> Sent: Thursday, February 02, 2006 7:50 PM > > I'm sorry, but it is just not possible to find design flaws > by staring at code. > > gem
That is simply not true. <anecdotal_examples> [...] (I originally wrote out some anecdotal stuffs here that on reflection implied more organizational issues with providing poor design specification, ...and leaving design up to implementation choices...than providing examples of design choices that are obvious from implementation review.) </anecdotal> So while I politely disagree, my insufficient examples reinforce that there is a slippery inference slope here. This has been one of the more stimulating dialogues on SCL; thanks. -ae p.s.--the original response bounced the list due to being subscribed under an older email alias. > -----Original Message----- > From: Jeff Williams [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] > Sent: Thu Feb 02 20:32:29 2006 > To: 'Secure Coding Mailing List' > Subject: RE: [SC-L] Bugs and flaws > > At the risk of piling on here, there's no question that it's > critical to > consider security problems across the continuum. While we're > at it, the > analysis should start back even further with the requirements > or even the > whole system concept. > > All of the representations across the continuum (rqmts, arch, > design, code) > are just models of the same thing. They start more abstract > and end up as > code. A *single* problem could exist in all these models at > the same time. > > Higher-level representations of systems are generally > eclipsed by lower > level ones fairly rapidly. For example, it's a rare group > that updates > their design docs as implementation progresses. So once > you've got code, the > architecture-flaws don't come from architecture documents > (which lie). The > best place to look for them (if you want truth) is to look in > the code. > > To me, the important thing here is to give software teams > good advice about > the level of effort they're going to have to put into fixing > a problem. If > it helps to give a security problem a label to let them know > they're going > to have to go back to the drawing board, I think saying > 'architecture-flaw' > or 'design-flaw' is fine. But I agree with others that saying > 'flaw' alone > doesn't help distinguish it from 'bug' in the minds of most > developers or > architects. > > --Jeff > > Jeff Williams, CEO > Aspect Security > http://www.aspectsecurity.com > > > -----Original Message----- > From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] > [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] > On Behalf Of Crispin Cowan > Sent: Wednesday, February 01, 2006 5:07 PM > To: John Steven > Cc: Will Kruse; Secure Coding Mailing List > Subject: Re: [SC-L] Bugs and flaws > > John Steven wrote: > > I'm not sure there's any value in discussing this minutia > further, but > here > > goes: > > > We'll let the moderator decide that :) > > > 1) Crispin, I think you've nailed one thing. The continuum from: > > > > Architecture --> Design --> Low-level Design --> (to) Implementation > > > > is a blurry one, and certainly slippery as you move from 'left' to > 'right'. > > > Cool. > > > But, we all should understand that there's commensurate blur in our > analysis > > techniques (aka architecture and code review) to assure > that as we sweep > > over software that we uncover both bugs and architectural flaws. > > > Also agreed. > > > 2) Flaws are different in important ways bugs when it comes to > presentation, > > prioritization, and mitigation. Let's explore by physical > analog first. > > > I disagree with the word usage. To me, "bug" and "flaw" are exactly > synonyms. The distinction being drawn here is between "implementation > flaws" vs. "design flaws". You are just creating confusing jargon to > claim that "flaw" is somehow more abstract than "bug". Flaw ::= defect > ::= bug. A vulnerability is a special subset of > flaws/defects/bugs that > has the property of being exploitable. > > > I nearly fell through one of my consultant's tables as I > leaned on it this > > morning. We explored: "Bug or flaw?". > > > The wording issue aside, at the implementation level you try to > code/implement to prevent flaws, by doing things such as using higher > quality steel (for bolts) and good coding practices (for software). At > the design level, you try to design so as to *mask* flaws by avoiding > single points of failure, doing things such as using 2 bolts (for > tables) and using access controls to limit privilege escalation (for > software). > > Crispin > -- > Crispin Cowan, Ph.D. > http://crispincowan.com/~crispin/ > Director of Software Engineering, Novell http://novell.com > Olympic Games: The Bi-Annual Festival of Corruption > > _______________________________________________ > Secure Coding mailing list (SC-L) > SC-L@securecoding.org > List information, subscriptions, etc - > http://krvw.com/mailman/listinfo/sc-l > List charter available at - > http://www.securecoding.org/list/charter.php > > _______________________________________________ > Secure Coding mailing list (SC-L) > SC-L@securecoding.org > List information, subscriptions, etc - > http://krvw.com/mailman/listinfo/sc-l > List charter available at - > http://www.securecoding.org/list/charter.php > > > > > -------------------------------------------------------------- > -------------- > This electronic message transmission contains information that may be > confidential or privileged. 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