Hi all, I am not opposed to this in principle. I see some value. However, I think it would be good to take an impact analysis into account in order to prioritise this relative to other rpki improvements. I agree with others who have said that there may be more valuable things for the ripe ncc to focus on, eg:
- rpki ta key rolls - robustness wrt abuse of the system (producing thousands or millions of objects) - aspa path validation with rpki Tim > On 2 Nov 2019, at 10:52, Carlos Friaças via routing-wg <[email protected]> > wrote: > > > > Hi, > (please see inline) > > >> On Fri, 1 Nov 2019, Gert Doering wrote: >> >> Hi, >> >>> On Fri, Nov 01, 2019 at 07:09:42AM +0100, Job Snijders wrote: >>> So we really have to wonder whether this is worth it, or whether a few >>> emails or phone calls can also solve the issue. >> >> Isn't that the whole question underlying RPKI deployment? >> >> What is it that we want to stop with RPKI? Only classic "prefix hijacking" >> (announcing space that is formally delegated somewhere) > > With RPKI alone, mistakes. > > But when in doubt if network X has rights over network Y, it's rather simple > to ask network X to create a proper ROA for network Y. > > If that *doesn't* happen, maybe some conclusions can be drawn. > (there is a recent thread on the NANOG list where someone raised that > "feature"...) > > >> or other misuses >> of BGP, like "announce unallocated space, use that for spamming or other >> sorts of network attacks, withdraw announcement before people can track >> things back to you". > >> From *one* computer security emergency response team's angle: > RPKI is a good first step. Then, hopefully, ASPA can be added at some point. > > Playing the quick withdraw game will only work (and it is working, i > suspect!) until people start understanding they need to log who announces > what to them (24/7/365). > > Speaking about "network attacks" -- there is a lot of focus about the address > space being hijacked, while major focus should be on those who receive the > announcements. While it's terrible for the people/networks being > impersonating, the potential targets are really everyone... > > ps: i wish to express support for 2019-08 in its current form. > > Cheers, > Carlos > > > >> Gert Doering >> -- NetMaster >> -- >> have you enabled IPv6 on something today...? >> >> SpaceNet AG Vorstand: Sebastian v. Bomhard, Michael >> Emmer >> Joseph-Dollinger-Bogen 14 Aufsichtsratsvors.: A. Grundner-Culemann >> D-80807 Muenchen HRB: 136055 (AG Muenchen) >> Tel: +49 (0)89/32356-444 USt-IdNr.: DE813185279 >>
