Re: [agi] Identity abstraction
I would agree that the ABC example is an analogy. Generally speaking I am quickly successful in explaining how you can model the brain in electronic to people with backgrounds in analog electronics. The historical efforts in this direction of associationism and opponent process go all the way back to Aristole. Interesting observations reveal the opponent process nature of color. Example stare at the picture of the American flag http://www.brainviews.com/abFiles/IntOpponent.htm in a dimly lighted room for 45 seconds then look at at any gray area in the room and you will see the colors switch. The opponent process for color are blue-yellow, red-green, and black-white. People who played with an opponent-process model of leaning reads like a list of who's who in psychology including Pavlov. They all dropped the model because it was not simple. Einstein said make your theories as simple as necessary to explain the data. Simple doe not mean so the average American can understand it. Illusion are clues on what the brain is doing. What the brain is doing can be model in an AGI machine, Even computers can be programed to experience illusions or violations of the programmed expectatons. Example: Marshall, J.A. Alley, R.K. (1993, October). A Self-Organizing Neural Network that Learns to Detect and Represent Visual Depth from Occlusion Events. [In Bowyer K.W. Hall L. (Eds.)] Proceedings of the AAAI Fall Symposium on Machine Learning and Computer Vision, Research Triangle, N.C. p70-74. Your stated goal is the development of an AGI machine. I am telling you in my opinion that it can not be done in a programming environment but it can be done using opponent process circuits. We can not stop a child open his head and list his programs for our review and simple understanding. Sadly this is also true for analogy phase state opponent processing machines. Children are not controlable and neither are analogy phase state opponent processing machines. The current goal is developing a programming control system to interface with an analogy phase state opponent processing machine. After spending $200,000 we have been stuck at this problem level for 18 years. We had the AGI but no interface to traditional computations. At this time the current progress is promising that the two procedures can be made to cooperate with each other. You now have enough information to start your thinking. Ron http://u2ai.us --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?member_id=8660244id_secret=126863270-d7b0b0 Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
Re: [agi] Identity abstraction
Ronald C. Blue wrote: I would agree that we are mutually close in ideas. Also current programming efforts at AI will not be wasted because those action packs can be used as seed for any AGI machine that has self control and awareness. Actually there are many paths to new AGI machines, we even went around our own original patent application but maintained the fundamental of the theoretical model of AGI based on the Correlational Holographic Opponent Processing model of the human mind. So far it seems as our approach is the best direction relative to others published research and models. Future direction and success is unknowable. You are correct that the heart of the AGI device is modeling the opponent-process which is creative into a physical circuit duplicating these paradoxical analogies. In so doing we have discover some rather odd unexpected behavior. Considering the 13 or B problem which is really based on our experiences of 13 or B. A primitive African cattle herdsman might see the milk producing breast of the cows. The point of view is that the observer collapses the meaning from stimuli and the stimuli do not cause the meaning. Only an AGI that is self aware can do this. The odd thing about the circuit is that you get different results when you measure either side of the opponent process circuit. Also the measurement destroys the information. If you don't measure it, it works. Why B over 13 Memory or priming and habituation are keys for creative shifts in perception. Goodness of fit of a stimulus after rotational and interference analysis results in a temporary conclusion. That conclusion can be habituated which cause another probability to express itself. Using your bicycle or bull pictures as an example http://cn.cl2000.com/history/beida/ysts/image18/jpg/02.jpg MINUS http://www.chu.cam.ac.uk/images/departments/classics_bulls_head_rhyton.jpg EQUALS So you can see that there is a goodness of fit between the two stimuli. Also notice that new knowledge is a product of allowing fact or identities to interact with each other. My program skills were inadequate compared to the ability of the human brain for creating the analysis but you got the idea. A average woman is a beautiful woman. The average woman is the average of all women we have ever met. A average theory of all the facts is a beautiful theory of the facts that we know. Variability comes from the realization that each person has a rich history of experiences. Those stored average memories of identities is what we use to judge our current experiences and occasion jump out of of comfort zone. Once the jump has occurred there is no going back. We have two brains (actually 4). One brain see tiny details and one brain sees the whole or big emotional pictures. When we combine that information we making a great leap forward. A good AGI machine has to do the same. Ron Please do not include images in your posts. The usual etiquette is to put them on a web server somewhere and give pointers in your message sent to the list. Thankyou Richard Loosemore --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?member_id=8660244id_secret=126863270-d7b0b0 Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
Re: [agi] Identity abstraction
Thanks for the more specific answer. It was the most illuminating of the ones I've gotten. I realize that this isn't really the right list for questions about human subjects experiments; just thought I'd give it a try. Richard Loosemore wrote: Harry Chesley wrote: On 1/9/2009 9:45 AM, Richard Loosemore wrote: There are certainly experiments that might address some of your concerns, but I am afraid you will have to acquire a general knowledge of what is known, first, to be able to make sense of what they might tell you. There is nothing that can be plucked and delivered as a direct answer. I was not asking for a complete answer. I was asking for experiments that shed light on the area. I don't expect a mature answer, only more food for thought. Your answer that there are such experiments, but you're not going to tell me what they are is not a useful one. Don't worry about whether I can digest the experimental context. Maybe I know more than you assume I do. What I am trying to say is that you will find answers that are partially relevant to your question scattered across about a third of the chapters of any comprehensive introduction to cognitive psychology. And then, at a deeper level, you will find something of relevance in numerous more specialized documents. But they are so scattered that I could not possibly start to produce a comprehensive list! For example, the easiest things to mention are object perception within a developmental psychology framework (see a dev psych textbook for entire chapters on that); the psycholgy of concepts will involve numerous experiments that require judgements of whether objects are same or different (but in each case the experiment will not be focussed on answering the direct question you might be asking); the question of how concepts are represented sometimes involves the dialectic between the prototype and exemplar camps (see book by Smith and Medin), which partially touches on the question; there are discussions in the connectionist literature about the problem of type-token discrimination (see Norman's chapter at the end of the second PDP volume - McClelland and Rumelhart 1986/7); then there is neurospychology of naming... see books on psychololinguistics like the one written by Trevor Harley for a comprehensive introduction to that area); there are also vast numbers of studies to do with recognition of abstract concepts using neural nets (you could pick up three or four papers that I wrote in the 1990s which center on the problem of extracting the spelled for of words using phoneme clusters if you look at the publications section of my website, susaro.com, but there are thousands of others). Then, you could also wait for my own textbook (in preparation) which treats the formation of concepts and the mechanisms of abstraction from the Molecular perspective. These are just examples picked at random. none of them answer your question, they just give you pieces of the puzzle, for you to assemble into a half-working answer after a couple of years of study ;-). Anyone who knew the field would say, in response to your inquiry, But what exactly do you mean by the question?, and they would say this because your question touches upon about six or seven major areas of inquiry, in the most general possible terms. Richard Loosemore --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?; Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?member_id=8660244id_secret=126863270-d7b0b0 Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
Re: [agi] Identity abstraction
Harry Chesley wrote: Thanks for the more specific answer. It was the most illuminating of the ones I've gotten. I realize that this isn't really the right list for questions about human subjects experiments; just thought I'd give it a try. In general no. But that is my specialty. Richard Loosemore Richard Loosemore wrote: Harry Chesley wrote: On 1/9/2009 9:45 AM, Richard Loosemore wrote: There are certainly experiments that might address some of your concerns, but I am afraid you will have to acquire a general knowledge of what is known, first, to be able to make sense of what they might tell you. There is nothing that can be plucked and delivered as a direct answer. I was not asking for a complete answer. I was asking for experiments that shed light on the area. I don't expect a mature answer, only more food for thought. Your answer that there are such experiments, but you're not going to tell me what they are is not a useful one. Don't worry about whether I can digest the experimental context. Maybe I know more than you assume I do. What I am trying to say is that you will find answers that are partially relevant to your question scattered across about a third of the chapters of any comprehensive introduction to cognitive psychology. And then, at a deeper level, you will find something of relevance in numerous more specialized documents. But they are so scattered that I could not possibly start to produce a comprehensive list! For example, the easiest things to mention are object perception within a developmental psychology framework (see a dev psych textbook for entire chapters on that); the psycholgy of concepts will involve numerous experiments that require judgements of whether objects are same or different (but in each case the experiment will not be focussed on answering the direct question you might be asking); the question of how concepts are represented sometimes involves the dialectic between the prototype and exemplar camps (see book by Smith and Medin), which partially touches on the question; there are discussions in the connectionist literature about the problem of type-token discrimination (see Norman's chapter at the end of the second PDP volume - McClelland and Rumelhart 1986/7); then there is neurospychology of naming... see books on psychololinguistics like the one written by Trevor Harley for a comprehensive introduction to that area); there are also vast numbers of studies to do with recognition of abstract concepts using neural nets (you could pick up three or four papers that I wrote in the 1990s which center on the problem of extracting the spelled for of words using phoneme clusters if you look at the publications section of my website, susaro.com, but there are thousands of others). Then, you could also wait for my own textbook (in preparation) which treats the formation of concepts and the mechanisms of abstraction from the Molecular perspective. These are just examples picked at random. none of them answer your question, they just give you pieces of the puzzle, for you to assemble into a half-working answer after a couple of years of study ;-). Anyone who knew the field would say, in response to your inquiry, But what exactly do you mean by the question?, and they would say this because your question touches upon about six or seven major areas of inquiry, in the most general possible terms. Richard Loosemore --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?; Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?; Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?member_id=8660244id_secret=126863270-d7b0b0 Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
Re: [agi] Identity abstraction
You need to name those parameters in a sentence only because it's linear, in a graph they can correspond to unnamed nodes. Abstractions can have structure, and their applicability can depend on how their structure matches the current scene. If you retain in a scene graph only relations you mention, that'd be your abstraction. -- Vladimir Nesov robot...@gmail.com http://causalityrelay.wordpress.com/ --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?member_id=8660244id_secret=123753653-47f84b Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
Re: [agi] Identity abstraction
Harry Chesley wrote: I'm trying to get an idea of how our minds handle the tension between identity and abstraction, and it occurs to me that there have probably been human subject experiments that would shed light on this. Does anyone know of any? The basic issue: On the one hand, we identify two objects as being the same one (having the same identity), even when encountered at different times or from different perspectives. At least a part of how we do this is very likely a matter of noticing that the two objects have common features which are unlikely to occur together at random. On the other hand, over time we make abstractions of situations that we encounter repeatedly, most likely by removing details that are not in common between the instances. Yet it's these very details that let us derive identity. So how do we remember abstractions that are dependent on identity? It seems that there must be experiments or evidence from brain-damaged individuals that would give clues. Example: I may notice over time that whenever object A is smaller than object B and object B is smaller than object C, then object A is smaller than object C. Note that I have to give them names in order to even state the problem. Internally, we might do likewise and assign names, in which case there might be a part of the brain that performs the naming and could be damaged. Or we might go back to the original cases (case-based reasoning). Or we might store references to the original object instances from which we abstracted the general rule, which would provide unique identity. The later two may be distinguishable experimentally by choosing clever instances to abstract from. Anyone know of any research that sheds light on this area? It is impossible to answer your question the way it is posed, because it needs to become more specific before it can be answered, and on the way to becoming more specific, you will find yourself drawn into an enormous maze of theoretical assumptions and empirical data. There are indeed parts of the brain that are involved in naming, but what we know could fill an entire book (or several) and it is organized according to our observations of what kinds of behaviors occur when some thing goes wrong, or when a particular experimental manipulation is performed. Those behaviors do not, by themselves, answer your astract questions about the underlying structures and mechanisms ... those structures and mechanisms are the subject of debate. Essentially, you are asking for cognitive science to be more mature than it is at the moment. There are certainly experiments that might address some of your concerns, but I am afraid you will have to acquire a general knowledge of what is known, first, to be able to make sense of what they might tell you. There is nothing that can be plucked and delivered as a direct answer. Richard Loosemore --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?member_id=8660244id_secret=123753653-47f84b Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
Re: [agi] Identity abstraction
On 1/9/2009 9:28 AM, Vladimir Nesov wrote: You need to name those parameters in a sentence only because it's linear, in a graph they can correspond to unnamed nodes. Abstractions can have structure, and their applicability can depend on how their structure matches the current scene. If you retain in a scene graph only relations you mention, that'd be your abstraction. I'm not sure if you mean a graph in the sense of nodes and edges, or in a visual sense. If the former, any implementation requires that the edges identify or link somehow to the appropriate nodes -- so how is this done in humans and what experiments reveal it? If the later, the location in space of the node in the abstract graph is effectively it's identity -- are you suggesting that human abstraction is always visual, and if so what experimental evidence is there? I don't mean to include or exclude your theory of abstraction, but the question is whether you know of experiments that shed light on this area. --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?member_id=8660244id_secret=123753653-47f84b Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
Re: [agi] Identity abstraction
On 1/9/2009 9:45 AM, Richard Loosemore wrote: There are certainly experiments that might address some of your concerns, but I am afraid you will have to acquire a general knowledge of what is known, first, to be able to make sense of what they might tell you. There is nothing that can be plucked and delivered as a direct answer. I was not asking for a complete answer. I was asking for experiments that shed light on the area. I don't expect a mature answer, only more food for thought. Your answer that there are such experiments, but you're not going to tell me what they are is not a useful one. Don't worry about whether I can digest the experimental context. Maybe I know more than you assume I do. --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?member_id=8660244id_secret=123753653-47f84b Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
Re: [agi] Identity abstraction
Harry Chesley wrote: On 1/9/2009 9:45 AM, Richard Loosemore wrote: There are certainly experiments that might address some of your concerns, but I am afraid you will have to acquire a general knowledge of what is known, first, to be able to make sense of what they might tell you. There is nothing that can be plucked and delivered as a direct answer. I was not asking for a complete answer. I was asking for experiments that shed light on the area. I don't expect a mature answer, only more food for thought. Your answer that there are such experiments, but you're not going to tell me what they are is not a useful one. Don't worry about whether I can digest the experimental context. Maybe I know more than you assume I do. What I am trying to say is that you will find answers that are partially relevant to your question scattered across about a third of the chapters of any comprehensive introduction to cognitive psychology. And then, at a deeper level, you will find something of relevance in numerous more specialized documents. But they are so scattered that I could not possibly start to produce a comprehensive list! For example, the easiest things to mention are object perception within a developmental psychology framework (see a dev psych textbook for entire chapters on that); the psycholgy of concepts will involve numerous experiments that require judgements of whether objects are same or different (but in each case the experiment will not be focussed on answering the direct question you might be asking); the question of how concepts are represented sometimes involves the dialectic between the prototype and exemplar camps (see book by Smith and Medin), which partially touches on the question; there are discussions in the connectionist literature about the problem of type-token discrimination (see Norman's chapter at the end of the second PDP volume - McClelland and Rumelhart 1986/7); then there is neurospychology of naming... see books on psychololinguistics like the one written by Trevor Harley for a comprehensive introduction to that area); there are also vast numbers of studies to do with recognition of abstract concepts using neural nets (you could pick up three or four papers that I wrote in the 1990s which center on the problem of extracting the spelled for of words using phoneme clusters if you look at the publications section of my website, susaro.com, but there are thousands of others). Then, you could also wait for my own textbook (in preparation) which treats the formation of concepts and the mechanisms of abstraction from the Molecular perspective. These are just examples picked at random. none of them answer your question, they just give you pieces of the puzzle, for you to assemble into a half-working answer after a couple of years of study ;-). Anyone who knew the field would say, in response to your inquiry, But what exactly do you mean by the question?, and they would say this because your question touches upon about six or seven major areas of inquiry, in the most general possible terms. Richard Loosemore --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?member_id=8660244id_secret=123753653-47f84b Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
Re: [agi] Identity abstraction
On Fri, Jan 9, 2009 at 8:48 PM, Harry Chesley ches...@acm.org wrote: On 1/9/2009 9:28 AM, Vladimir Nesov wrote: You need to name those parameters in a sentence only because it's linear, in a graph they can correspond to unnamed nodes. Abstractions can have structure, and their applicability can depend on how their structure matches the current scene. If you retain in a scene graph only relations you mention, that'd be your abstraction. I'm not sure if you mean a graph in the sense of nodes and edges, or in a visual sense. If the former, any implementation requires that the edges identify or link somehow to the appropriate nodes -- so how is this done in humans and what experiments reveal it? If the later, the location in space of the node in the abstract graph is effectively it's identity -- are you suggesting that human abstraction is always visual, and if so what experimental evidence is there? I don't mean to include or exclude your theory of abstraction, but the question is whether you know of experiments that shed light on this area. Graph as with nodes. It's more a reply to your remark that you have to introduce names in order to communicate the abstraction than to the rest. AFAIK, neuroscience is far from answering or even formulating properly questions like this, but you can analyze theoretical models of cognitive algorithms that answer your questions. -- Vladimir Nesov robot...@gmail.com http://causalityrelay.wordpress.com/ --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?member_id=8660244id_secret=123753653-47f84b Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
RE: [agi] Identity abstraction
Harry, Obviously this is an issue any intelligent AGI has to deal with. However, at high level I don't think it is that mysterious, although, like most things in AGI, in detail it would have quite a few wrinkles, most of which a properly designed AGI should learn to deal with automatically. At a high level, the concept of an individual physical object that has a continued path through space time, is one the system learns from grounded experience --- and the system learns to label certain sets of perceptions as corresponding to such an individual object, based on experiential knowledge about what perceptions are likely to correspond to an instance of such a type of object. This is a refinement of the concept of the persistence of objects which babies learn by, I think it is, six months --- made more sophisticated by understandings of the probabilities, under differing circumstances, that what appears to the same physical object, might actually be a different one. When I did most of my thinking on this I thought about diet coke cans, since they are often a common object in my environment, and since individual instances of this type share so many similar traits. Yet still there are might be attributes, which one might associate with one particular set of diet coke can perceptions which can convince your mind to different degrees that they correspond to the same physical object, rather than to two or more very similar objects. Such information can include something obvious, like a particular dent, or something less direct, such as a memory of placing a can in the location diet coke can perceptions are currently coming from, in an environment where there are believed to be no other things that could have replaced it with a similar can in the same location. The more exactly it matches your recollection of the position and orientation with which you remember last placing it, and/or the more exactly it matches having the same amount of coke in it, the more likely you are to believe it is the same physical object, even if you are at a crowded party where there are multiple agents capable of having replaced it since you last saw it. An object like a single large tree in the front yard of a house is much more likely to have multiple perceptions of it at different times be labeled as being associated with the same physical object, since the chances that such a tree would be replaced by a roughly similar try in most human time spans is very low, even if the memories of the trees properties are rather vague. Interesting experiments have been done showing the extend to which generally, but not necessarily, reliable assumptions, often play a larger role than accurate perception, in our guesses about continuity of identity. I attended a lecture, where they showed video clips of multiple repetitions of the following amazing experiment. A person in a construction outfit, including hard hat, near a construction site, asks a passerby for directions. While the passerby is pointing in the direction of the asked for path of travel, two other pretend construction workers, similarly dressed, walk between them carrying a 8x4 piece of plywood or wallboard. When this happens, the pretend construction worker who asked the question, grabs the end of the plywood, and is replaced by one of the similarly clad construction workers previously carrying the plywood. This new pretend construction worker stands in the same location with the same stance and expression as the original questioner. In the vast majority of cases, when the passerby looks back to where the questioner was, her or she, fails to notice he was talking to a different person, even though they are separated by only two to three feet. And the passerby continues the brief interchange without any look of surprise or other evidence of noticing the switcheroo. This is true even when the new construction worker was obviously, to any one who looked with any care, of a different sex. So probabilistic reasoning is often involved when thinking about identity is done. Ed Porter -Original Message- From: Harry Chesley [mailto:ches...@acm.org] Sent: Friday, January 09, 2009 12:10 PM To: agi@v2.listbox.com Subject: [agi] Identity abstraction I'm trying to get an idea of how our minds handle the tension between identity and abstraction, and it occurs to me that there have probably been human subject experiments that would shed light on this. Does anyone know of any? The basic issue: On the one hand, we identify two objects as being the same one (having the same identity), even when encountered at different times or from different perspectives. At least a part of how we do this is very likely a matter of noticing that the two objects have common features which are unlikely to occur together at random. On the other hand, over time we make abstractions of situations that we encounter repeatedly
Re: [agi] Identity abstraction
object perception Identity is the abstraction that you are focusing your attention on. Habituation is stimulus specific and does not reduce the responsiveness for stimuli you are currently ignoring. As such after habituation or eye movement new abstract interpretations to NAME an identity from previous learning is possible. Consider the problem of figure/background. The figure is the identity and the background provides a relativistic anchor to judge the figure. After habituation it is possible to see the background as the figure or identity and the old figure becomes a relativity background anchor. Example: opponent process illusions... Meteor Crater Arizona flip upside down to become the Knob Arizona The vase with a picture of King William and Queen Mary in it. This vase plus pointillism art movement leads to TV. The opponent image illustrate how the mind is handling data. It forms gaussian reciprocal identities which we call habituation which it uses for as wavelet filters for new incoming stimuli. Technically speaking the brain is a holographic stimuli storing immune system. To illustrate what can duplicated in a zero informational computational system lets add the two vases together but in reverse with a 1 % error. Notice that information almost cancelled out completely and created a base zero or gray reference system. Information that does not cancel out is called novel and attracts our attention. Ron Blue Assistant Professor of Psychology Lehigh Carbon Community College rb...@lccc.edu --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?member_id=8660244id_secret=123753653-47f84b Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com attachment: meteor_crater_and_mountain.jpg attachment: PICTURE1.JPG attachment: PICTURE1z.jpg
