anupamme opened a new pull request, #57778:
URL: https://github.com/apache/spark/pull/57778
## Summary
Harden input handling in `python/pyspark/sql/connect/client/reattach.py`
(flagged by multi_agent_ai).
## Vulnerability
| Field | Value |
|-------|-------|
| **ID** | V-003 |
| **Severity** | HIGH |
| **Scanner** | multi_agent_ai |
| **Rule** | `V-003` |
| **File** | `python/pyspark/sql/connect/client/reattach.py:329` |
| **Assessment** | Defensive hardening |
| **Chain Complexity** | 2-step |
**Description**: Spark Connect client's reattachment mechanism allows
resuming sessions using only the session_id without fresh authentication. An
attacker who obtains a valid session_id (e.g., from logs or network traffic)
can hijack the session.
## Threat Model Context
This is a Python library - vulnerabilities affect applications that import
this code.
## Changes
- `python/pyspark/sql/connect/client/reattach.py`
## Behavior Preservation
The change is scoped to 1 file on the vulnerable path; it only tightens
handling of untrusted input and leaves valid inputs unaffected.
## Security Invariant
> **Property**: Protected endpoints reject unauthenticated requests
<details>
<summary>Regression test</summary>
```python
import pytest
import sys
import os
# Add the module path to sys.path to import from pyspark
sys.path.insert(0, os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), "../../../.."))
from pyspark.sql.connect.client.reattach import SparkConnectClient
@pytest.mark.parametrize("auth_token", [
None, # Missing token - exact exploit case
"", # Empty token - boundary case
"expired_token_123", # Expired token
"malformed.token.@#$", # Malformed token
"valid_token_abc123", # Valid token (should pass if auth is optional)
])
def test_reattach_requires_authentication(auth_token):
"""Invariant: Reattachment requests without valid authentication must be
rejected."""
# Create a minimal client instance with the auth token
client = SparkConnectClient("localhost", 15002, use_ssl=False,
token=auth_token)
# Attempt to create a reattach request
try:
# This triggers the internal reattachment mechanism
request = client._create_reattach_execute_request()
# If we reach here without authentication failure, check if auth is
actually validated
# For valid tokens, we expect success; for invalid tokens, we expect
failure
if auth_token in [None, "", "expired_token_123",
"malformed.token.@#$"]:
# This should not happen - authentication should have failed
assert False, f"Reattachment allowed with invalid auth:
{auth_token}"
else:
# Valid token case - request creation should succeed
assert request is not None
except Exception as e:
# Check if the exception is authentication-related
error_msg = str(e).lower()
auth_errors = ["unauthorized", "forbidden", "authentication",
"token", "401", "403"]
if auth_token in [None, "", "expired_token_123",
"malformed.token.@#$"]:
# Invalid tokens should raise authentication errors
assert any(auth_error in error_msg for auth_error in
auth_errors), \
f"Expected auth error but got: {e}"
else:
# Valid tokens should not raise authentication errors
assert not any(auth_error in error_msg for auth_error in
auth_errors), \
f"Unexpected auth error for valid token: {e}"
```
</details>
This test guards against regressions — it's useful independent of the code
change above.
---
*This patch removes an exploit primitive — a code pattern that, while not
independently exploitable today, could be chained with other weaknesses by
automated exploit-development tooling. Proactive removal of such primitives
raises the bar against increasingly capable automated attack tools.*
---
*Automated security fix by [OrbisAI Security](https://orbisappsec.com)*
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