions, youth groups are taken seriously, and government, media and civil society groups treat their views as a kind of barometer of public attitudes. Participants, too, benefit from their contact with political parties, acquiring experience and connections and offering opportunities for mobility they would otherwise be denied. “Managed” youth groups are likely to persist as long as nationalistic rhetoric and social deprivation are present, and as long as they are useful tools for political operators. They will only wither away when young people have more avenues open to them, through economic recovery, a better business environment and easier access to loans; when Kyrgyzstan’s political environment becomes more stable; and when the rule of law is enforced properly so that revolutions are no longer an opportunity to go looting with impunity. If and when these conditions come into being, young people will have less of a motivation for joining such movements. Pavel Dyatlenko is a political analyst with the Polis Asia think-tank in Bishkek. **** http://iwpr.net/ ********************************************************** REPORTING CENTRAL ASIA provides the international community with a unique insiders' perspective on the region. Using our network of local journalists, the service publishes news and analysis from across Central Asia on a weekly basis. The service forms part of IWPR's Central Asia Project based in Almaty, Bishkek, Tashkent and London, which supports media development and encourages better local and international understanding of the region. IWPR's Reporting Central Asia is supported by the UK Community Fund. The service is published online in English and Russian. The opinions expressed in Reporting Central Asia are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent those of the publication or of IWPR. REPORTING CENTRAL ASIA: Editor-in-Chief: Anthony Borden; Senior Editor and Acting Managing Editor: John MacLeod; Central Asia Programme Director: Abakhon Sultonnazarov; Central Asia Editor: Saule Mukhametrakhimova. IWPR PROJECT DEVELOPMENT AND SUPPORT: Executive Director: Anthony Borden; Head of Programmes: Sam Compton. **** http://iwpr.net/ ********************************************************** IWPR – Giving Voice, Driving Change To contact IWPR please go to: http://iwpr.net/contact IWPR - Europe, 48 Gray’s Inn Road, London WC1X 8LT, UK Tel: +44 20 7831 1030 IWPR – United States, 729 15th Street, NW Suite 500, Washington, DC 20005, United States Tel: +1 202 393 5641 Stichting IWPR Nederland, Eisenhowerlaan 77 K, 2517 KK Den Haag, The Netherlands Tel: +31 70 338 9016 For further details on this project and other information services and media programmes, go to: http://iwpr.net/ ISSN: 1477-7924 Copyright © 2009 The Institute for War & Peace Reporting **** http://iwpr.net/ **********************************************************
