On 7/17/06, Crispin Cowan <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > mikeiscool wrote: > > On 7/17/06, Crispin Cowan <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > >> > Goertzel Karen wrote: > >> > I've been struggling for a while to synthesise a definition of secure > >> > software that is short and sweet, yet accurate and comprehensive. > >> > >> My favorite is by Ivan Arce, CTO of Core Software, coming out of a > >> discussion between him and I on a mailing list about 5 years ago. > >> > >> Reliable software does what it is supposed to do. Secure software > >> does what > >> it is supposed to do, and nothing else. > > and what if it's "supposed" to take unsanitzed input and send it into > > a sql database using the administrators account? > > > > is that secure? > > "supposed to" goes to intent.
I don't know. I think there is a difference between "this does what it's supposed to do" and "this has no design faults". That's all I was trying to highlight. The point remains though: trimming this down into a friendly little phrase is, IMCO, useless. > If it is a bug that allows this, then it > was not intentional. If it was intended, then (from this description) it > was likely a Trojan Horse, and it is secure from the perspective of the > attacker who put it there. > > IMHO, bumper sticker slogans are necessarily short and glib. There isn't > room to put in all the qualifications and caveats to make it a perfectly > precise statement. As such, mincing words over it is a futile exercise. > > Or you could just print a technical paper on a bumper sticker, in really > small font :) > > Crispin -- mic _______________________________________________ Secure Coding mailing list (SC-L) SC-L@securecoding.org List information, subscriptions, etc - http://krvw.com/mailman/listinfo/sc-l List charter available at - http://www.securecoding.org/list/charter.php
