Re: [geo] Re: Geoengineering and Climate Change Polarization: Testing a Two-channel Model of Science Communication, Ann. Am. Acad. Pol. Soc. Sci.
The full paper is now available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1981907 Abstract: We conducted a two-nation study (United States, n = 1500; England, n = 1500) to test a novel theory of science communication. The cultural cognition thesis posits that individuals make extensive reliance on cultural meanings in forming perceptions of risk. The logic of the cultural cognition thesis suggests the potential value of a distinctive two-channel science communication strategy that combines information content (“Channel 1”) with cultural meanings (“Channel 2”) selected to promote open-minded assessment of information across diverse communities. In the study, scientific information content on climate change was held constant while the cultural meaning of that information was experimentally manipulated. Consistent with the study hypotheses, we found that making citizens aware of the potential contribution of geoengineering as a supplement to restriction of CO2 emissions helps to offset cultural polarization over the validity of climate-change science. We also tested the hypothesis, derived from competing models of science communication, that exposure to information on geoengineering would provoke discounting of climate-change risks generally. Contrary to this hypothesis, we found that subjects exposed to information about geoengineering were slightly more concerned about climate change risks than those assigned to a control condition. climate change, geoengineering, cultural cognition, risk perception working papers series On 4 Mar 2014 02:37, David Morrow dmorr...@gmail.com wrote: FYI, the lead author of that paper, Dan Kahan, posted two additional blog posts on culture, values, and geoengineering: http://www.culturalcognition.net/blog/2014/2/24/geoengineering-the-cultural-plasticity-of-climate-change-ris.html http://www.culturalcognition.net/blog/2014/2/26/geoengineering-the-science-communication-environment-the-cul.html On Thursday, February 27, 2014 2:04:00 AM UTC-6, andrewjlockley wrote: Poster's note : This is just brilliant. At last an explanation of why believing nonsense is rational. Useful to reflect on how this paper replies to the origin and persistence of other belief systems, as well as climate change. Leaves me wondering what nonsense I believe. http://www.culturalcognition.net/blog/2014/2/23/three- models-of-risk-perception-their-significance-for-self.html Three models of risk perception their significance for self-government Dan Kahan Posted on Sunday, February 23, 2014 at 7:52AM From Geoengineering and Climate Change Polarization: Testing a Two-channel Model of Science Communication, Ann. Am. Acad. Pol. Soc. Sci. (in press). Theoretical background Three models of risk perception The scholarly literature on risk perception and communication is dominated by two models. The first is the rational-weigher model, which posits that members of the public, in aggregate and over time, can be expected to process information about risk in a manner that promotes their expected utility (Starr 1969). The second is the irrational-weigher model, which asserts that ordinary members of the pubic lack the ability to reliably advance their expected utility because their assessment of risk information is constrained by cognitive biases and other manifestations of bounded rationality (Kahneman 2003; Sunstein 2005; Marx et al. 2007; Weber 2006).Neither of these models cogently explains public conflict over climate change—or a host of other putative societal risks, such as nuclear power, the vaccination of teenage girls for HPV, and the removal of restrictions on carrying concealed handguns in public. Such disputes conspicuously feature partisan divisions over facts that admit of scientific investigation. Nothing in the rational-weigher model predicts that people with different values or opposing political commitments will draw radically different inferences from common information. Likewise, nothing in the irrational-weigher model suggests that people who subscribe to one set of values are any more or less bounded in their rationality than those who subscribe to any other, or that cognitive biases will produce systematic divisions of opinion of among such groups. One explanation for such conflict is the cultural cognition thesis (CCT). CCT says that cultural values are cognitively prior to facts in public risk conflicts: as a result of a complex of interrelated psychological mechanisms, groups of individuals will credit and dismiss evidence of risk in patterns that reflect and reinforce their distinctive understandings of how society should be organized (Kahan, Braman, Cohen, Gastil Slovic 2010; Jenkins-Smith Herron 2009). Thus, persons with individualistic values can be expected to be relatively dismissive of environmental and technological risks, which if widely accepted would justify restricting commerce and industry,
[geo] Re: Geoengineering and Climate Change Polarization: Testing a Two-channel Model of Science Communication, Ann. Am. Acad. Pol. Soc. Sci.
There is an saying that goes something like *To get along one needs to go along.* and I believe this old saying encapsulates the issue of 'Cultural Theory of Risk'. The general issue loosely known as 'The Moral Hazard' is not an overly complicated scenario and core guidance in understanding that scenario may be found at the definitional level of Metaethicshttp://moralphilosophy.info/metaethics/. I've tried to simplify this general issues involved in the following statement (from a working draft on marine biomasshttps://docs.google.com/document/d/1m9VXozADC0IIE6mYx5NsnJLrUvF_fWJN_GyigCzDLn0/pubGE). Mapping out the moral paradox: The primary opposing views of metaethics revolves around the issue of ones’ perspective. To qoute http://moralphilosophy.info/http://moralphilosophy.info/metaethics/ : “Perhaps the biggest controversy in metaethics is that which divides moral realists and antirealists. Moral realists hold that moral facts are objective facts that are out there in the world. Things are good or bad independent of us, and then we come along and discover morality. Antirealists hold that moral facts are not out there in the world until we put them there, that the facts about morality are determined by facts about us. On this view, morality is not something that we discover so much as something that we invent.”. In the context of Global Warming Mitigation (GWM), the highly complex matrix of the socioeconomic, political and environmental realities, encompass both ‘realistic’ and ‘antirealistic’ valid moral views. This creates a co-realistic moral paradox. Solving the moral paradox: Solving paradoxes requires identifying the point of fallacy in the paradox and then avoiding that point. The premise that fossil fuels are currently irreplaceable at the global scale is the fallacy which needs avoiding as FFs are the core cause of GW and FFs can be replaced with current technology. The overall issue of large scale mitigation of global warming offers up a blinding array of relative rights or wrongs which can possibly be reduced to one core question and a simply stated strategy. Is the continued use of FFs, on a global scale, scientifically, morally or ethically supportable? If not, ending the FF era should be the prime objective. Any large scale mitigation strategy which can support the primary objective of replacing FFs should be given priority. Until trans-formative improvements in energy storage and or distribution occurs, production of vast amounts of carbon negative, renewable, low cost, portable biofuels are needed to supplant FF use. Under a global carbon negative fuel scenario, *the failure to increase fuel production and use would be considered unethical due to the CDR/CCS potential of BECCS*. Thus, production of carbon negative biofuels seems to ethically negate the moral hazard of mitigating FF induced global warming.. I believe the study of meta-ethics can provide important guidance to both GW mitigation technology strategies and the cultural understanding of the complex matrix of scientific issues related to GW and GE. From the technical side, ethically negating the moral hazard of global warming mitigation is technically possible using carbon neutral/negative bio-fuels (BECCS) and or space based energy. From the cultural side, the 'global community' (what ever that may be) seems to demand both abundance and environmental balances. The use of carbon neutral/negative energy or space based energy seems capable of meeting this apparent core cultural demand of 'Having the cake and eating it too'. In the final analysis, the cultural cognition of the need for global warming mitigation and the mitigation method(s) employed will need to be well synchronized if there is to be a globally inclusive effort with a high level of cultural acceptance. To-date, from both the technical and cultural levels, only BECCS and space based energy provide the ability to ethically mitigate the moral hazard of global warming mitigation. The other mitigation methods have their value and need to be integrated with the primary mitigation means, when and where appropriate, as secondary strategies. Best, Michael On Thursday, February 27, 2014 12:04:00 AM UTC-8, andrewjlockley wrote: Poster's note : This is just brilliant. At last an explanation of why believing nonsense is rational. Useful to reflect on how this paper replies to the origin and persistence of other belief systems, as well as climate change. Leaves me wondering what nonsense I believe. http://www.culturalcognition.net/blog/2014/2/23/three-models-of-risk-perception-their-significance-for-self.html Three models of risk perception their significance for self-government Dan Kahan Posted on Sunday, February 23, 2014 at 7:52AM From Geoengineering and Climate Change Polarization: Testing a Two-channel Model of Science Communication, Ann. Am. Acad. Pol.
Re: [geo] Re: Geoengineering and Climate Change Polarization: Testing a Two-channel Model of Science Communication, Ann. Am. Acad. Pol. Soc. Sci.
Dear Dan, Views of nature I've read through the Thompson paper of 2003 (Chapter 8) and your paper of 2012, attached to the email sent by Jesse Reynolds a few days ago. Neither paper tackles geoengineering, but both help to define four camps rather than the two I had assumed in my last email. Of particular interest to me was the figure 1 in the Thompson paper, where the four camps are defined in a quadrant. Each has a different view of nature, represented by a ball perched on a line. If the line is concave, then nature is inherently stable. If the line is convex, then nature is ephemeral. If the line is straight, then nature is fickle and untrustworthy. If the line is concave with humps on each side, then nature is tolerant up to a certain discoverable threshold. Strength of emotional response Because of feelings of solidarity, people tend to be polarised into one of the four camps (where we had two before). Anything which conflicts with the view of nature of the group is rejected, regardless of scientific evidence. This is your assertion, and I can believe it. The strength of rejection is remarkable in my experience, even from top scientists who one would expect to be objective in their judgement. Thus climate models are often accepted in preference to observations, if these observations conflict with deeply held views of the Earth System (as you might call nature). In particular, if the observations suggest the system is past a threshold or tipping point, such a conclusion can be totally rejected by spurious argument and reliance on models showing no such threshold. The views of their particular camp will then reinforce this rejection (and the spurious arguments for it) in what one might consider group denial. Subject of discourse Battle lines are set in concrete. The discourse of the papers is about global warming and how each camp reacts to proposed policies for CO2 emissions reduction. But CO2 emissions reduction, however drastic, will not halt global warming and will have little effect in the Arctic, where warming is accelerating. This restriction of discourse makes it extremely difficult to discuss any interventions other than CO2 emissions reduction, with its related topics of clean energy, sustainable lifestyle, etc. The problem of facing the real world What does the scientist do when he finds that real-world observations of the Earth System show that it is beyond the threshold where CO2 reduction alone could prevent a catastrophe? Suppose the discoverable threshold has already been passed. None of the camps (except perhaps the fatalists) will accept this, because it conflicts with their world view of nature. Geoengineering is the only solution, but is rejected by the three main camps, because they don't believe, reject or ignore the scientific evidence. (The so-called fatalists in the fourth camp are inherently defeatist, so they see no point in trying geoengineering, but at least they are tolerant of the idea, since the evidence for a geoengineering requirement fits with their world view.) The way forward Scientists in this position have no large camp to join. They are isolated except in their solidarity on shared scientific opinion. Yet, if the people in the various camps could have sufficient self-awareness to counter their natural feelings against geoengineering, then there could be meaningful collaboration between people in all camps to tackle the real-world problem that these scientists present. It is in the interests of everyone on the planet that the climate problem is sorted. And nobody need suffer as a result of the kind of interventions being proposed: removal of CO2 from the atmosphere and cloud cooling techniques to cool the Arctic. With careful management they should be entirely beneficial. Could a psychologist help to solve a real-world problem of climate change by releasing people from the restricted view of nature held by their own camp? Cheers, John On Fri, Mar 7, 2014 at 6:18 PM, Rau, Greg r...@llnl.gov wrote: John, Yes buck up = cheer up over here, sorry or the cowboy colloquialism. Psychology is indeed at the root of behavior, a little detail they didn't teach us in Earth Science grad school. That's why we need the professionals in human behavior on our side - Madison Ave, Mark Zuckerberg, etc ;-) Greg -- *From:* John Nissen [johnnissen2...@gmail.com] *Sent:* Thursday, March 06, 2014 3:21 PM *To:* Rau, Greg *Cc:* dmorr...@gmail.com; geoengineering@googlegroups.com; dan.ka...@yale.edu; John Nissen *Subject:* Re: [geo] Re: Geoengineering and Climate Change Polarization: Testing a Two-channel Model of Science Communication, Ann. Am. Acad. Pol. Soc. Sci. Hi Greg, Having researched the meaning of buck up, I realise that your meaning is to do with cheering me up, rather than speeding me up. It is cheering to have a meaningful discussion on the popular rejection of geoengineering.
RE: [geo] Re: Geoengineering and Climate Change Polarization: Testing a Two-channel Model of Science Communication, Ann. Am. Acad. Pol. Soc. Sci.
John, Yes buck up = cheer up over here, sorry or the cowboy colloquialism. Psychology is indeed at the root of behavior, a little detail they didn't teach us in Earth Science grad school. That's why we need the professionals in human behavior on our side - Madison Ave, Mark Zuckerberg, etc ;-) Greg From: John Nissen [johnnissen2...@gmail.com] Sent: Thursday, March 06, 2014 3:21 PM To: Rau, Greg Cc: dmorr...@gmail.com; geoengineering@googlegroups.com; dan.ka...@yale.edu; John Nissen Subject: Re: [geo] Re: Geoengineering and Climate Change Polarization: Testing a Two-channel Model of Science Communication, Ann. Am. Acad. Pol. Soc. Sci. Hi Greg, Having researched the meaning of buck up, I realise that your meaning is to do with cheering me up, rather than speeding me up. It is cheering to have a meaningful discussion on the popular rejection of geoengineering. I can understand a religious objection to geoengineering, on the grounds that weather is God's business so we should not interfere with it. And I can understand that scientists are used to observing the environment while trying not to alter the subject of their observations. But these are not sociological effects. What fascinates me is how a psychologist can bring a new perspective on this. You, Dan, have shown, in the CCT theory, how the majority of people, and that of course includes scientists, fall into one of two distinct classes and identify themselves with an associated 'camp', as I call it. My deduction from what you, Dan, have said is that geoengineering is rejected by both camps. The strength of emotion exhibited against geoengineering indicates that something is offending deeply held values - values shared by the associated camp. There is certainly overt antagonism between the camps. But a strong subconscious driver may be fear. We see an aversion to the discussion of present danger share by both camps - anything that is at all scary. The camp that rejects climate change has an aversion to discussing the scientific evidence which indicates the danger to human society from many degrees of global warming and from Arctic meltdown. This camp rejects geoengineering because it is associated with this evidence which it does not wish to discuss. People in this camp say that geoengineering will not be required for a long time, if ever, because the world is changing slowly. When a scientist describes the actual situation to such a person, they reply it can't possibly be as bad as that. On the other hand the camp which accepts climate change also has an aversion to the discussion of near-term danger, while they accept the long-term danger of climate change, e.g. by the end of the century. Some reject geoengineering on the grounds that it is a conspiracy by the other camp (especially fossil fuel industry) to 'get out of gaol free', i.e. to continue their vile polluting practice of burning fossil fuels. Others say that geoengineering is too dangerous - the implication it is more risky to apply geoengineering than to leave the climate system to change. (This is like condemning the fire engines for the water damage they might produce, while the building is burning down.) Others have more sophisticated arguments - all having the characteristic of avoiding proper discussion of near-term danger, especially from the warming of the Arctic. So who can escape from this emotional reaction? There are the psychologists, like you, Dan, who can present the situation as a case study in psychological theory. There are economists who accept the economic impact of fossil fuel reduction, yet realise that climate change will have a huge economic impact, even within a few decades, because of the limited carbon budget set by AR5. And there are those of us who acknowledge that there are these two camps who are pre-occupied by fighting a battle over emissions reductions, while two more immediate problems are overlooked: 1. The global warming and ocean acidification from existing CO2 in the atmosphere require that CO2 is removed from the atmosphere, by the CRD geoengineering techniques. 2. The Arctic will proceed towards total meltdown, unless it is quickly cooled by SRM geoengineering techniques sufficient to halt the sea ice retreat. Neither of the two camps is seriously engaged in discussion about these urgent requirements for geoengineering. Or they will deny the science and scientific observations that point to these requirements. And yet geoengineering offers a golden opportunity for international collaboration, for solving these most immediate and urgent problems faced by mankind. It would be tragic if this opportunity were missed because of psychological problems. Cheers, John On Tue, Mar 4, 2014 at 10:02 PM, Rau, Greg r...@llnl.govmailto:r...@llnl.gov wrote: Buck up, John. Once the real hazards of rising sea level, failed crops, and acidified
Re: [geo] Re: Geoengineering and Climate Change Polarization: Testing a Two-channel Model of Science Communication, Ann. Am. Acad. Pol. Soc. Sci.
I think oversimplifies things a bit. There's a component of society, certain very large corporations, who would be delighted to see major CC impacts that require massive geoengineering efforts. They're the companies that will do the work. And, as I argued recently on my blog [http://www.grinzo.com/energy/2014/01/29/the-climate-impact-line/], we have a CC wedge: People above it will benefit in the short term from making CC worse by sticking to BAU, and they are wealthy enough that they perceive that they and their loved ones can buy their way out of danger. People below the wedge are going to suffer a great deal, and many will die. Those above the wedge consider those below an expendable resource. And there's a non-trivial portion of people who aren't thrilled with geoengineering not for the reasons you mention (although I know those people exist), but because they don't think we can do it without screwing it up and making a bad situation even worse. They look at political and corporate ineptitude and corruption, and remember all the high-profile screw ups that regularly appear in the news, and they wonder how anyone could think we'd intentionally influence the world's environment and get it right. While I don't agree with that position, it's a pragmatic view that I understand. On Tuesday, March 4, 2014 2:21:47 PM UTC-5, John Nissen wrote: Hi Greg, The theory is that people tend to be polarised into two camps. One camp is against the idea that climate change can have anything to do with our greenhouse gas emissions; and therefore (subconsciously) this camp is against geoengineering because it would admit of a massive problem to be solved. The other camp is against geoengineering (subconsciously) because of the moral hazard - the idea that it's a get out of jail free for the people responsible for causing climate change in the first place. They will talk of geoengineering as a climate fix, that it is playing with God, etc. Kahan refers repeatedly to a 2012 study where it was shown that the moral hazard argument against geoengineering was scientifically invalid. But subconsciously the second camp may still have this deep-seated fear of geoengineering. Therefore I deduce, using his argument, that neither camp will accept geoengineering, whatever evidence of the need for geoengineering is presented to them. I think this is the crux of the matter: nobody, identified with either of the common camps, will accept geoengineering. Only when this impasse is properly acknowledged, will it be possible for people to accept the scientific evidence that geoengineering is needed, not only to suck CO2 out of the atmosphere, but also to cool the Arctic. Cheers, John On Tue, Mar 4, 2014 at 4:22 AM, Rau, Greg ra...@llnl.gov javascript:wrote: This observation may bear repeating: To be effective, science communication must successfully negotiate both channels. That is, in addition to furnishing individuals with valid and pertinent information about how the world works, it must avail itself of the cues necessary to assure individuals that assenting to that information will not estrange them from their communities. Isn't this what good advertising does, and couldn't our community benefit from some cogent advice from Madison Ave, if we could afford it? Science and scientific reasoning alone apparently isn't enough, especially when there are (well funded) individuals who would cast such reasoning as a threat to their communities. Greg -- *From:* geoengi...@googlegroups.com javascript: [ geoengi...@googlegroups.com javascript:] on behalf of David Morrow [ dmor...@gmail.com javascript:] *Sent:* Monday, March 03, 2014 6:27 PM *To:* geoengi...@googlegroups.com javascript: *Subject:* [geo] Re: Geoengineering and Climate Change Polarization: Testing a Two-channel Model of Science Communication, Ann. Am. Acad. Pol. Soc. Sci. FYI, the lead author of that paper, Dan Kahan, posted two additional blog posts on culture, values, and geoengineering: http://www.culturalcognition.net/blog/2014/2/24/geoengineering-the-cultural-plasticity-of-climate-change-ris.html http://www.culturalcognition.net/blog/2014/2/26/geoengineering-the-science-communication-environment-the-cul.html On Thursday, February 27, 2014 2:04:00 AM UTC-6, andrewjlockley wrote: Poster's note : This is just brilliant. At last an explanation of why believing nonsense is rational. Useful to reflect on how this paper replies to the origin and persistence of other belief systems, as well as climate change. Leaves me wondering what nonsense I believe. http://www.culturalcognition.net/blog/2014/2/23/three- models-of-risk-perception-their-significance-for-self.html Three models of risk perception their significance for self-government Dan Kahan Posted on Sunday, February 23, 2014 at 7:52AM
Re: [geo] Re: Geoengineering and Climate Change Polarization: Testing a Two-channel Model of Science Communication, Ann. Am. Acad. Pol. Soc. Sci.
Hi Greg, The theory is that people tend to be polarised into two camps. One camp is against the idea that climate change can have anything to do with our greenhouse gas emissions; and therefore (subconsciously) this camp is against geoengineering because it would admit of a massive problem to be solved. The other camp is against geoengineering (subconsciously) because of the moral hazard - the idea that it's a get out of jail free for the people responsible for causing climate change in the first place. They will talk of geoengineering as a climate fix, that it is playing with God, etc. Kahan refers repeatedly to a 2012 study where it was shown that the moral hazard argument against geoengineering was scientifically invalid. But subconsciously the second camp may still have this deep-seated fear of geoengineering. Therefore I deduce, using his argument, that neither camp will accept geoengineering, whatever evidence of the need for geoengineering is presented to them. I think this is the crux of the matter: nobody, identified with either of the common camps, will accept geoengineering. Only when this impasse is properly acknowledged, will it be possible for people to accept the scientific evidence that geoengineering is needed, not only to suck CO2 out of the atmosphere, but also to cool the Arctic. Cheers, John On Tue, Mar 4, 2014 at 4:22 AM, Rau, Greg r...@llnl.gov wrote: This observation may bear repeating: To be effective, science communication must successfully negotiate both channels. That is, in addition to furnishing individuals with valid and pertinent information about how the world works, it must avail itself of the cues necessary to assure individuals that assenting to that information will not estrange them from their communities. Isn't this what good advertising does, and couldn't our community benefit from some cogent advice from Madison Ave, if we could afford it? Science and scientific reasoning alone apparently isn't enough, especially when there are (well funded) individuals who would cast such reasoning as a threat to their communities. Greg -- *From:* geoengineering@googlegroups.com [geoengineering@googlegroups.com] on behalf of David Morrow [dmorr...@gmail.com] *Sent:* Monday, March 03, 2014 6:27 PM *To:* geoengineering@googlegroups.com *Subject:* [geo] Re: Geoengineering and Climate Change Polarization: Testing a Two-channel Model of Science Communication, Ann. Am. Acad. Pol. Soc. Sci. FYI, the lead author of that paper, Dan Kahan, posted two additional blog posts on culture, values, and geoengineering: http://www.culturalcognition.net/blog/2014/2/24/geoengineering-the-cultural-plasticity-of-climate-change-ris.html http://www.culturalcognition.net/blog/2014/2/26/geoengineering-the-science-communication-environment-the-cul.html On Thursday, February 27, 2014 2:04:00 AM UTC-6, andrewjlockley wrote: Poster's note : This is just brilliant. At last an explanation of why believing nonsense is rational. Useful to reflect on how this paper replies to the origin and persistence of other belief systems, as well as climate change. Leaves me wondering what nonsense I believe. http://www.culturalcognition.net/blog/2014/2/23/three- models-of-risk-perception-their-significance-for-self.html Three models of risk perception their significance for self-government Dan Kahan Posted on Sunday, February 23, 2014 at 7:52AM From Geoengineering and Climate Change Polarization: Testing a Two-channel Model of Science Communication, Ann. Am. Acad. Pol. Soc. Sci. (in press). Theoretical background Three models of risk perception The scholarly literature on risk perception and communication is dominated by two models. The first is the rational-weigher model, which posits that members of the public, in aggregate and over time, can be expected to process information about risk in a manner that promotes their expected utility (Starr 1969). The second is the irrational-weigher model, which asserts that ordinary members of the pubic lack the ability to reliably advance their expected utility because their assessment of risk information is constrained by cognitive biases and other manifestations of bounded rationality (Kahneman 2003; Sunstein 2005; Marx et al. 2007; Weber 2006).Neither of these models cogently explains public conflict over climate change--or a host of other putative societal risks, such as nuclear power, the vaccination of teenage girls for HPV, and the removal of restrictions on carrying concealed handguns in public. Such disputes conspicuously feature partisan divisions over facts that admit of scientific investigation. Nothing in the rational-weigher model predicts that people with different values or opposing political commitments will draw radically different inferences from common information. Likewise, nothing in the irrational-weigher model suggests that people who
Re: [geo] Re: Geoengineering and Climate Change Polarization: Testing a Two-channel Model of Science Communication, Ann. Am. Acad. Pol. Soc. Sci.
My understanding is that many conservatives are rather fond of geoengineering as it allows the continuing BAU pathway (at least superficially). Further, as David Keith has pointed out, a degree of moral hazard is entirely rational. However, what's surprising is that a degree of negative or perverse moral hazard has been found in a couple of studies. IE that some people become more worried about AGW when CE is explained. This can potentially be rationalised by the shift in perception caused by realising CE is considered a serious option. I guess they'd prefer blue skies to SUVs, and facing that choice makes it more pressing. My own serious games work supported negative moral hazard, but had to be ditched due to methodology flaws. A On 4 Mar 2014 19:22, John Nissen johnnissen2...@gmail.com wrote: Hi Greg, The theory is that people tend to be polarised into two camps. One camp is against the idea that climate change can have anything to do with our greenhouse gas emissions; and therefore (subconsciously) this camp is against geoengineering because it would admit of a massive problem to be solved. The other camp is against geoengineering (subconsciously) because of the moral hazard - the idea that it's a get out of jail free for the people responsible for causing climate change in the first place. They will talk of geoengineering as a climate fix, that it is playing with God, etc. Kahan refers repeatedly to a 2012 study where it was shown that the moral hazard argument against geoengineering was scientifically invalid. But subconsciously the second camp may still have this deep-seated fear of geoengineering. Therefore I deduce, using his argument, that neither camp will accept geoengineering, whatever evidence of the need for geoengineering is presented to them. I think this is the crux of the matter: nobody, identified with either of the common camps, will accept geoengineering. Only when this impasse is properly acknowledged, will it be possible for people to accept the scientific evidence that geoengineering is needed, not only to suck CO2 out of the atmosphere, but also to cool the Arctic. Cheers, John On Tue, Mar 4, 2014 at 4:22 AM, Rau, Greg r...@llnl.gov wrote: This observation may bear repeating: To be effective, science communication must successfully negotiate both channels. That is, in addition to furnishing individuals with valid and pertinent information about how the world works, it must avail itself of the cues necessary to assure individuals that assenting to that information will not estrange them from their communities. Isn't this what good advertising does, and couldn't our community benefit from some cogent advice from Madison Ave, if we could afford it? Science and scientific reasoning alone apparently isn't enough, especially when there are (well funded) individuals who would cast such reasoning as a threat to their communities. Greg -- *From:* geoengineering@googlegroups.com [geoengineering@googlegroups.com] on behalf of David Morrow [dmorr...@gmail.com] *Sent:* Monday, March 03, 2014 6:27 PM *To:* geoengineering@googlegroups.com *Subject:* [geo] Re: Geoengineering and Climate Change Polarization: Testing a Two-channel Model of Science Communication, Ann. Am. Acad. Pol. Soc. Sci. FYI, the lead author of that paper, Dan Kahan, posted two additional blog posts on culture, values, and geoengineering: http://www.culturalcognition.net/blog/2014/2/24/geoengineering-the-cultural-plasticity-of-climate-change-ris.html http://www.culturalcognition.net/blog/2014/2/26/geoengineering-the-science-communication-environment-the-cul.html On Thursday, February 27, 2014 2:04:00 AM UTC-6, andrewjlockley wrote: Poster's note : This is just brilliant. At last an explanation of why believing nonsense is rational. Useful to reflect on how this paper replies to the origin and persistence of other belief systems, as well as climate change. Leaves me wondering what nonsense I believe. http://www.culturalcognition.net/blog/2014/2/23/three- models-of-risk-perception-their-significance-for-self.html Three models of risk perception their significance for self-government Dan Kahan Posted on Sunday, February 23, 2014 at 7:52AM From Geoengineering and Climate Change Polarization: Testing a Two-channel Model of Science Communication, Ann. Am. Acad. Pol. Soc. Sci. (in press). Theoretical background Three models of risk perception The scholarly literature on risk perception and communication is dominated by two models. The first is the rational-weigher model, which posits that members of the public, in aggregate and over time, can be expected to process information about risk in a manner that promotes their expected utility (Starr 1969). The second is the irrational-weigher model, which asserts that ordinary members of the pubic lack the ability to reliably advance their
Re: [geo] Re: Geoengineering and Climate Change Polarization: Testing a Two-channel Model of Science Communication, Ann. Am. Acad. Pol. Soc. Sci.
Buck up, John. Once the real hazards of rising sea level, failed crops, and acidified oceans materialize, the decision-makers just might yearn for some hazards of the moral kind. And you and I might still be around when that happens. Even then there is no guarantee that any countering action will be effective and safe unless we do some research to find out before the real need for hazard mitigation arises, which for some of us is right now. Keep up the good fight... Greg From: John Nissen johnnissen2...@gmail.commailto:johnnissen2...@gmail.com Date: Tuesday, March 4, 2014 11:21 AM To: Default r...@llnl.govmailto:r...@llnl.gov Cc: dmorr...@gmail.commailto:dmorr...@gmail.com dmorr...@gmail.commailto:dmorr...@gmail.com, geoengineering geoengineering@googlegroups.commailto:geoengineering@googlegroups.com, dan.ka...@yale.edumailto:dan.ka...@yale.edu dan.ka...@yale.edumailto:dan.ka...@yale.edu, John Nissen j...@cloudworld.co.ukmailto:j...@cloudworld.co.uk Subject: Re: [geo] Re: Geoengineering and Climate Change Polarization: Testing a Two-channel Model of Science Communication, Ann. Am. Acad. Pol. Soc. Sci. Hi Greg, The theory is that people tend to be polarised into two camps. One camp is against the idea that climate change can have anything to do with our greenhouse gas emissions; and therefore (subconsciously) this camp is against geoengineering because it would admit of a massive problem to be solved. The other camp is against geoengineering (subconsciously) because of the moral hazard - the idea that it's a get out of jail free for the people responsible for causing climate change in the first place. They will talk of geoengineering as a climate fix, that it is playing with God, etc. Kahan refers repeatedly to a 2012 study where it was shown that the moral hazard argument against geoengineering was scientifically invalid. But subconsciously the second camp may still have this deep-seated fear of geoengineering. Therefore I deduce, using his argument, that neither camp will accept geoengineering, whatever evidence of the need for geoengineering is presented to them. I think this is the crux of the matter: nobody, identified with either of the common camps, will accept geoengineering. Only when this impasse is properly acknowledged, will it be possible for people to accept the scientific evidence that geoengineering is needed, not only to suck CO2 out of the atmosphere, but also to cool the Arctic. Cheers, John On Tue, Mar 4, 2014 at 4:22 AM, Rau, Greg r...@llnl.govmailto:r...@llnl.gov wrote: This observation may bear repeating: To be effective, science communication must successfully negotiate both channels. That is, in addition to furnishing individuals with valid and pertinent information about how the world works, it must avail itself of the cues necessary to assure individuals that assenting to that information will not estrange them from their communities. Isn't this what good advertising does, and couldn't our community benefit from some cogent advice from Madison Ave, if we could afford it? Science and scientific reasoning alone apparently isn't enough, especially when there are (well funded) individuals who would cast such reasoning as a threat to their communities. Greg From: geoengineering@googlegroups.commailto:geoengineering@googlegroups.com [geoengineering@googlegroups.commailto:geoengineering@googlegroups.com] on behalf of David Morrow [dmorr...@gmail.commailto:dmorr...@gmail.com] Sent: Monday, March 03, 2014 6:27 PM To: geoengineering@googlegroups.commailto:geoengineering@googlegroups.com Subject: [geo] Re: Geoengineering and Climate Change Polarization: Testing a Two-channel Model of Science Communication, Ann. Am. Acad. Pol. Soc. Sci. FYI, the lead author of that paper, Dan Kahan, posted two additional blog posts on culture, values, and geoengineering: http://www.culturalcognition.net/blog/2014/2/24/geoengineering-the-cultural-plasticity-of-climate-change-ris.html http://www.culturalcognition.net/blog/2014/2/26/geoengineering-the-science-communication-environment-the-cul.html On Thursday, February 27, 2014 2:04:00 AM UTC-6, andrewjlockley wrote: Poster's note : This is just brilliant. At last an explanation of why believing nonsense is rational. Useful to reflect on how this paper replies to the origin and persistence of other belief systems, as well as climate change. Leaves me wondering what nonsense I believe. http://www.culturalcognition.net/blog/2014/2/23/three-models-of-risk-perception-their-significance-for-self.html Three models of risk perception their significance for self-government Dan Kahan Posted on Sunday, February 23, 2014 at 7:52AM From Geoengineering and Climate Change Polarization: Testing a Two-channel Model of Science Communication, Ann. Am. Acad. Pol. Soc. Sci. (in press). Theoretical background Three models of risk perception The scholarly literature
[geo] Re: Geoengineering and Climate Change Polarization: Testing a Two-channel Model of Science Communication, Ann. Am. Acad. Pol. Soc. Sci.
FYI, the lead author of that paper, Dan Kahan, posted two additional blog posts on culture, values, and geoengineering: http://www.culturalcognition.net/blog/2014/2/24/geoengineering-the-cultural-plasticity-of-climate-change-ris.html http://www.culturalcognition.net/blog/2014/2/26/geoengineering-the-science-communication-environment-the-cul.html On Thursday, February 27, 2014 2:04:00 AM UTC-6, andrewjlockley wrote: Poster's note : This is just brilliant. At last an explanation of why believing nonsense is rational. Useful to reflect on how this paper replies to the origin and persistence of other belief systems, as well as climate change. Leaves me wondering what nonsense I believe. http://www.culturalcognition.net/blog/2014/2/23/three-models-of-risk-perception-their-significance-for-self.html Three models of risk perception their significance for self-government Dan Kahan Posted on Sunday, February 23, 2014 at 7:52AM From Geoengineering and Climate Change Polarization: Testing a Two-channel Model of Science Communication, Ann. Am. Acad. Pol. Soc. Sci. (in press). Theoretical background Three models of risk perception The scholarly literature on risk perception and communication is dominated by two models. The first is the rational-weigher model, which posits that members of the public, in aggregate and over time, can be expected to process information about risk in a manner that promotes their expected utility (Starr 1969). The second is the irrational-weigher model, which asserts that ordinary members of the pubic lack the ability to reliably advance their expected utility because their assessment of risk information is constrained by cognitive biases and other manifestations of bounded rationality (Kahneman 2003; Sunstein 2005; Marx et al. 2007; Weber 2006).Neither of these models cogently explains public conflict over climate change—or a host of other putative societal risks, such as nuclear power, the vaccination of teenage girls for HPV, and the removal of restrictions on carrying concealed handguns in public. Such disputes conspicuously feature partisan divisions over facts that admit of scientific investigation. Nothing in the rational-weigher model predicts that people with different values or opposing political commitments will draw radically different inferences from common information. Likewise, nothing in the irrational-weigher model suggests that people who subscribe to one set of values are any more or less bounded in their rationality than those who subscribe to any other, or that cognitive biases will produce systematic divisions of opinion of among such groups. One explanation for such conflict is the cultural cognition thesis (CCT). CCT says that cultural values are cognitively prior to facts in public risk conflicts: as a result of a complex of interrelated psychological mechanisms, groups of individuals will credit and dismiss evidence of risk in patterns that reflect and reinforce their distinctive understandings of how society should be organized (Kahan, Braman, Cohen, Gastil Slovic 2010; Jenkins-Smith Herron 2009). Thus, persons with individualistic values can be expected to be relatively dismissive of environmental and technological risks, which if widely accepted would justify restricting commerce and industry, activities that people with such values hold in high regard. The same goes for individuals withhierarchical values, who see assertions of environmental risk as indictments of social elites. Individuals with egalitarian and communitarian values, in contrast, see commerce and industry as sources of unjust disparity and symbols of noxious self-seeking, and thus readily credit assertions that these activities are hazardous and therefore worthy of regulation (Douglass Wildavsky 1982). Observational and experimental studies have linked these and comparable sets of outlooks to myriad risk controversies, including the one over climate change (Kahan 2012).Individuals, on the CCT account, behave not as expected-utility weighers—rational or irrational—but rather as cultural evaluators of risk information (Kahan, Slovic, Braman Gastil 2006). The beliefs any individual forms on societal risks like climate change—whether right or wrong—do not meaningfully affect his or her personal exposure to those risks. However, precisely because positions on those issues are commonly understood to cohere with allegiance to one or another cultural style, taking a position at odds with the dominant view in his or her cultural group is likely to compromise that individual’s relationship with others on whom that individual depends for emotional and material support. As individuals, citizens are thus likely to do better in their daily lives when they adopt toward putative hazards the stances that express their commitment to values that they share with others,
RE: [geo] Re: Geoengineering and Climate Change Polarization: Testing a Two-channel Model of Science Communication, Ann. Am. Acad. Pol. Soc. Sci.
This observation may bear repeating: To be effective, science communication must successfully negotiate both channels. That is, in addition to furnishing individuals with valid and pertinent information about how the world works, it must avail itself of the cues necessary to assure individuals that assenting to that information will not estrange them from their communities. Isn't this what good advertising does, and couldn't our community benefit from some cogent advice from Madison Ave, if we could afford it? Science and scientific reasoning alone apparently isn't enough, especially when there are (well funded) individuals who would cast such reasoning as a threat to their communities. Greg From: geoengineering@googlegroups.com [geoengineering@googlegroups.com] on behalf of David Morrow [dmorr...@gmail.com] Sent: Monday, March 03, 2014 6:27 PM To: geoengineering@googlegroups.com Subject: [geo] Re: Geoengineering and Climate Change Polarization: Testing a Two-channel Model of Science Communication, Ann. Am. Acad. Pol. Soc. Sci. FYI, the lead author of that paper, Dan Kahan, posted two additional blog posts on culture, values, and geoengineering: http://www.culturalcognition.net/blog/2014/2/24/geoengineering-the-cultural-plasticity-of-climate-change-ris.html http://www.culturalcognition.net/blog/2014/2/26/geoengineering-the-science-communication-environment-the-cul.html On Thursday, February 27, 2014 2:04:00 AM UTC-6, andrewjlockley wrote: Poster's note : This is just brilliant. At last an explanation of why believing nonsense is rational. Useful to reflect on how this paper replies to the origin and persistence of other belief systems, as well as climate change. Leaves me wondering what nonsense I believe. http://www.culturalcognition.net/blog/2014/2/23/three-models-of-risk-perception-their-significance-for-self.html Three models of risk perception their significance for self-government Dan Kahan Posted on Sunday, February 23, 2014 at 7:52AM From Geoengineering and Climate Change Polarization: Testing a Two-channel Model of Science Communication, Ann. Am. Acad. Pol. Soc. Sci. (in press). Theoretical background Three models of risk perception The scholarly literature on risk perception and communication is dominated by two models. The first is the rational-weigher model, which posits that members of the public, in aggregate and over time, can be expected to process information about risk in a manner that promotes their expected utility (Starr 1969). The second is the irrational-weigher model, which asserts that ordinary members of the pubic lack the ability to reliably advance their expected utility because their assessment of risk information is constrained by cognitive biases and other manifestations of bounded rationality (Kahneman 2003; Sunstein 2005; Marx et al. 2007; Weber 2006).Neither of these models cogently explains public conflict over climate change--or a host of other putative societal risks, such as nuclear power, the vaccination of teenage girls for HPV, and the removal of restrictions on carrying concealed handguns in public. Such disputes conspicuously feature partisan divisions over facts that admit of scientific investigation. Nothing in the rational-weigher model predicts that people with different values or opposing political commitments will draw radically different inferences from common information. Likewise, nothing in the irrational-weigher model suggests that people who subscribe to one set of values are any more or less bounded in their rationality than those who subscribe to any other, or that cognitive biases will produce systematic divisions of opinion of among such groups. One explanation for such conflict is the cultural cognition thesis (CCT). CCT says that cultural values are cognitively prior to facts in public risk conflicts: as a result of a complex of interrelated psychological mechanisms, groups of individuals will credit and dismiss evidence of risk in patterns that reflect and reinforce their distinctive understandings of how society should be organized (Kahan, Braman, Cohen, Gastil Slovic 2010; Jenkins-Smith Herron 2009). Thus, persons with individualistic values can be expected to be relatively dismissive of environmental and technological risks, which if widely accepted would justify restricting commerce and industry, activities that people with such values hold in high regard. The same goes for individuals withhierarchical values, who see assertions of environmental risk as indictments of social elites. Individuals with egalitarian and communitarian values, in contrast, see commerce and industry as sources of unjust disparity and symbols of noxious self-seeking, and thus readily credit assertions that these activities are hazardous and therefore worthy of regulation (Douglass Wildavsky 1982). Observational and experimental studies have linked these and