Re: Doppelganger/tripleganger intermediate certificates

2017-10-03 Thread Adriano Santoni via dev-security-policy
Kathleen, you do not see such subordinate in CCADB because it's a technically constrained subordinate, and there is no requirement (to date) to disclose technically constrained subordinates. At any rate, I confirmed our issuance of such subordinate in my response to Gerv on 15/5/2017 when he

Re: DigiCert-Symantec Announcement

2017-10-03 Thread Ryan Sleevi via dev-security-policy
Jeremy, I think the grouping may mix a bit of the solutions in with the problem definitions, so I tried to reword a little. Does this capture the mix of what’s been discussed? 1) Clients that support a ‘common’ root store of various CAs, including DigiCert, and do not use pinning. 2) Browser cli

Re: PROCERT issues

2017-10-03 Thread Ryan Sleevi via dev-security-policy
Hi Kathleen, With respect to providing a list - is there any requirement to ensure Mozilla accepts that as a reasonable remediation? For example, would "We plan to not do the same in the future" be an acceptable remediation plan? As currently worded, it would seem to meet the letter of this requi

Re: PROCERT issues

2017-10-03 Thread Kathleen Wilson via dev-security-policy
Here's a draft of the Bugzilla Bug that I plan to file to list the action items for PROCERT to complete before they may re-apply for inclusion in Mozilla's Root Store. I will appreciate feedback on this. == DRAFT == Subject: PROCERT: Action Items As per Bug #1403549 the PSCProcert certificate w

Re: Doppelganger/tripleganger intermediate certificates

2017-10-03 Thread Kathleen Wilson via dev-security-policy
On Friday, September 29, 2017 at 1:29:26 PM UTC-7, Rob Stradling wrote: > Several CAs have issued intermediate CA certificates with duplicate > serial numbers. This is a clear violation of the serial number > uniqueness requirement of the BRs and RFC5280 4.1.2.2. Below is a list > of all those

Issuing and using SHA-1 OCSP signing certificates

2017-10-03 Thread Doug Beattie via dev-security-policy
Hello Gerv, The BRs are clear on the use of SHA-1, but I have a question about the Mozilla policy and how it relates to the use of SHA-1 OCSP signing certificates. In December 2016 the Mozilla policy 2.3 was published and it didn't address the use of SHA-1 on OCSP signing certificates (see any

Re: Public trust of VISA's CA

2017-10-03 Thread Tim Smith via dev-security-policy
On Tuesday, September 19, 2017 at 8:13:26 AM UTC-7, Gervase Markham wrote: > In the light of this, I believe it is reasonable to discuss the question > of whether Visa's PKI (and, specifically, the VISA eCommerce Root, > https://crt.sh/?id=896972 , which is the one includes in our store) > meets th