Having devoted security personnel is a low priority at most companies.
General engineers will be tasked with figuring out how to incorporate
"security" and cryptography into products. I have visited many a company
where I am talking to a room full of very sharp engineers, but there is
a fundamenta
On Thu, 15 Aug 2002, Lucky Green wrote:
> Hopefully some of those people will not limit themselves to hypothetical
> attacks against The Spec, but will actually test those supposed attacks
> on shipping TPMs. Which are readily available in high-end IBM laptops.
But doesn't the owner of the box c
Stand-Alone and Laptop Computer Evidence
d. Check for outside connectivity (e.g., telephone modem, cable,
ISDN, DSL). If a telephone connection is present, attempt to
identify the telephone number.
http://www.ncjrs.org/pdffiles1/nij/187736.pdf
--
"Better bombing through chemistry."
-John Pike
Hey, this is off-topic for DRM-punks! ;)
more seriously: I think the fundamental issue is that crypto doesn't
really solve many business problems, and it may solve fewer security
problems. See Bellovin's work on how many vulnerabilities would be
blocked by strong crypto. The buying public can't
Adam Back <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes:
> Are there any more definitive security industry stats? Are applied
> crypto people suffering higher rates of unemployment than general
> application programmers? (From my statistically too small sample of
> acquaintances it might appear so.)
Hard to say.
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On Thursday 15 August 2002 19:53, Trei, Peter wrote:
> Take off your economic hat, and try on a law-enforcement one.
>
> With DMCA, etal, the tools to get around TCPA's taking of your
> right to use your property as you please have been criminalized.
http://www.anti-state.com/vroman/vroman9.html
The Jim Bell System Revisited
by Robert Vroman
Ed. note: This article reflects the views of the author ONLY, not the
editors. We have no official opinion whatsoever on the Jim Bell System, aka
Assassination Politics.
Please see Robert Vroman's ori
On Fri, 16 Aug 2002, Adam Back wrote:
> failure to realise this issue or perhaps just not caring, or lack of
> financial incentives to care on the part of software developers.
> Microsoft is really good at this one. The number of times they
> re-used RC4 keys in different protocols is amazing!
Hi,
I am currently in the SF Bay Area and wondering whether any cypherpunks
are around and might want to say hi. Right now I'm in Berkeley, but I'm
willing to travel (public transportation) to see people.
thanks,
-David Molnar
>>Pay attention to the antitrust angle. I guarantee you that Microsoft >
believes Pd is a way to extend its market share, not to increase competition<<
Bruce.
This was the first thing our resident state hater Mong picked up on.Its
would be under ACCC investigation down here in 5 nanoseconds...
I arrived at that decision over four years ago ... TCPA possibly didn't
decide on it until two years ago. In the assurance session in the TCPA
track at spring 2001 intel developer's conference I claimed my chip was
much more KISS, more secure, and could reasonably meet the TCPA
requirements at the
AARG! Wrote:
>
> It seems that there is (a rather brilliant) way to bypass
> TCPA (as spec-ed.) I learned about it from two separate
> sources, looks like two independent slightly different hacks
> based on the same protocol flaw.
>
> Undoubtedly, more people will figure this out.
Hopefully
OK, this edition is probably "cleaner" than the 1st edition.
My fellow Cypherpunks,
Tim May writes:
>Faster even than the usual algorithm?
>The factors of a prime number are 1 and the number itself.
Always the gracious one, Tim May takes time out of his busy schedule to
assist me. Well, n
OK, the following addition is a little "cleaner" than the 1st edition.
My fellow Cypherpunks,
Lucky Green says:
>AFICT, the proposed algorithm is for a test for primality and does not
>represent an algorithm to factor composites.
Well, pardon me! I was in a hurry and should have proof read
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