Ok, so your point then is that a desire for type-safety influenced the hardware architecture of these machines. Fair enough, though I don't know enough of the history of these machines to know how accurate it is. But how can I doubt you Gary? :)
I was mainly reflecting in my comments though that the programming language and the hardware architecture are coupled in terms of the resulting security model. Or they can be anyway. On Wed, Mar 25, 2009 at 8:42 AM, Gary McGraw <g...@cigital.com> wrote: > Hi Andy, > > The code/data mix is certainly a problem. Also a problem is the way stacks > grow on many particular machines, especially with common C/C++ compilers. > You noted a Burroughs where things were done better. There are many > others. C is usually just a sloppy mess by default. > > Language choice can sometimes make up for bad machine architecture, but > ultimately at some level of computational abstraction they come to be the > same thing. You may recall that I am a scheme guy. TI made a scheme > machine that never caught on some years back (around the same time as the > LISP machine...like emacs only even more bindings at least on the Symbolics > <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lisp_machine>). Those machines had a > fundamentally different architecture at the processor level. > > In any case, type safety is at the root of these decisions and makes a HUGE > difference. Go back and read your lambda calculus, think about closure, > symbolic representation, continuations, and first class objects and I think > you'll see what I mean. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lambda_calculus > > gem > (supposedly still on vacation, but it is a rainy day) > > http://www.cigital.com/~gem <http://www.cigital.com/%7Egem> > > > On 3/24/09 2:50 PM, "Andy Steingruebl" <stein...@gmail.com> wrote: > > > On Mon, Mar 23, 2009 at 7:22 AM, Gary McGraw <g...@cigital.com> wrote: > hi guys, > > I think there is a bit of confusion here WRT "root" problems. In C, the > main problem is not simply strings and string representation, but rather > that the "sea of bits" can be recast to represent most anything. The > technical term for the problem is the problem of type safety. C is not type > safe. > > Really? It isn't that the standard von Neumann architecture doesn't > differentiate between data and code? We've gone over this ground before > with stack-machines like the Burroughs B5500 series which were not > susceptible to buffer overflows that changed control flow because code and > data were truly distinct chunks of memory. > > Sure its a different programming/hardware model, but if you want to fix the > root cause you'll have to go deeper than language choice right? You might > have other tradeoffs but the core problem here isn't just type safety. > > Just like in the HTML example. The core problem is that the > language/format mixes code and data with no way to differentiate between > them. > > Or is my brain working too slowly today? > -- Andy Steingruebl stein...@gmail.com
_______________________________________________ Secure Coding mailing list (SC-L) SC-L@securecoding.org List information, subscriptions, etc - http://krvw.com/mailman/listinfo/sc-l List charter available at - http://www.securecoding.org/list/charter.php SC-L is hosted and moderated by KRvW Associates, LLC (http://www.KRvW.com) as a free, non-commercial service to the software security community. _______________________________________________
