Hello, ---- On Wed, Nov 12, 2014 at 11:18:25AM +0400, [email protected] wrote: > I'm not sure the problem is imminent first hand.
The problem is real, and needs to be fixed. ---- Your word against my word - nothing changed in the world. ---- > I'm sure that the routing is not RIPE NCC's business. As long as nobody else is providing a high-quality and well-authenticated IRR DB for RIPE region objects, it *very much* is the RIPE NCC's business. ---- It's not me who mentioned "region". As soon as the authority of RIPE NCC is limited to RIPE region it is none of the RIPE NCC business to rule "around the world". I'm in doubt that the burden of inter-RIR arguments should be put on the end users. RPKI, when it was initially introduced, was, is and I hope will be independent decision of the end-user. ---- > I believe that the routing object should be created at the place where > it can be checked properly. Please provide suggestions how that will help RIPE region LIRs properly document their routing policy if out-of-region networks are involved. ---- The "routing policy" should be built in each region by their respective rules. If someone (including RIPE NCC) does not like the rules outside the region there should be some agreements between RIRs, not between end users. I hope you've heard my suggestion to form the routing policy in the RIR's database where it can be authenticated internally (against ASs and IP address blocks), than between complicated inter-RIR transfers. In that way it is only the inter-RIR process of exchanging high-integrity databases, not multi-thousand companies activity for implementing untrusted mechanisms to be in place. In my opinion there has been enough money spent on this already. Regards, Vladislav
