Dacheng,
Maybe do it the IETF way - discuss on the mailing list how it should
be updated, when we have consesnsus - update draft, and then see if
there is anything that we need to take up time to do at the f2f
meeting :) !
/Loa
On 2015-11-25 13:57, Dacheng Zhang wrote:
Great! Let us update that draft and discuss it in the next IETF meeting.
^_^
Cheers
Dacheng
在 15-11-25 上午9:33， "Gregory Mirsky" <[email protected]> 写入:
Hi Dacheng,
HW became more capable and we, one hopes, wiser. Perhaps it's time to
re-visit our options.
Regards,
Greg
-----Original Message-----
From: Dacheng Zhang [mailto:[email protected]]
Sent: Monday, November 23, 2015 11:12 PM
To: Gregory Mirsky; Marc Binderberger; Reshad Rahman (rrahman);
[email protected]; Stephen Farrell
Cc: [email protected]
Subject: Re: Request for WG adoption of draft-mahesh-bfd-authentication
在 15-11-24 下午2:46， "Gregory Mirsky" <[email protected]> 写入:
Dear All,
I'd like to share comment by Security AD Stephen Farrell on a work that
is directly related to BFD, draft-ietf-mpls-lsp-ping-mpls-tp-oam-conf
(hope it is OK to raise security awareness in BFD community):
- 2.1.1, is there any chance of moving on from the "Keyed SHA1"
from RFC5880 to e.g. HMAC-SHA256 for this? We're generally trying to
get that kind of transition done as we can and moving to use of a
standard integrity check rather than a more home-grown one has some
benefits. The HMAC-SHA1-like thing you're doing is still probably ok,
(though could maybe do with crypto eyeballs on it as there may have
been relevant new results since 2010) but future-proofing would
suggest moving to HMAC-SHA256 if we can. (I can imagine such a change
might require a new document, but am asking anyway:-)
GIM>> The fact is that we're bound by what is defined in RFC 5880.
I wonder for how long though, that's now a five year old RFC.
Assuming it takes a few years for new deployments to pick up new
algorithms, isn't it time that a whole bunch of algorithm choices were
revisited?
There was a proposal to strengthen BFD security BFD Generic
Cryptographic
Authentication<http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-bhatia-bfd-crypto-auth
-03
but the document had expired.
Pity that.
I am one of the co-author of that draft. We didn’t try to update document
because we got the feedback from the group that the influence on the
performance is a big concern. That is why I raised the question in the
last email whether it is a good time for us to re-consider the usage of
aha-2 in BFD.
