It could also be that all 5 RIRs have trust roots for 0/0, so if you get a different RIR to sign with a different origin (including AS 0), that network is going to be unreachable at a lot of locations.
Rubens On Fri, Feb 18, 2022 at 7:09 AM Job Snijders via routing-wg <[email protected]> wrote: > > Hi all, > > It might be the case that the vulnerability is in the realm of disagreement > with some design choices of the past, rather than a traditional CVE hole in > one or more software packages. > > I found the following paper which touches upon the “assumed trust” aspect of > RPKI in the relationship between Relaying Party and Trust Anchor(s). > > https://www.researchgate.net/publication/349045074_Privacy_Preserving_and_Resilient_RPKI > > I’m very interested in discussion about cross-signing schemes. > > Kind regards, > > Job > -- > > To unsubscribe from this mailing list, get a password reminder, or change > your subscription options, please visit: > https://lists.ripe.net/mailman/listinfo/routing-wg -- To unsubscribe from this mailing list, get a password reminder, or change your subscription options, please visit: https://lists.ripe.net/mailman/listinfo/routing-wg
