Thinking about "attackable surface area" is a good metaphor, but I
think it's breaking down on you.
Think about a classic forms-driven (MVC) web application. If it's at
all complex, it'll contain a variety of form processing programs that
are all interlinked with a complex state-sharing mechanism. Such an
application might be hosted on just a single "port" or "service", but
it has huge surface area. It's also devilishly difficult to verify the
code.
On the other hand, many web services look like lots and lots of
"services", but each of them has extremely limited surface area on its
own. WS programs are typically smaller than their forms-processing
cousins-- even with all the automagic frameworks for MVC.
Web services tend to be specified syntactically as opposed to
semantically. In other words, the behavior of the RPC service is
defined by how you've structured your requests and is often not based
upon the content of an server-internal state sharing mechanism. This
is a huge advantage for security because it means that the scope of a
WS service is narrowly limited to its syntactic function. It shouldn't
tend to bleed out into other functional areas.
Finally, because web services are smaller and easier to write, they
should be (much) easier to verify for correctness. Many WS frameworks
also provide really nice abstractions of authentication and
authorization, so that you can check those separately without even
having to look at business logic in the process.
So, point being that I think that claiming that WS/SOA architectures
have greater "surface area" is ignoring the big picture. Our notion of
surface area needs to become more sophisticated to account for the
architectural differences between WS and classic-MVC apps.
If web developers want to use web services, I can't see why shouldn't
do so immediately. It shouldn't be THAT difficult for WS/SOA to make a
net positive impact on security.
Security folks shouldn't be scared of WS/SOA, we should be welcoming
it. It's a great opportunity to reintegrate seurity in a way that we
just never had with the Web 1.0 universe.
-nash
On Tue, Aug 15, 2006 at 10:03:07AM +0200, John Wilander wrote:
> Hi!
>
> The security principle of minimizing your attack surface (Writing
> Secure Code, 2nd Ed.) is all about minimizing open sockets, rpc
> endpoints, named pipes etc. that facilitate network communication
> between applications. Web services and Service Oriented Architecture
> on the other hand are all about exposing functionality to offer
> interoperability. Have any of you had discussions on the seemingly
> obvious conflict between these things? I would be very happy to hear
> your conclusions and opinions!
>
> Regards, John
>
> ____________________________ John Wilander, PhD student Computer and
> Information Sc. Linkoping University, Sweden
> http://www.ida.liu.se/~johwi
> _______________________________________________ Secure Coding
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Please do not mock other religons
in your quest for the Spaghetti god.
- anonymous
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