Re: Belief vs Truth

2013-06-02 Thread Richard Ruquist
I have to respond that in Judaism in the high holiday service there is a
 prayer praising doubt.
I think that may be unique to Judaism?
Richard


On Sun, Jun 2, 2013 at 8:54 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:




 Russell wrote:
 *...When it comes to Bp  p capturing the notion of knowledge, I can see it
 captures the notion of mathematical knowledge, ie true theorems, as opposed
 to true conjectures, say, which aren't knowledge.
 *


 I can see your point, at least for arithmetic, but I am not sure that
 distinction is interesting, at least for awhile. In both case we assert
 some proposition, that we cannot prove. Then with some luck it can be true.



 * But I am vaguely sceptical it captures the notion of scientific knowledge,
 which has more to do with falsifiability, than with proof.
 *


 But the Löbian point is that proof, even when correct, are falsifiable.
 Why, because we might dream, even of a falsification.

 On 01 Jun 2013, at 21:41, John Mikes wrote:

 * And that's about where I left it - years ago.*
 *...*
 Interesting difference between 'scientific' and 'mathematical'
 (see the Nobel Prize distinction)


 That's one was contingent.
 Nobel was cocufied by a mathematician who would have deserved the price
 (Mittag Leffler I think). Hmm.. Wiki says it is a legend, and may be it is
 just the contingent current Aristotelianism. Some people believe that math
 is not a science, like David Deutsch. That makes no sense for me. Like
 Gauss I think math is the queen of science, and arithmetic is the queen of
 math ...



 - also in falsifiability, that does not automatically escape the agnostic
 questioning about the circumstances of the falsifying and the original
 images.


 Excellent point.



 Same difficulty as in judging proof.


 Formal, first order proof can be verified mechanically, but they still
 does not necessarily entail truth, as the premises might be inconsistent or
 incorrect.



 Scientific knowledge indeed is part of a belief system. In conventional
 sciences we THINK we know,


 Only the pseudo-religious or pseudo-scientist people think they know.



 in math we assume
 (apologies, Bruno).



 ?
 On the contrary I agree. I thought I insisted a lot on this. Except for
 the non scientific personal (not 3p) consciousness it is always assumption,
 that is why I say that I assume that 0 is a number, that 0 ≠ s(x) for all
 x, etc.

 In science there is only assumption. We never know-for-certain anything
 that we could transmit publicly.

 Science is born from doubt, lives in doubt and can only augment the
 doubts.

 In the ideal world of the correct machines, *all* certainties are madness.

 Bruno




 *
 *
 On Thu, May 30, 2013 at 6:43 PM, Russell Standish 
 li...@hpcoders.com.auwrote:

 On Thu, May 30, 2013 at 12:04:13PM -0700, meekerdb wrote:
  You mean unprovable?  I get confused because it seems that you
  sometimes use Bp to mean proves p and sometimes believes p
 

 To a mathematician, belief and proof are the same thing. I believe in
 this theorem because I can prove it. If I can't prove it, then I don't
 believe it - it is merely a conjecture.

 In modal logic, the operator B captures both proof and supposedly
 belief. Obviously it captures a mathematician's notion of belief -
 whether that extends to a scientists notion of belief, or a
 Christian's notion is another matter entirely.

 When it comes to Bp  p capturing the notion of knowledge, I can see
 it captures the notion of mathematical knowledge, ie true theorems, as
 opposed to true conjectures, say, which aren't knowledge.

 But I am vaguely sceptical it captures the notion of scientific
 knowledge, which has more to do with falsifiability, than with proof.

 And that's about where I left it - years ago.

 Cheers

 --


 
 Prof Russell Standish  Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
 Principal, High Performance Coders
 Visiting Professor of Mathematics  hpco...@hpcoders.com.au
 University of New South Wales  http://www.hpcoders.com.au

 

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Re: Belief vs Truth

2013-06-02 Thread Stephen Paul King
How do we integrate empirical data into Bpp?

On Saturday, June 1, 2013 3:41:56 PM UTC-4, JohnM wrote:

 Russell wrote:
 *...When it comes to Bp  p capturing the notion of knowledge, I can see it 
 captures the notion of mathematical knowledge, ie true theorems, as opposed 
 to true conjectures, say, which aren't knowledge.
 But I am vaguely sceptical it captures the notion of scientific knowledge, 
 which has more to do with falsifiability, than with proof.
 And that's about where I left it - years ago.*
 *...*
 Interesting difference between 'scientific' and 'mathematical' 
 (see the Nobel Prize distinction) - also in falsifiability, that does not 
 automatically escape the agnostic questioning about the circumstances of 
 the falsifying and the original images. Same difficulty as in judging 
 proof.  
 Scientific knowledge indeed is part of a belief system. In conventional 
 sciences we THINK we know, in math we assume 
 (apologies, Bruno). 
 John M
 *
 *
 On Thu, May 30, 2013 at 6:43 PM, Russell Standish 
 li...@hpcoders.com.aujavascript:
  wrote:

 On Thu, May 30, 2013 at 12:04:13PM -0700, meekerdb wrote:
  You mean unprovable?  I get confused because it seems that you
  sometimes use Bp to mean proves p and sometimes believes p
 

 To a mathematician, belief and proof are the same thing. I believe in
 this theorem because I can prove it. If I can't prove it, then I don't
 believe it - it is merely a conjecture.

 In modal logic, the operator B captures both proof and supposedly
 belief. Obviously it captures a mathematician's notion of belief -
 whether that extends to a scientists notion of belief, or a
 Christian's notion is another matter entirely.

 When it comes to Bp  p capturing the notion of knowledge, I can see
 it captures the notion of mathematical knowledge, ie true theorems, as
 opposed to true conjectures, say, which aren't knowledge.

 But I am vaguely sceptical it captures the notion of scientific
 knowledge, which has more to do with falsifiability, than with proof.

 And that's about where I left it - years ago.

 Cheers

 --


 
 Prof Russell Standish  Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
 Principal, High Performance Coders
 Visiting Professor of Mathematics  hpc...@hpcoders.com.aujavascript:
 University of New South Wales  http://www.hpcoders.com.au

 

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RE: The secret of perception. Particular minds and how they relate to the overall or Cosmic Mind

2013-06-02 Thread chris peck
A question Roger:

To recap:

there is only one mind (the Perceiver or Cosmic Mind or God) that 
perceives and acts, doing this through the Surpreme (most dominant) monad.
It perceives the whole universe with perfect clarity. 

Only it can perceive and act . the Supreme Monad continually and instantly 
updates its universe of
monads.

 Thus each monad knows everything
in the universe, but only from its own perspective, and monads being monads,
not perfectly clear but distorted.

I'm very gratified to hear that I know everything and to finally know that I 
know everything. :)

But, Im interested in the process by which the perfectly clear perception 
degrades into a distorted one. So there's the supreme monad injecting me 
continually and instantly with its perfectly clear perceptions. Being 
windowless, they are not my perceptions at all. Is there something inherent in 
the act of perception injection which is flawed? Or does the Supreme monad 
deliberately inject distortions to maintain supremacy? Afterall, in an ideal 
universe there is no space to differentiate my perspective from anyone elses. 
This perspective must be part of the perception injection musn't it?

Regards.

CP.





 From: rclo...@verizon.net
 To: rclo...@verizon.net
 Subject: The secret of perception. Particular minds and how they relate to 
 the overall or Cosmic Mind
 Date: Sat, 1 Jun 2013 08:41:12 -0400
 
 The secret of perception. Particular minds and how they relate to the overall 
 or Cosmic Mind
 
 The problem of perception in materialistic thinking is that it forces us to
 think that there is a homunculo us
 
 Leibniz has a more complicated understanding of particular minds and how they 
 relate to Cosmic Mind.
 
 In Leibniz's metaphysics, there is only one mind (the Perceiver or Cosmic 
 Mind or God) that 
 perceives and acts, doing this through the Surpreme (most dominant) monad.
 It perceives the whole universe with perfect clarity. 
 
 Only it can perceive and act, because its monads (which includes our minds) 
 have no windows.
 The monads (our minds)  perceive only indirectly, as the Supreme Monad is the 
 only
 --what we would call-- conscious mind.   We only think and perceive 
 indirectly,
 as the Supreme Monad continually and instantly updates its universe of
 monads. Thus there is no problem communing with God (the Cosmic Mind)
 as we do so continually and necessarily, although only aqccording to our own 
 abilities
 and perspective. s  
 
 That we ourselves, not God, appear to be the perceiver is thus only apparent.
 
 Also, because Cosmic Mind sees the entire universe as viewed by a 
 kaleidoscope of
 individual monads, the perceptions it returns to us contains not only what
 we see (the universe from our  own individual perspectives) but what the
 perceptions of all of the other monads.  Thus each monad knows everything
 in the universe, but only from its own perspective, and monads being monads,
 not perfectly clear but distorted.
 
 
  
 Dr. Roger Clough NIST (ret.) 6/1/2013 
 See my Leibniz site at
 http://team.academia.edu/RogerClough
 
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