在 15-11-24 下午2:46， "Gregory Mirsky" <[email protected]> 写入:
>Dear All, >I'd like to share comment by Security AD Stephen Farrell on a work that >is directly related to BFD, draft-ietf-mpls-lsp-ping-mpls-tp-oam-conf >(hope it is OK to raise security awareness in BFD community): > >> - 2.1.1, is there any chance of moving on from the "Keyed SHA1" >> >> from RFC5880 to e.g. HMAC-SHA256 for this? We're generally trying to >> get that kind of transition done as we can and moving to use of a >> standard integrity check rather than a more home-grown one has some >> benefits. The HMAC-SHA1-like thing you're doing is still probably ok, >> (though could maybe do with crypto eyeballs on it as there may have >> been relevant new results since 2010) but future-proofing would >> suggest moving to HMAC-SHA256 if we can. (I can imagine such a change >> might require a new document, but am asking anyway:-) >> >> GIM>> The fact is that we're bound by what is defined in RFC 5880. > >I wonder for how long though, that's now a five year old RFC. >Assuming it takes a few years for new deployments to pick up new >algorithms, isn't it time that a whole bunch of algorithm choices were >revisited? > >> There was a proposal to strengthen BFD security BFD Generic >> Cryptographic >>Authentication<http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-bhatia-bfd-crypto-auth-03 >>> but the document had expired. > >Pity that. I am one of the co-author of that draft. We didn’t try to update document because we got the feedback from the group that the influence on the performance is a big concern. That is why I raised the question in the last email whether it is a good time for us to re-consider the usage of aha-2 in BFD. >
